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Deconstructing Contract Doctrine
[A]pparently the realization of deepgoing antinomies in the struc-
ture of our system of contracts is too painful an experience to be
permitted to rise to the full level of our consciousness.
-Friedrich Kessler*
INTRODUCTION
Law, like every other cultural institution, is a place where we tell one
another stories about our relationships with ourselves, one another, and
authority.' In this, law is no different from the Boston Globe, the CBS
evening news, Mother Jones, or a law school faculty meeting. When we
tell one another stories, we use languages and themes that different pieces
of the culture make available to us, and that limit the stories we can tell.
Since our stories influence how we imagine, as well as how we describe,
our relationships, our stories also limit who we can be.
In this Article, by examining the rules of contract law as applied by
judges and elaborated by commentators, I ask whether we can begin to
understand the particular limits law stories impose on the twin projects of
self-definition and self-understanding.2 Can we, in other words, expose
the way law shapes all stories into particular patterns of telling, favors
certain stories and disfavors others, or even makes it impossible to tell
certain kinds of stories?'
The stories told by contract doctrine4 are preoccupied with what must
be central issues in any human endeavor of our time and place. One set of
questions concerns power: What separates me from others and connects
*Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REv. 629, 633 (1943).
1. For a recent compelling account of the lawyer as storyteller, see Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32
UCLA L. REv. 1 (1984).
2. For some incisive observations about the peculiar nature of legal stories, see Llewellyn, What
Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 705, 720-24 (1931).
3. If we lawyers create this world of story, then we may legitimately ask how we could ever
transcend our own limitations to see the limitations of our creation. The answer must be that the
stories we tell only partly constrain us. Lawyers and would-be lawyers can and do learn to set off
their "professional" stories from their "personal" stories; in this sense, at least, some competing view-
points are available to all of us. A fruitful comparison is provided by the work of Carol Gilligan, who
writes of the two different voices that members of our society tend to use to formulate and resolve
moral dilemmas. Both voices are generally available to each individual, but individuals differ dramati-
cally in the extent to which they use each voice, and different types of situation may provoke the use
of one voice rather than the other. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT Voice (1982).
In addition, those who dominate the legal forum only incompletely dictate the range of legitimate
stories. There is therefore some room for those who speak in a different voice, and who can use that
voice to critique the dominant one.
4. I am using the word "doctrine" here in an expansive sense. I mean by it not just the bare-bones
articulation of rules, as in "silence cannot generally constitute assent," or the text of a Restatement
provision, but instead the rules as applied by judges and elaborated by commentators. A judicial
opinion is therefore an instance of "doctrine," as are the commentary and illustrations that accompany
each Restatement provision.
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me to them? What is the threat and the promise to me of other individu-
als? Can I enjoy the promise without succumbing to the threat? Am I able
to create protective barriers that will not at the same time prevent me
from sharing the pleasures of community? What is the role of the state in
regulating my relations with others? The other set of questions concerns
knowledge: How can I know what others see, what they intend? On what
basis can I share my understanding of the world with others? Is there a
reality separate from my grasp of it? Is communication possible? These
central questions of power and knowledge devolve from the split between
self and other, subject and object, which structures our experience of the
world. This Article examines precisely how this split structures our con-
tract doctrine; how doctrine devotes its energies to describing, policing,
and disguising the divide.
A. The Project Described
In this Article, I give an account of selected portions of contract doctrine
and the themes and problems that permeate them. I demonstrate how our
preoccupation with questions of power and knowledge is mirrored in doc-
trinal structures that depend on the dualities of public and private, objec-
tive and subjective, form and substance.5 I suggest that it is these problems
of power and knowledge, these doctrinal structures, which contribute to
the inconsistency and substantial indeterminacy of contract doctrine.
In elaborating doctrinal dichotomies, I suggest that contract doctrine
consistently favors one pole of each duality: Contract law describes itself
as more private than public, interpretation as more about objective than
subjective understanding, consideration as more about form than about
substance. And I suggest further that while the method of hierarchy in
5. 1 have chosen these dualities because they are a familiar part of the discourse of contract doc-
trine. Since the nineteenth century, contract doctrine has conceived of itself as being about intention
and not regulation, and therefore as private and not public. The Second Restatement has expressed its
preference for objective rather than subjective standards of interpretation by subordinating intent to
manifestation. A longstanding debate over the nature of consideration asks whether the requirement is
one of form or of substance.
Precisely because these concepts are familiar and much used, I am relying on my readers sharing at
least a rough sense of what the terms convey, and how they are employed. This frees me from the task
of having to offer initial definitions. Instead, I can ask my readers to explore with me the range of
meaning and use of these key concepts as my analysis develops. Indeed, the provision of tidy defini-
tions would be fundamentally incompatible with my project, which demonstrates that each pole of a
duality is best understood and defined in relation to its opposite, and in fact depends upon an (un-
available) prior understanding of its opposite.
The dualities are also connected to one another by the problems of power and knowledge, in a
fashion which their conceptual differentiation falsifies. Within our current doctrinal framework, the
shift from intent to manifestation, as I will show, is most easily viewed as a shift from private to
public from the perspective of knowledge. The shift from substance to form is most easily viewed as a
similar shift from private to public from the perspective of knowledge, but can be seen as a shift from
public to private from the perspective of power. All this is the subject of my story.
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duality allows our doctrinal rhetoric to avoid the underlying problems of
power and knowledge, it is an avoidance that is also a confession: The
problems are only displaced, not overcome. This displacement is both
diachronic and synchronic: The problems are frequently presented as hav-
ing been then and not now, and equally frequently presented as being
there and not here. To answer the strategy of displacement, my account
necessarily deals with historical moments in the development of doctrine,
as well as with doctrine in its current state. My claim is that the problems
are now as well as then, here as well as there.
I begin the Article with a discussion of the public-private distinction in
contract law, as reflected in the law's treatment of the implied contract.
The implied-in-law contract or quasi-contract is traditionally considered
an exceptional supplement to the body of contract doctrine; its reliance on
social norms to create a public obligation is traditionally viewed as a
deviation from contract doctrine's focus on the facilitation of private in-
tent. But I demonstrate that the same factors that lead judges to impose
quasi-contractual obligations influence both the "finding" of obligations
implied-in-fact and the interpretation of express contracts. In this sense all
contracts are public. The courts' creation of categories of contract of vary-
ing degrees of privateness is therefore only a strategy of displacing and
containing, not resolving, the public threat to the private world of
contract.
I next discuss the public-private distinction in the context of the doc-
trines of duress and unconscionability. Like the doctrine of quasi-contract,
these doctrines serve as self-consciously public supplements to a domi-
nantly private contract doctrine, by policing the limits of acceptable bar-
gain in the name of social norms of fairness. But the route to that end is a
convoluted one. At one level the "public" is consistently "reprivatized,"
with the undoing of a defective deal presented as depending upon the ab-
sence of will or intent rather than on mere inequivalence of exchange. Yet
as the previous look at implied contracts demonstrates, this privatization
itself ineluctably partakes of the public, as objective measures of will or
intent-most notably the equivalence of the exchange-become the neces-
sary proxies for subjective states of mind.
In Part II, I discuss the objective-subjective dichotomy in the context of
those areas of contract doctrine-contract formation, the parol evidence
rule, and mistake-that directly address questions of communciation be-
tween parties, and questions of interpretation. I focus on the way doctrine
favors objective interpretations of contracts over subjective ones by using
devices that deflect attention from the threat objectivity poses to the claim
that contract law is more private than public. These devices disguise the
1001
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law's inability to maintain an objective sphere uncontaminated by
subjectivity.
In Part III, I explore the form-substance dichotomy as it operates in the
doctrines dealing with consideration and with the alternative basis for lia-
bility we have come to call "reliance." The traditional debate is whether
consideration is a doctrine of form or of substance. I suggest that the ques-
tion is misplaced, for we are incapable of distinguishing correct from in-
correct form without an answer to the question "Form of what?" And the
latter question inevitably takes us from a concern with form to a concern
with substance.
In the traditional debate, substance is understood to stand for the idea
of "objective value." To the extent that consideration doctrine does depend
on notions of objective value, it reflects the supplemental public rather
than the dominant private view of contract. What the traditional debate
largely has not recognized is that an alternative substance on which con-
sideration doctrine frequently depends is the substance of the parties' in-
tentions. To the extent that consideration depends on notions of subjective
intent, it reflects the supplemental subjective rather than the dominant
objective view of contract interpretation. The wickedly intricate play of
consideration doctrine therefore contains both the public-private dilemma
earlier located in the doctrines of implied contract, duress, and
unconscionability, and the objective-subjective dilemma earlier located in
the doctrines of contract formation and interpretation.
In these manifold guises, contract doctrine promises that the source of
our deepest anxiety, the chasm between self and other, can be bridged. It
talks as if we were able to define the terms of the polarities we substitute
for the basic one of self and other, as if we knew what was private and
what public, what subjective and what objective, what form and what sub-
stance, or at least as if we could determine how much of one we needed
and how much of the other by referring to standards we could all accept.
Contract doctrine talks as if our problems of power and of knowledge
could be resolved in all but the "hard case," the acknowledged frontier of
the determinacy of the legal system. The privileging mechanism and the
device of displacement together play a large part in providing us this sem-
blance of reassurance, even as the "hard case" reassures us by reminding
us of the "easy cases" from which we would distinguish it.
But, as it turns out, even the terms of our polarities are empty; within
the discourse of doctrine, the only way we can define form, for example, is
by reference to substance, even as substance can be defined only by its
compliance with form. The doctrinal scheme provides us with no way to
fill these empty vessels. It is not possible to draw lines at ordained points
on axes whose poles exist only in relation to one another. Each supposed
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"solution" to one of these doctrinal conundra, each attempt at definition
or line-drawing, winds up mired at the next level of analysis in the un-
resolved dichotomy it purported to leave behind.
In my conclusion, I put the analysis developed in the earlier portions of
the Article to work in examining how courts have dealt with the problems
of enforcing agreements of cohabitation between unmarried people. Here
I suggest that the demonstration of indeterminacy, and the linkage be-
tween indeterminacy and the fundamental problems of knowledge and
power, can clear the way for some new inquiries into how and why cases
get decided as they do. I show how the doctrinal techniques described in
this Article work together in this setting toward the supposed resolution of
a particular set of doctrinal issues. I try to bring to life the underlying
issues of power and knowledge that lie buried in the doctrine, by focusing
on the images of women and of human relationship that the doctrine pre-
supposes, or that appear to influence the judges. I ask that we reflect
directly on the concrete aspects of social life that create the disputes and
shape their resolution in an area where there is startling lack of consen-
sus, rather than covertly translate those aspects into the presence or ab-
sence of consideration, the presence or absence of implied contract.
The piece ends, as it begins, with questions. Why do we allow our
decisionmakers to conduct their search for answers to concrete human
problems in this particular form? This returns us to the problems of
knowledge and power. In the name of what understanding of the human
condition do our judges exert authority over us in our interactions with
others? In the name of what understanding of the human condition do we
allow ourselves to be thus constrained in imagining the possibilities of re-
lationship with others?
B. Method
To demonstrate my thesis that contract doctrine is organized around the
problems of power and knowledge, and that certain areas of doctrine con-
tain particular manifestations of these difficulties, I rely on very close
analyses of comparatively few texts. In part because the thinking that has
gone into this piece began and continues in the classroom, my selected
texts are familiar classroom materials: an assortment of older, well-known
cases and recent, less-well-known ones, some seminal articles, and the re-
cently published Restatement (Second) of Contracts.6 My claim is that the
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND)]. Unless otherwise indicated, references in the text to the Restatement, are to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.
I present what should be understood to be a flattened, synchronic picture of the Second Restate-
ment's current signification. This picture is the reality for most students of contract, who come to the
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patterns of conflict I uncover in the texts I examine, and the mediating
devices I identify, are characteristic.
I support this claim in various ways throughout the Article. First, I
draw on cases from different historical periods to show that the central
problems of any area of doctrine, and the elements through which the
problems are sought to be resolved, remain the same over time, although
particular approaches to the resolution of these problems may come and
go. Similarly, I draw on some very recent cases to demonstrate that these
core problems cannot be consigned to history, but continue to plague the
application of contract doctrine in our own time.
My major source of older cases is Kessler and Gilmore's Contracts:
Cases and Materials." Its disdain for the general rule, its methodical col-
lection of contradictory decisions, and its insistence on contextualization
make it perhaps the most skeptical of the traditional teaching materials. I
find it particularly useful because of the editors' respectful refusal to edit
the heart out of the texts they include, and their preference for opinions in
which judges pay close attention to doctrine and wrestle with its limita-
tions. In addition, the editors' many scholarly notes provide a good foil
against which to test the possibility of a post-Realist reconstruction of the
world of doctrine. 9
I have also chosen to supplement case material with the more general
subject with little or no appreciation for its history, or for the role of the Restatements in that history.
To them the Second Restatement speaks with the authority of a single, not a divided, voice; and its
provisions are taken to announce the best articulated wisdom we can muster on the various topics
within its scope. This is indeed one of the claims the Second Restatement makes, and for students it is
likely to be unmitigated by the sophisticated understanding of differing perspectives which allows
teachers to excuse evidence of internal inconsistency. Perhaps most importantly, the "frozen" picture
of the Second Restatement that I paint allows us all, teachers and students, to face more directly the
question whether any group, unanimous or divided, could have produced the internally consistent
document the Second Restatement turns out not to be.
7. I have found recent cases to be of particular use in the classroom. They give students the
experience of using their own understanding of how their society works today as a basis for critiquing
a judicial product. Otherwise students seem all too ready to assume that their lack of historical infor-
mation prevents them from judging a result which, if it were contemporary, would instinctively appall
them. A contemporary decision denying relief to a woman who lived with a man for twenty years,
raised his children, helped set him up in business, and then was abandoned by him is harder for
students to distance themselves from than, for example, the plight of Sister Antillico, related in Kirk-
sey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
8. F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1970) (1st ed.
1953) [hereinafter cited as KESSLER & GILMORE].
9. Unfortunately the book has one severe limitation: It is now desperately out of date, the most
recent edition having been published in 1970. At one level any such concern is trivial, given how
many contract casebooks give pride of place to nineteenth-century cases, how much of doctrine is
essentially the same now as then. But it does mean that the Uniform Sales Act receives undue promi-
nence, while the Uniform Commercial Code and interpretive cases get short shrift; and the Second
Restatement appears only as a ghost on the horizon, making marginal appearances through extant
Tentative Drafts. I have resolved this problem, for my teaching purposes, by relying heavily on the
Second Restatement as a separate source, and by adding recent cases in a number of places, to demon-
strate current variations on doctrinal manipulation.
1004
Deconstructing Contract Doctrine
account provided by the Restatement. It is often suggested that the Re-
statement sits uneasily between description and prescription, offering both
a general account of the state of doctrine as practiced in the courts, and a
preferred vision of what that doctrine should be. For my purposes, either
view of the enterprise of the Restatement is valuable. Viewed as descrip-
tion, the fact that, as I will show, the Restatement shares the patterns I
have found to operate in the cases, confirms my thesis. Viewed as pre-
scription, it serves as further evidence of our culture's inability to progress
beyond the problems I suggest plague the cases. Some might argue, "Yes,
but everyone knows that the Restatement is an internally conflicted com-
mittee product." To this my reply would be: "Isn't it interesting that those
same internal conflicts exactly characterize the work of any individual
judge." Still others might charge, "Doesn't your reliance on idiosyncratic
judicial products undermine your conclusions?" To this I would answer:
"Isn't it interesting that the flaws in the judicial product are exactly those
present in the Restatement."
Where I have used particular articles to support my arguments, I have
chosen them either because the article itself is recognized as a particularly
valuable addition to the literature, or because the author, at least in his
own time, was held in high regard. I draw on articles because they, too,
confirm that the problems inherent in judicial opinions are not the result
of judicial inability or inattention, but are instead faithful reflections of
the same difficulties that inhere in academic treatments of the same issues.
In addition, the article writer often is forced into more complex and more
thorough efforts at mediation because of the broader scope of his inquiry.
The judge can often write an opinion that appears more coherent because
of what he is able to leave out.
It is always possible to cast doubt on an argument by suggesting that it
has been insufficiently proven, or proven only by judicious selection of
evidence. I would simply have readers ask themselves whether the analy-
ses I suggest are ones that shed new light on the material to which they
apply those analyses. That a reader is intrigued enough to attempt such
further applications, and in trying finds his perceptions altered by the
framework I have offered, would make the project, for me, a successful
one.
C. The Project Located
My approach to contract doctrines owes much to traditions of scholar-
ship outside of law, and shares much with other attempts to bring these
traditions to bear on legal materials and issues. At one level I incorporate
a critique of liberal political theory and legal liberalism that has provided
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a consistently fruitful perspective on structures of legal argumentation."
The liberal conception criticized is that individuals can remain free to ex-
perience positive interactions with one another without interference by the
state, while relying on the state to protect them from negative interactions.
Under this liberal conception, clear guidelines as to what are positive and
what negative interactions, guidelines formulated as legal rules, prevent
the state from overstepping its proper boundaries.1
The critique seeks to demonstrate how the various guidelines proposed
by liberal legalism lack the clarity on which the liberal order presents
itself as depending.' 2 The critique further reveals that this lack of clarity
represents our inability to decide how we should conceive relationships
between people, how we should understand and police the boundary be-
tween self and other.' Liberalism's obsession with, and inability to re-
solve, the tension between self and other suggests that our stories about
politics, policy, and law will be organized along dualities reflecting this
basic tension.' 4
The critique of liberalism connects this central tension within legal
10. For the origins of this critique, see K. MARX, On theJewish Question, in EARLY WRITINGS I
(T. Bottmore trans. 1963). Early legal work in this genre could be said to include the writings of
Commons, Hale, Felix and Morris Cohen, and Kessler. Later exponents are those working under the
loose umbrella of "critical legal studies," with the first significant contribution perhaps being Ken-
nedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
11. For a critical account of this liberal conception in a non-legal context, see C. MACPHERSON,
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 1-4, 263-77 (1962). For an account in the
context of legal consciousness, see Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 18, 23-26 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
THE POLITICS OF LAW].
12. It is crucial to understand that the critique is not espousing consistency or clarity or determi-
nacy as its values; rather it seeks to reveal how the liberal system fails to live up to its expectations of
itself. The flaw is measured against internal, not external, standards. This method of attack is fre-
quently countered by an assertion that any "adult" understanding of the system includes the recogni-
tion that there will be "hard cases," and that clarity and consistency and determinacy are not univer-
sally attainable. The response to this argument must be, as I hope this Article demonstrates, first, that
the problems extend beyond the "hard case," and second, that a system that devotes so much rhetoric
to disguising indeterminacy, rather than frankly acknowledging it, forfeits the claim to adulthood.
13. To take concrete examples from work that has explored this difficulty: To what extent do we
imagine that people should have regard only for their own interests, and to what extent do we imag-
ine that people should have regard for the interests of others? See Kennedy, supra note 10, at
1713-37. To what extent do we think that people should be free to act, even if the consequences are
injurious to others, and to what extent should people instead be protected against the consequences of
others' activity? See Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to
Hohfeld, 1982 Wisc. L. REV. 975, 980-84. Our difficulties with the boundary between self and other
are reiterated in our inability definitively to know what is or is not in our interests, and to define what
counts as injury.
14. In Form and Substance, Kennedy frames his discussion around individualism and altruism,
rule and principle. See Kennedy, supra note 10, at 1685-87. Singer, in The Legal Rights Debate,
centers his analysis on the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding behavior. See
Singer, supra note 13, at 980; Feinman, in Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV.
829, 838-47 (1983), uses individualism and collectivism as his organizing categories.
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thought to the possibility for systematic (although not necessarily con-
scious) oppression by the "haves" of the "have-nots" through the manipu-
lation of inconsistent but equally legitimate strands of legal argument.
This is not a crude determinism, but an explanation of how a legal order
that proclaims itself to be based on democratic principles, individual
rights, due process, and equal protection can still operate to exclude im-
portant constituencies from the benefits available within the society. 15
If this critique of liberal legal argument has weight, as I believe it does,
we need first to understand more concretely how doctrinal inconsistency
necessarily undermines the force of any conventional legal argument, and
how opposing arguments can be made with equal force. We need also to
understand how legal argumentation disguises its own inherent indetermi-
nacy and continues to appear a viable way of talking and persuading. We
need, finally, to understand how legal argumentation is used, knowingly
or unknowingly, to perpetuate a world view that imposes itself upon con-
stituencies that it simultaneously leaves essentially without power or
resources.
In addressing the way legal doctrine is unable to provide determinate
answers to particular disputes while continuing to claim an authority
based on its capacity to do so, I have drawn on another critical tradition,
described loosely as post-structuralism.' In particular, I have benefited
from the "deconstructive" textual strategies developed by Jacques Der-
rida, 7 and from the input of colleagues who are incorporating various of
these techniques into their own work. 8
Derrida affirms the role of conceptual duality in the discourse of philos-
ophers since the eighteenth century, and observes that all discourse tends
to favor one pole of any duality over the other, creating a hierarchical
relationship between the poles. 9 The disfavored pole he calls the danger-
ous supplement, "dangerous" because of its undermining potential, its role
in revealing to us that things are not, after all, what they seem.20
15. See Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 11,
at 281, 284-89.
16. Three helpful introductions are J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM
AFTER STRUCTURALISM (1982); C. NORRIS, DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1982);
STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE: FROM LIEVI-STRAUSS TO DERRIDA (J. Sturrock ed. 1979).
17. For an introduction, see generally Culler, Jacques Derrida, in STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE,
supra note 16, at 154; Spivak, Translator's Preface to J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY, at ix (G.
Spivak trans. 1976).
18. See, e.g., Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276,
1277-96 (1984); David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (1984) (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
19. J. DERRIDA, supra note 17, at 144.
20. Id. An example of the dynamic of the dangerous supplement is contract doctrine's stressing of
objective interpretations of contractual intent over subjective ones, invoking both the difficulty of as-
sessing subjective intent, and the loss of predictability, stability, certainty, and security that reliance on
subjective intent would produce. Yet subjective intent retains a tolerated supplemental position in
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Taking as his starting point that philosophy as a discipline depends on
a capacity for objective reason and transparent communication, Derrida is
concerned to expose the sleight of hand by which philosophers convince
their readership that language can represent an objective reality, and serve
as a transparent medium of thought. He would restore us to a world in
which we would be not only without a false confidence in either the
power of objective reason or the possibility of transparent communication,
but also without a sense of false constraint. 1 I believe Derrida's strategies
are singularly apt for the analysis of a legal order that has, like the phi-
losophy he critiques, founded its authority on objectivity, and that
presumes access to individual intentions and understandings.
In aspiring to a perspective external to the dominant discourse-an as-
piration necessary for the type of analysis I develop in this piece-I have
also drawn strength from feminist theory and from attempts to bring fem-
inism to bear on legal theory.2 In understanding the central problem of
our legal discourse to be a corrosive preoccupation with self and other, I
contract doctrine, being invoked quite explicitly to resolve certain doctrinal problems. An examination
of the way in which subjective intent is used as supplement reveals that even as the adherence to
objectivity is designed to banish the unreliable subjective, that very objectivity is in fact sustained only
by its claim to incorporate and represent the subjective. Because the subjective it purports to represent
is unknowable, however, the privileged objective loses its claim to dominance.
The lesson of subjective intent as supplement is that the problem of knowledge, which the dominant
voice of doctrine purports to resolve by recourse to objective standards, has not in fact been contained.
By assuring us that problems of understanding arise only in the realm of the subjective, doctrine
"defers" or "displaces" the problem of knowledge, puts it over to some other place where it will not
threaten to sabotage the project at hand.
For an illustration of the dynamic of the dangerous supplement in Derrida's own writing, see his
treatment of speech and writing in Rousseau's work, id. at 141-64. For an illustration based on
conventional understandings of the relationship between law and society, see Frug, supra note 18, at
1288-89.
21. Derrida has described the possibilities that would exist in such a world:
[Elverything becomes possible against the language-police; for example "literatures" or
"revolutions" that as yet have no model. Everything is possible except for an exhaustive typol-
ogy that would claim to limit the owners of graft or fiction by and within an analytical logic of
distinction, opposition, and classification in genus and species.
Derrida, Limited, Inc., 2 GLYPH 162, 243 (1977).
22. The strands of feminist theory that have most influenced my thinking are the psychoanalytic
work represented by N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978) and D. DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR:
SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE (1976); the work in literary theory exemplified by
J. CULLER, supra note 16, at 43-64; J. FETrERLEY, THE RESISTING READER at xi-xxvi (1978); and
S. GILBERT & S. GUBAR, THE MADWOMAN IN THE Arric 3-104 (1979); and the work of radical
French feminists collected in NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS (E. Marks & I. de Courtivron eds. 1981) and
described in Stanton, Language and Revolution: The Franco-American Dis-Connection, in THE FU-
TURE OF DIFFERENCE 73 (H. Eisenstein & A. Jardine eds. 1980). Powerful examples of feminism
brought to bear on legal materials and legal theory include MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc. 515
(1982); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8
SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc. 635 (1983); Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study
of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983).
I use the word "aspire" to reflect that the search for an external perspective must be conducted with
the awareness that we are always problematically implicated in the dominant discourse from which
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see correspondences among the "liberal" world depicted by legal scholars,
the "rational" world depicted by Derrida, and the "male" world depicted
by feminists.2"
D. Implications
It is distressingly common to interpret the kind of analysis I undertake
in this Article as an attack on doctrine, as a claim that doctrinal talk is
somehow "meaningless." I hope to show that such interpretations are mis-
perceptions. At the most practical level, my analysis suggests that the ad-
vocate's task is precisely as traditionally imagined, a job requiring a most
sophisticated sense both of the array of available argument and of the
limits of legal discourse. At the level of theory, my account suggests that
doctrine is redolent with meaning, that it incorporates debates about com-
mitments and concerns central to our society. However, the usefulness of
those debates is unfortunately limited by their stylized distance from the
core issues they represent. Debate on these core issues is further limited
by doctrine's pretense that it can resolve these issues rather than simply
articulate them in a fashion that would allow a decisionmaker to make a
considered choice in the case before her.
To expose the limitations of doctrine-to reveal the poverty of legal
discourse, its dependence on only a few types of feint and parry, emi-
nently graspable-is one of the major goals of this piece. That done, it
becomes possible systematically to surface the core issues underlying con-
tractual disputes, by decoding the doctrinal formulations.
My analysis, which supports the idea that judicial decisionmaking is
indeterminate, is rendered vulnerable by our experience of being able to
speculate successfully about how at least some cases will come out. One
response is that our ability to speculate has less to do with the determi-
nacy of doctrine than with our sensitivity to cultural values and under-
standings as they impinge on and are created by our decisionmakers. This
implies that while "doctrine-as-rule-system" is indeterminate, "doctrine-
in-application" is after all determinate, needing just that infusion of (de-
terminate) cultural value and understanding to make it so. But if doctrinal
indeterminacy is produced, as I have suggested, by the same dualities that
structure the rest of our life and thought, that affect the very development
we wish to extricate ourselves. "Feminism criticizes this male totality without an account of our ca-
pacity to do so, or to imagine or realize a more whole truth. Feminism affirms women's point of view
by revealing, criticizing and explaining its impossibility." MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra, at 637.
23. It therefore seems unnecessary, for the purposes of this Article, to choose among these cri-
tiques, although when it comes to looking behind and beyond doctrine to ask what is perpetrated
through it, my own first commitment is to assess how women are viewed and treated in legal contexts.
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of our cultural values and understandings, then indeterminacy must exist
at all these levels. Our seeming ability nonetheless to understand and to
predict (in a historically contingent fashion) the particular links that deci-
sionmakers create between particular arguments, and the particular fact
situations decisionmakers construct from the testimony submitted to them,
requires us to search for other explanations.24 The devaluing of doctrine
clears the ground for this further work.2"
I. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
The opposing ideas of public and private have traditionally dominated
discourse about contract doctrine. The underlying notion has been that to
the extent contract doctrine is "private," or controlled by the parties, it
guarantees individual autonomy or freedom; to the extent it is "public," or
controlled by the state, it infringes individual autonomy.
Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, the discourse of contract doc-
trine has tried to portray contract as essentially private and free. 26 At all
times, nonetheless, traditional doctrine has uneasily recognized a public
aspect of contract, viewing certain state interests as legitimate limitations
on individual freedom. But this public aspect has traditionally been as-
signed a strictly supplemental role; indeed, a major concern of contract
doctrine has been to suppress "publicness" by a series of doctrinal moves.
The public aspect of contract doctrine is suppressed differently in each
area of that doctrine, and in each historical period. The method of sup-
pression is generally either an artificial conflation of public and private,
24.
Anything we know is outside
of rational expression. Do we know
anything? No, of course we don't.
What we know is not true and what is true
is beyond our knowing; knowing is not the point.
But we are aware of something and, in that sense,
we know ...
W. BRONK, Rational Expression, in LIFE SUPPORTS: NqEW AND COLLECTED POEMS 210 (1982).
25. The work of Foucault offers a highly relevant model, in its intricate examination of the rela-
tionship between knowledge and power, or the "regime du savoir," as it operates in the development
of both social institutions and disciplines of learning, and their interaction. See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT,
THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1978); Foucault, Afterword: The Subject and Power, in H. DREYFUS
& P. RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208 (1982).
On the methodology of "thick description," see C. GEERTz, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES
3-30 (1973) (discussing use of this technique in anthropological research to produce ethnographic
descriptions that advance interpretive rather than scientific theory of culture).
26. To borrow from Kessler:
The freedom of contract dogma is the real hero or villain in the drama ... but it prefers to
remain in the safety of the background if possible, leaving the actual fighting to consideration
and to the host of other satellites-all of which is very often confusion to the audience which
vaguely senses the unreality of the atmosphere.
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. REV.
629, 639 (1943).
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in which the public is represented as private, or an artificial separation of
public from private, which distracts attention from the public element of
the protected "private" arena by focusing attention on the demarcated
(and limited) "public" arena.
The current mainstream treatment of quasi-contracts and implied con-
tracts illustrates doctrine's techniques of separation and conflation. The
prevailing position, represented by the Second Restatement, but also by
cases and commentary from the 1850's to the present, is that quasi-
contracts are not contracts at all, but constitute instead an exceptional im-
position of obligation by the state in order to prevent unjust enrichment.
An artificially sharp line of demarcation is therefore presented as separa-
ting quasi-contracts from implied-in-fact contracts, and public from pri-
vate. But this position obscures the fact that the finding of contractual
implication is guided in the so-called "private" sphere by the same consid-
erations that dictate the imposition of quasi-contract. Any inquiry into a
party's intent must confront the problem of knowledge-our ultimate in-
ability to gain access to the subjective intent underlying any particular
agreement. The indicia or manifestations of intent, discussed in detail in
Part II, serve as substitutes for subjective intent. But in relying on this
objective evidence, we move from the realm of the private to that of the
public. Calling implied contracts based on party intention "private," and
thereby ignoring the extent to which their content is shaped by external
norms, conflates public with private.
This same pattern of separation and conflation characterizes the doc-
trines of duress and unconscionability. Like quasi-contract, they are
presented in current doctrine as public supplements to the otherwise pri-
vate law of contract, supplements necessary for policing the limits of fair
bargain. The separation of duress and unconscionability from the main
body of contract doctrine diverts attention from the fact that the entire
doctrine of consideration reflects societal attitudes about which bargains
are worthy of enforcement. But even as the technique of separation marks
out duress and unconscionability as public exceptions to private contract
doctrine, within duress and unconscionability doctrine public and private
are conflated-the public grounds for disapproving bargains recast as evi-
dence that there is no private bargain to be enforced. In this arena, the
techniques of separation and conflation serve to camouflage critical issues
of power-the power of the state to police private agreements, and the
power of one private party over another. These issues lie not only at the
heart of duress and unconscionability doctrine, but also at the heart of
consideration doctrine, as Part III of this Article elaborates.
My analysis of public and private starts with a brief historical overview
of the way these themes have been treated in contract doctrine since the
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nineteenth century. I then examine in greater detail the suppression of the
public aspect of contract in doctrine's treatment of quasi-contract, and in
the rules governing duress and unconscionability.
A. A Brief History
In the earlier part of the nineteenth century, a will theory of contract
dominated the commentary and influenced judicial discussion.17 Contrac-
tual obligation was seen to arise from the will of the individual. This
conception of contract was compatible with (and early cases appear sym-
pathetic to) an emphasis on subjective intent: Judges were to examine the
circumstances of a case to determine whether individuals had voluntarily
willed themselves into positions of obligation.2" In the absence of a "meet-
ing of the minds," there was no contract.29 This theory paid no particular
attention to the potential conflict between a subjective intention and an
objective expression of that intention.
The idea that contractual obligation has its source in the individual will
persisted into the latter part of the nineteenth century, consistent with the
pervasive individualism of that time and the general incorporation into
law of notions of liberal political theory.30 Late nineteenth-century theo-
rists like Holmes and Williston, however, began to make clear that the
proper measure of contractual obligation was the formal expression of the
will, the will objectified. Obligation should attach, they reasoned, not ac-
cording to the subjective intention of the parties, but according to a rea-
sonable interpretation of the parties' language and conduct. Enforcement
of obligation could still be viewed as a neutral facilitation of intent, de-
spite this shift, if the parties are imagined as selecting their language and
conduct as accurate and appropriate signals of their intent."' Thus, even
in this objectified form, the will theory of contract was equated with the
27. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 405-08 (1979) (trac-
ing the emergence of will theory in late 18th and early 19th centuries).
28. "[W]hen both parties will the same thing, and each communicates his will to the other, with a
mutual engagement to carry it into effect, then (and not till then) an agreement or contract between
the two is constituted." Haynes v. Haynes, I Dr. & Sm. 426, 433, 62 Eng. Rep. 442, 445 (1861).
29. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876); Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 Hurl. & C. 906,
159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864), and the discussion of these cases in G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT 28-29, 35-42 (1974).
30. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, supra note 27, at 407-08; Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L.
REV. 553, 575-78 (1933); Feinman, supra note 14, at 831-32.
31. "There is no contract without assent, but once the objective manifestations of assent are pres-
ent, their author is bound." Kessler, supra note 26, at 630. "The thing which characterizes the law of
contracts and conveyances is that in this field forms are deliberately used, and are intended to be so
used, by the parties whose acts are to be judged by the law." Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941). Fuller also suggests that autonomy is dependent upon "security of
transactions," and that "security of transactions" is by-and-large guaranteed by objective interpreta-
tion, even though objective interpretation may defeat party intention in particular instances. Id. at
808.
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absence of state regulation: The parties governed themselves; better yet,
each party governed himself.32
The Realists made it impossible to believe any longer that contract is
private in the sense suggested by this caricature. By insisting that the
starting point of contract doctrine is the state's decision to intervene in a
dispute, the Realists exposed the fiction of state neutrality. As Morris
Cohen argued:
[I]n enforcing contracts, the government does not merely allow two
individuals to do what they have found pleasant in their eyes. En-
forcement, in fact, puts the machinery of the law in the service of
one party against the other. When that is worthwhile and how that
should be done are important questions of public policy.33
From this vantage point, the objectivist reliance on intent as the source of
contractual obligation was a blatant abdication of responsibility, a failure
to address and debate the substantive public policy issues involved in deci-
sions about when and how courts should intervene in disputes between
contracting parties.
At its most radical, the Realist critique portrays the "publicness" of
contract as overshadowing its "privateness." According to Cohen, "[T]he
law of contract may be viewed as a subsidiary branch of public law, as a
body of rules according to which the sovereign power of the state will be
exercised as between the parties to a more or less voluntary transaction.13 4
Thinking about contract from this perspective revealed that the state's in-
terest in maintaining a free enterprise system-while policing its ex-
cesses-was at work in doctrines such as duress and consideration.3 5
Problems of power-the state's power over individuals, and the power of
individuals over one another-came into focus.
This basic challenge to the "privateness" of contract, however, was ac-
companied by a continuing faith in the ability of courts to understand the
agreements made by contracting parties. For example, the contract was
felt to restrain the terms on which the court, if it chose to intervene, would
32.
Contractualism in the law, that is, the view that in an ideally desirable system of law all
obligation would arise only out of the will of the individual contracting freely, rests not only on
the will theory of contract but also on the political doctrine that all restraint is evil and that the
government is best which governs least. This in turn is connected with the classical economic
optimism that there is a sort of preEstablished harmony between the good of all and the pursuit
by each of his own selfish economic gain.
Cohen, supra note 30, at 558.
33. Id. at 562. See also Feinman, supra note 14, at 834.
34. Cohen, supra note 30, at 586.
35. See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REv. 253, 266
(1947); Kessler, supra note 26, at 638-39.
1013
The Yale Law Journal
favor one party over the other. In the hands of the Realists, then, a sensi-
tivity to the problem of power was coupled, by and large, with an appar-
ent lack of sensitivity to the problem of knowledge, and to the way in
which power could be subtly exercised through the interpretation and con-
struction of intention.3 6
In the decades since, the Realist challenge to the "privateness" of con-
tract has been assimilated and defused, a process aided by the incomplete
nature of the Realist assault. Thus our principal vision of contract law is
still one of a neutral facilitator of private volition. We understand that
contract law is concerned at the periphery with the imposition of social
duties, that quasi-contract governs situations where obligation attaches
even in the absence of agreement, that doctrines of duress and fraud de-
prive the contracting reprobate of benefits unfairly extorted. But we con-
ceive the central arena to be an unproblematic enforcement of obligations
voluntarily undertaken. We excise regulated and compulsory contracts
from the corpus of contract doctrine altogether, and create special niches
for them, as in labor law and utility regulation. Although we concede that
the law of contract is the result of public decisions about what agreements
to enforce, we insist that the overarching public decision is to respect and
enforce private intention.
Thus, for better than a hundred years, contract doctrine and the com-
mentary it has generated have been characterized by a concern with pub-
lic imposition and private volition. In the remainder of this section, I ex-
plore in much more detail how the public-private dichotomy has
influenced doctrine in both the area of the implied contract and in that of
duress and unconscionabilicy. I begin each story with some history, and
end each by suggesting that our modern formulations do nothing more
than give a new disguise to age-old problems.
B. The Implied Contract Story: Wrestling with the Problem of
Knowledge
The implied-in-law or quasi-contract plays a crucial role in sustaining
the notion that contract law is essentially private. The implied-in-law con-
tract is portrayed as essentially non-contractual and public, in contrast to
36. Jerome Frank is an exception, in that he did consistently focus on the problematic relationship
between subjective and objective in the area of contractual interpretation. On occasion, he stresses the
vagaries of competing idiosyncratic subjectivities, as, for example, in Zell v. American Seating Co.,
138 F.2d 641, 647 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 709 (1944) (per curiam), reprinted in KESSLER &
GILMORE, supra note 8, at 679. See infra text accompanying note 162. Elsewhere, he suggests the
possilbility for a more systematic imposition of cultural norms. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON
TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 309 (1969).
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the implied-in-fact contract in which the private is dominant. In this ac-
count, the implied-in-fact contract is presented as kin to the express con-
tract, the only difference being that the former is constituted by conduct
and circumstance rather than words. 7 An examination of how and when
courts choose to impose quasi-contractual obligations, however, reveals the
essential similarity between this decision and the supposedly dissimilar de-
cision that a given situation evidences implied-in-fact contractual obliga-
tions. Thus, although the distinction between the two types of implied
contracts accords with our experience-we intuitively know that being
bound by one's word is different from being bound by an externally im-
posed obligation-the methods of legal argument used for over one hun-
dred years to distinguish the two situations do not and cannot hold.
1. Hertzog-The Constructive Contract.
Hertzog v. Hertzog, s decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
1857, is reputedly the first American case to distinguish the quasi-contract
from the implied-in-fact contract. The themes and method of analysis pre-
sent in Hertzog still reverberate in the treatment of implied contract found
in the Second Restatement and in modern case law.
In Hertzog, an adult son lived and worked with his father until his
father's death, at which point the son sued the estate for compensation for
services rendered." The trial judge instructed the jury that John Hertzog
could recover only if an employment contract existed between father and
son. Two witnesses gave testimony that could be interpreted as evidence of
such an agreement: One Stamm testified that he "heard the old man say
he would pay John for the labour he had done,"40 while one Roderick
swore that the father "said he intended to make John safe."'41 The jury
found for John, and the defendant appealed, successfully.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Lowrie begins the opinion by dis-
tinguishing express, implied-in-fact, and implied-in-law contracts. 42 In ad-
vancing this categorization, Lowrie particularly criticized Blackstone for
failing to distinguish the implied-in-fact from the implied-in-law
contract.
43
37. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 4 comments a & b.
38. 29 Pa. 465 (1857). The case is reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 120. In
this account I am indebted to Duncan Kennedy, who discusses the emergence of the modern concept
of quasi-contract in The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought: 1850-1940, at 19-24 (Chapter
IV) (Oct. 1975) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
39. The suit also involved repayment of a loan, but that aspect is not treated here.
40. Hertzog, 29 Pa. at 465.
41. Id. at 466.
42. Id. at 467; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 4 comments a & b (presenting
parallel modern treatment of different types of contracts).
43. Hertzog, 29 Pa. at 467.
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Blackstone had suggested that "[i]mplied [contracts] are such as reason
and justice dictate; and which, therefore, the law presumes that every man
undertakes to perform.""" Lowrie, true to his advanced understanding of
the implications of the will theory of contract, observes, "There is some
looseness of thought in supposing that reason and justice ever dictate any
contracts between parties, or impose such upon them. All true contracts
grow out of the intentions of the parties to transactions, and are dictated
only by their mutual and accordant wills.""5 The only "contracts" that
reason and justice dictate, according to Lowrie, are "constructive con-
tracts" in which the contract is "mere fiction," a form adopted solely to
enforce a duty independent of intention.4" "In one," says Lowrie, "the
duty defines the contract; in the other, the contract defines the duty. ' '4'
Lowrie offers this definition of quasi-contract:
[Wihenever, not our variant notions of reason and justice, but the
common sense and common justice of the country, and therefore the
common law or statute law, impose upon any one a duty, irrespec-
tive of contract, and allow it to be enforced by a contract remedy,
[this is] a case of [quasi-]contract. 48
For Justice Lowrie, quasi-contract, unlike contract proper, reflects public
norms. Public norms, however, require legitimation, and Lowrie offers
two types-one positivist, the other dependent on natural law. The norms
are "positively" binding because they are part of the body of common law
or statute recognized as authoritative. They are "naturally" binding be-
cause they reflect "common sense and common justice." 49 While Lowrie
distinguishes these public obligations from obligations based on consent,
he invokes consent to legitimize public norms: Consent underlies his dis-
tinction between "variant notions of reason and justice" and "common
sense and common justice."5
Lowrie avoids the need to devote more time and attention in Hertzog to
quasi-contract by stating that "[i]n the present case there is no pretence of
a constructive contract, but only of a proper one, either express or im-
plied."51 The focus of the opinion, then, is on whether John Hertzog can
demonstrate the existence of a contract by words spoken or by an account
of the relationship and circumstances.
44. See id. (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *443).
45. 29 Pa. at 467.
46. Id. at 468 (emphasis in original).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 467.
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 468.
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As to the express contract, Lowrie explicitly uses the parties' relation-
ship and their circumstances to "frame" the words spoken in such a way
that they become words of "non-contract" instead of contract:
The court told the jury that a contract of hiring might be inferred
from the evidence of Stamm and Roderick. Yet these witnesses add
nothing to the facts already recited, except that the father told them,
shortly before his death, that he intended to pay his son for his work.
This is no making of a contract or admission of one; but rather the
contrary. It admits that the son deserved some reward from his fa-
ther, but not that he had a contract for any.52
The father-son relationship clearly influences Lowrie's conclusion.
Hertzog thus illustrates that words of intention are inconclusive until they
are shaped by a judicial reading of the context in which they are uttered.
Even the paradigmatically self-sufficient "express" contract, in which "the
terms of the agreement are openly uttered and avowed at the time of the
making,"53  is invaded by "publicness" in its interpretation and
enforcement.
In regard to the implied-in-fact contract, Lowrie says that "[t]he law
ordinarily presumes or implies a contract whenever this is necessary to
account for other relations found to have existed between the parties."5 In
Hertzog, Lowrie's willingness to find an employment contract will there-
fore turn on whether the parties are related: He assumes that strangers
assist one another only on the expectation of reward,55 whereas precisely
the opposite is true of employment between intimates.56
Lowrie thus bases his conclusion that no implied contract exists almost
entirely upon "the customs of society"'57 and commonly accepted notions
about human nature in general and family relationships in particular.5"
52. Id. at 470.
53. See id. at 467 (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *443).
54. 26 Pa. at 468.
55. Id. at 469. Judge Lowrie wrote: "If we find, as ascertained circumstances, that a stranger has
been in the employment of another, we immediately infer a contract of hiring, because the principles
of individuality and self-interest, common to human nature, and therefore the customs of society,
require this inference." Id.
56. Id. "But if we find a son in the employment of his father," Lowrie writes, "we do not infer a
contract of hiring, because the principle of family affection is sufficient to account for the family
association, and does not demand the inference of a contract." Id.
Actually Lowrie goes further in his analysis of father-son employment. On the one hand, it de-
means sons to put them in the legal position of hired servants, when they are characteristically much
superior. On the other, the son who fails to strike out on his own is a burden to his father; the father
supports such a son because he "lack[s] the energy and independence necessary for such a course," not
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But his reliance on such customs and commonalities hopelessly under-
mines his distinction between contracts implied-in-fact and quasi-
contracts. Lowrie's treatment of the absence of a contract proper could just
as easily be read as an account of the absence of a quasi-contract. Plainly
he has decided that common sense and common justice demand a finding
that no contract exists here. The advantage of his contractual analysis is
that it permits public considerations to be introduced as if they were pri-
vate, without the elaborate scrutiny of their source and justification that a
quasi-contractual analysis would require.
Lowrie's concluding ruminations about the jury's finding for the son
ironically illustrate his obliviousness to the "publicness" of his analysis:
The difficulty in trying causes of this kind often arises from juries
supposing that, because they have the decision of the cause, therefore
they may decide according to general principles of honesty and fair-
ness, without reference to the law of the case. But this is a despotic
power, and is lodged with no portion of this government.
Their verdict may, in fact, declare what is honest between the par-
ties, and yet it may be a mere usurpation of power, and thus be an
effort to correct one evil by a greater one. Citizens have a right to
form connexions on their own terms and to be judged accordingly.
When parties claim by contract, the contract proved must be the rule
by which their rights are to be decided. To judge them by any other
rule is to interfere with the liberty of the citizen.59
This moralizing might be more convincing if the judge had not just exer-
cised, in the guise of fact-finding, the type of state power he now labels
"despotic." '6
0
In resolving this dispute, then, Lowrie proves incapable of sustaining
the distinction between public and private on which he places so much
emphasis. He asserts that the intrusion of the state into the relationships
of private individuals is generally undesirable. He suggests that in ex-
treme circumstances such intrusion can be justified, provided we impose
only those obligations grounded both in community standards and in posi-
tive promulgation. In normal circumstances, however, contract law is
purely about the intentions of the parties. Disciplined and rational judges,
aware of the limitations of their authority, are better equipped to discern
these intentions than undisciplined and irrational juries who confuse their
sense of what is fair and honest with what the parties had in mind. But
when it comes to deciding the case, Lowrie uses standards that were
neither explicitly adopted by the parties nor promulgated by the state. In
59. Id. at 470-71.
60. Id. at 471.
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determining that the relationship between the parties was not contractual,
he invokes common understandings about the context of the agreement to
transform words of agreement into evidence of non-contract. In so doing
he avoids the problem of power by appearing to endorse the parties' own
choice that their relationship be without legal consequence, and avoids the
problem of knowledge by presenting his own normative interpretation of
the situation as nothing more than a transparent reading of the parties'
intentions.
2. Since Hertzog-Plus Qa Change...
By the first decades of this century, theorists had begun cautiously to
explore the extent to which an objectified will theory required public in-
trusion on private volition. In 1920, for example, Costigan61 suggested
that quasi-contractual obligations could not be successfully separated from
implied-in-fact obligations without recognizing that there were, in addi-
tion to "meeting-of-the-minds implied-in-fact contract[s],"6 2 those implied-
in-fact contracts that were not based on meetings of minds. Costigan's
prime example was the implied warranty, which he described in terms
that would also apply to Lowrie's analysis of the absence of contract in
Hertzog: "Implied warranties are founded upon the implied facts of gen-
eral .. .experience and understanding-implied because people in gen-
eral, and not necessarily the particular parties concerned, when acting un-
derstandingly and fairly, normally agree upon such an assumed factual
basis .... ,"3 As the quotation suggests, Costigan explicitly recognizes
that the actual intent of the parties is not the basis of the obligation in
these cases. At the same time, rather than asserting explicitly the "public"
interest in the imposition of such terms, he "privatizes" the imposition of
obligation by reference to what other fair-minded people would intend
under similar circumstances.
Costigan is left having to explain why his category of "no-meeting-of-
the-minds" contracts are still contracts rather than quasi-contracts. To
this end, he focuses initially on the remedy attached: Where the court
awards a restitutionary measure, the action is quasi-contractual; where an
expectation measure is awarded, the action is contractual. 4 Costigan him-
self, however, later recognizes that this position is indefensible: He ac-
knowledges that "[t]he contractual right justifies the measure of damages,
61. Costigan, Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Mutual Assent, 33 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1920).
62. Id. at 383.
63. Id. at 384-85; see also Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17
CALIF. L. REV. 441, 450-51 (1929) (role of custom and common understanding in implication (in
fact) of promises).
64. Costigan, supra note 61, at 378.
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not the measure the right."65 Ultimately, then, he fails to demonstrate how
these cases can be viewed as contractual without the parties' minds having
met.66
As I have already sketched,6 7 the Realist approach to contract involves a
radical shift of emphasis from the private to the public aspects of enforce-
ment. Predictably, then, when the Realist Cohen addresses the question of
interpretation, he sees and describes its public face. He pinpoints the way
in which judges, in the guise of interpretation, "decide the 'equities,' the
rights and obligations of the parties . . . . [T]hese legal relations are de-
termined by the courts and the jural system and not by the agreed will of
the contesting parties."6 Cohen also identifies how rules of interpretation
serve as state regulation:
When courts follow the same rules of interpretation in diverse cases,
they are in effect enforcing uniformities of conduct.
We may thus view the law of contract not only as a branch of
public law but also as having a function somewhat parallel to that of
the criminal law. Both serve to standardize conduct by penalizing
departures from the legal norm.69
Cohen laments that while the fictional nature of the will theory is at
one level a commonplace, it is at the same time ignored, forgotten, or
otherwise resisted-in part, because of the force of the traditional lan-
guage.7 ' And indeed, the Realists did generally fail to explore the implica-
tions of the will theory's fictional basis. They tended to be much more
concerned with problems of coercion and of relief from the bad bargain.
The Realist focus was the public-private split as it implicates the problem
of power, not the public-private split as it implicates the problem of
knowledge. Since the line of inquiry initiated by those such as Costigan
has been given only scant attention in the following decades, Cohen's criti-
cism could be levelled with equal force today.
65. Id. at 390.
66. He suggests that his earlier discussion of Vickery v. Ritchie, 202 Mass. 247, 88 N.E. 835
(1909), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 139, has "foreshadowed" this demonstra-
tion. Costigan, supra note 61, at 390. It has not. Later in the article, he refers back to the earlier
discussion and he claims that "the real nature of the primary right . . . was contractual." Id. at 400
n.37. It is not clear why.
67. See supra Part IA.
68. Cohen, supra note 30, at 577.
69. Id. at 589. Fuller is elaborating a similar idea when he details the "channeling function" of
consideration. Fuller, supra note 31, at 801-03.
70. "[W]hile this objection has become familiar," Cohen writes, "it has not been very effective.
The force of the old ideas, embodied in the traditional language, has not always been overcome even
by those who like Langdell and Salmond profess to recognize the fictional element in the will theory."
Cohen, supra note 30, at 575.
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The position taken by the Second Restatement is essentially that of Jus-
tice Lowrie. The Second Restatement divides the universe of contracts
along the private-public axis into express contracts, contracts implied-in-
fact, and contracts implied-in-law or quasi-contracts. It defines the ex-
press contract as an agreement made up of words, either oral or written,
and the implied-in-fact contract as one that a court infers wholly or partly
from conduct or circumstances.7 1 Quasi-contracts, in contrast, are "pub-
lic." And because they are not concerned with the intentions of the par-
ties, they are not really contracts at all.72 That quasi-contracts even share
the appellation "contract" is a matter of historical accident.7 ' Like torts,
quasi-contracts are "obligations created by law for reasons of justice. '7 4
Their non-contractual nature is so essential that they are separated out for
treatment in the Restatement of Restitution.5 Only that fact even alerts us
that the "reasons of justice"76  that dictate the imposition of quasi-
contractual obligations have to do with the idea of unjust enrichment.
At the same time, the Second Restatement of Contracts confesses that
this analytically clear distinction between contract and quasi-contract does
not always work in practice, that "in some cases the line between the two
is indistinct."77 The Restatement attributes the potential for confusion to
the difficulties of "Conduct as Manifestation of Assent. 71 8 Except where
formal requirements give words special significance as evidence of agree-
ment, "there is no distinction in the effect of the promise whether it is
expressed in writing, or orally, or in acts, or partly in one of these ways
71. Thus, the promise "may be stated in words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly
or partly from conduct." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 4. Comment a elaborates:
Contracts are often spoken of as express or implied. The distinction involves, however, no
difference in legal effect, but lies merely in the mode of manifesting assent. Just as assent may
be manifested by words or other conduct, sometimes including silence, so intention to make a
promise may be manifested in language or by implication from other circumstances, including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance.
Id.; see also id. § 19 comment a (assent may be manifested in words or in acts, with no distinction as
to effect of promise).
72. Id. § 4 comment b.
73.
Quasi-contracts have often been called implied contracts or contracts implied in law; but, un-
like true contracts, quasi-contracts are not based on the apparent intention of the parties to
undertake the performances in question, nor are they promises. They are obligations created
by law for reasons of justice. Such obligations were ordinarily enforced at common law in the
same form of action (assumpsit) that was appropriate to true contracts, and some confusion
with reference to the nature of quasi-contracts has been caused thereby.
Id.
74. Id.
75. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTIrrUTON: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
(1937).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 4 comment b.
77. Id.
78. Id. § 19 comment a.
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and partly in others." 9 But conduct "is more uncertain and more depen-
dent on its setting than are words."80 The uncertainty of conduct as evi-
dence of agreement can make it unclear whether a particular relationship
should be considered contractual or quasi-contractual.
This explanation allows the Restatement to save the express contract
from involvement in potential confusion between public and private.
Words that directly express the parties' intentions make state intrusion
unnecessary. Only conduct, inherently more ambiguous and open-
textured, threatens the public-private distinction by requiring the inter-
preter of fact to add his sense of the context to the acts of the parties in
order to understand them."'
As Hertzog demonstrates, however, the division between public and pri-
vate cannot be so neatly made. Divining intention in order to find an
implied-in-fact contract depends on understanding the societal background
against which a relationship is formed: A knowledge of private thus re-
quires a knowledge of public. Deciding that a social relationship requires
the imposition of a quasi-contract depends on knowing which relationship
the parties have entered: A knowledge of public thus requires a knowledge
of private.
In failing to account successfully for the kinship of the implied-in-fact
and quasi-contract, the Restatement is not an aberration in modern treat-
ments. The note in Kessler and Gilmore's casebook82 introducing the topic
of the implied contract also fails in this regard. The note begins by repeat-
ing the standard distinction between "genuine" contracts and the fictional
quasi-contract, but warns that the "famous, plausible and innocent-
looking" distinction raises "a host of troublesome questions. '83 The next
passage of the note is a spectacular account of how what is commonly
conceived of as private in the realm of contract formation and interpreta-
tion is in fact public. In a short compass, Kessler and Gilmore suggest
that in one sense all contracts, even express ones, are implied: that express
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. The Second Restatement provides an example apparently intended to provide further reassur-
ance. See id. § 19 comment a, illustration 1. The example involves a claim "against a decedent's estate
for services rendered"-the Hertzog situation. Id. § 19 comment a. Because one of the parties to the
relationship is dead, his "words" are unavailable as evidence; because of the Dead Man's Statute,
words exchanged between the parties are probably also inadmissable. Conduct and circumstance are
therefore peculiarly preponderant as evidence of whether "services were rendered gratuitously." Id.
The carefully delimited parameters of the hypothetical convey a message: Only in exceptional circum-
stances do courts risk crossing the line between enforcing private agreement and imposing external
obligations; "publicness" will not invade the area of the express contract.
82. See KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 116-19.
83. Id. at 117.
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contracts are possible only through "a regulation which is originally so-
cial"; 8 ' that "environment" is crucial;85 that "official control becomes an
integral part of the contract itself";88 and that the courts' habit of presen-
ting their enforcement task as one of "interpretation" obscures the "degree
of control over private volition thus exercised." 8
Then, abruptly, the note introduces the concept of quasi-contract. Early
in its treatment we are warned: "If it [quasi-contract] is unduly extended,
private autonomy . . . will suffer erosion."88 The degree of erosion
demonstrated in the interpretation of contracts proper was never explicitly
presented as this kind of a threat, however, and it is not clear why the
threat inheres in quasi-contract and not in contract.
At this point the very distinction about which the authors expressed
doubt in their opening paragraphs is reintroduced as essential: Although
the "borderline" may be "wavering and blurred,"8 the boundary is "nec-
essary," and "not to be ignored."'90 The separation of quasi-contract and
contract is vital, not just for the sake of private autonomy, but because of
the different remedies attaching, even though in many situations the mea-
sure of recovery is the same. 1 We are also warned that judges are not as
good at recognizing the essentially different natures of these kinds of con-
tracts as we will presumably be once we have digested the elaborate
"guidance" the note provides. 2
There are manifold messages here. Kessler and Gilmore understand the
world of contract to be more complicated and difficult than the standard
division into implied-in-fact and implied-in-law would indicate. They
fully and sympathetically present the problem of knowledge as it affects
issues of interpretation. But this insight is not permitted to influence their
treatment of the quasi-contract, which is still presented as the place where
the real threat to privateness exists. In shoring up the distinction between
real and quasi-contracts by referring to the remedies attached, Kessler and
Gilmore repeat Costigan's mistake-unless their point is instead that we
should draw this distinction in order to know what remedy is appropriate.
This is different from Costigan's claim that the remedy given lets us know
what kind of action we are dealing with, but it leaves us asking why we
84. Id., (quoting T. PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 311 (1949)).
85. KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 117.
86. Id. at 118 (quoting J. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS 100 (2d ed. 1939)). In support
of this proposition, Kessler and Gilmore cite Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n'v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934). See KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 118.
87. KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 118.
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should base a choice of remedy on so weak a foundation. Kessler and
Gilmore's final move of pinning the blame on judges deflects attention
from the inadequacies of the conceptual scheme itself.
The inadequacies of Kessler and Gilmore's treatment echo those evident
in the Second Restatement and in Hertzog. None of the accounts fully
acknowledges the interrelationship of public and private. None adequately
recognizes that public concerns and conceptions necessarily inform the ju-
dicial decision about whether to impose contractual obligations. None sug-
gests that quasi-contractual obligation depends on prior understandings of
the private relationship of the parties. Once these inter-relationships are
understood, as the (failed) attempt to distinguish contract from quasi-
contract allows us to understand them, the public-private dichotomy
threatens to dissolve.
C. The Story of Duress and Unconscionability: Wrestling with the
Problem of Power
The efforts of more than a century have been devoted, as we have seen,
to trying to create a private domain in which individuals can reach bind-
ing agreements and courts can enforce them, despite the difficulties
presented by the problem of knowledge. The story of the doctrines of du-
ress and unconscionability reveals similar efforts over time to create a pri-
vate domain in which individuals can reach binding agreements and
courts can enforce them, despite the difficulties presented by the problem
of power. In the context of duress and unconscionability, doctrine wrestles
with the power of contracting parties over one another, and the power of
the state over both.
The doctrines of duress and unconscionability are self-consciously
"public" insofar as they are designed to police the limits of "fair" bargain.
They legitimate the exercise of state power to prevent one contracting
party from exercising an illegitimate power over the other. Thus, the pri-
vate deal of the parties-or what appears to be the private deal of the
parties-may be overridden in the name of a norm that, under appropri-
ate circumstances, trumps the otherwise prevalent norm of non-
intervention.
In a discourse so protective of its private or non-interventionist status,
this is a dangerous move that raises a number of interesting questions:
Why should contract have to harbor such a public aspect? When is inter-
vention justified? How has this public aspect of contract been reconciled
over time with the rest of "private" contract doctrine? What does this
particular story reveal about the body of doctrine to which it bears such a
dangerously supplemental relationship? While this section will explore all
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these questions, discussion of the first two figures most prominently in the
work of traditional theorists.
The "why" question has both a private and a public answer. The pri-
vate answer is that since privacy in contract is conceived of as a guarantor
of freedom, contracts entered into under coercion are not deserving of that
privacy-indeed, under those circumstances, state intrusion becomes the
guarantor of freedom. The public answer is that we have some values that
occasionally trump our desire for a system of contract in which each party
bears full responsibility for protecting his own interests. We conceive some
limit to self-interest, some requirement that under certain circumstances
contracting parties should look out for one another, and we are prepared
to use the power of the state to enforce that obligation.9"
The "when" question reveals the extent of the problem of power.
Three different approaches to the question are embedded in contract doc-
trine as it has evolved since the nineteenth century. One approach is to
focus on the disfavored party, and ask whether that party's assent to the
transaction was genuine. Another approach is to focus on the behavior of
the favored party, and to rule that some kinds of behavior between con-
tracting parties are unacceptable. A third approach is to look at the terms
of the transaction itself, and to determine that some deals are just too
lopsided to be enforceable.
The first approach-determining whether the disfavored party genu-
inely assented-is rendered unworkable by the problem of knowledge. We
cannot directly know or ascertain the subjective intent of the disfavored
party. Our inquiry therefore becomes indirect-we turn to objective evi-
dence of the party's subjective intent. But in our search for objective evi-
dence we find ourselves abandoning our initial focus, and focusing instead,
as the second and third approaches suggest, on the other party's behavior
and the terms of the resulting deal. Could anyone resist the pressure ex-
erted by that threat, those circumstances? Would anyone have voluntarily
agreed to that deal?
The second and third approaches each embody an assumption that we
can distinguish the acceptable from the unacceptable; the attempt to make
this distinction throws us directly into the problem of power. We live with
two convictions-that we should take care of ourselves and that we should
take care of others-and we lack any conceptual or instrumental scheme
sufficiently persuasive in its neutrality or its appeal to consensual values
93. For statements of the content of these impulses of "individualism" and "altruism," see Ken-
nedy, supra note 10, at 1713-22. For a caveat about the precision with which these impulses can be
identified in operation, see id. at 1722-24. Finally, for an account of the way in which the impulses
collide in modem legal thought, see id. at 1731-37, 1766-78. Kennedy's account connects the contra-
diction between individualism and altruism to the broader tension between subject and object that I
have suggested is the basis for the other polarities I describe. Id. at 1766-78.
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to regulate when one impulse should predominate. How, then, should we
determine that some self-interested behavior is beyond the pale, but some
other is not? How should we determine that some transactions are accept-
able in their terms but others are not?
These questions go to the heart of the problem of power-the power of
the state to control private arrangements and to evaluate private power
relations. Doctrine attempts to deny that these questions can be answered
only by recourse to non-neutral and non-consensual choices. Since doc-
trine's devices for denial suppress the public aspect of duress and
unconscionability, they also serve to reconcile those doctrines with the oth-
erwise private face of contract.
One device, at once evasive and reconciliatory, conflates public and pri-
vate by shifting attention from the behavior of the favored party or the
terms of the transaction back to the subjective assent of the disfavored
party-a seemingly private inquiry. The refuge provided by this tech-
nique is scarcely adequate, of course, for reasons just explored: Because
any search for subjective intent encounters the problem of knowledge, doc-
trine cannot remain lodged in the subjective, but must venture out again
into the territory of the objective, where the problem of power remains.
Alternatively, another favored device is to present duress and
unconscionability as doctrines policing process, not substance. This tech-
nique of separation admits public involvement, but reassures that the pub-
lic decisions are being made in neutral and consensual territory-the ter-
ritory of bargaining process. To the extent that this illusion can be
maintained, the dangerous questions of substance are left in the private
sphere. The problem is that found in any shift from substance to form:
We are incapable of identifying form, let alone distinguishing the proper
from the defective form, without recourse to the very substance we were
hoping to escape.
An important illustration of this latter technique is the translation of
bad behavior into a procedural concern. Sometimes privacy is presented as
inhering above all in the power of private individuals to set the substan-
tive terms of their exchanges. Accordingly, to protect privacy, courts must
scrupulously avoid evaluating those terms. A focus on bad behavior,
presented as a policing of bargaining process, thereby becomes a less prob-
lematic intrusion than a focus on the substance of the resulting exchange.
The substantive nature of judging behavior is thus disguised, or the norms
of conduct presented as more neutral and/or consensual than any norm of
exchange.
A final device is to acknowledge the difficulties and dangers of public
duress and unconscionability doctrine, but to reassure by limitation: These
doctrines are to be applied only in the extreme case; they stand in glaring
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contrast to the rest of (private) contract doctrine. Actually, this inquiry
ultimately reveals how all of contract doctrine is as "public" as these sup-
posedly exceptional cases. Or, it would be equally true to say, duress and
unconscionability turn out to be just as private as the rest of contract doc-
trine-which is not nearly as private as traditional theory would have it.
1. Duress as the Absence of Will
Including duress within the core of contract doctrine seemed appropri-
ate, even necessary, to nineteenth century will theorists, who believed that
enforcement of contracts was all about implementing the free wills of the
parties.94 They believed contract required assent; voluntarism was the
heart of contractual obligation. 5 In developing a body of duress doctrine,
the crucial issue was therefore the reality of assent.
The idea that the state could exert control in the name of freedom was
easy to assert as an abstraction, but it was difficult in practice to make
intervention look like nonintervention. Courts had to make concrete deci-
sions about what was freedom and what coercion in specific contractual
situations. They had to struggle with the fact that the whole economic
structure quite obviously depended on the law accepting as legitimate
countless deals imposed by one party upon another. The judicial identifi-
cation of "unfreedom" became an uncertain task of drawing lines between
acceptable and unacceptable "unfreedom." The line-drawing exercise ac-
tually took the form of distinguishing between unacceptable and accept-
able behavior by the favored party, although this focus was not made
explicit.
The United States Supreme Court in Coppage v. Kansas96 exposed
these difficulties in a completely self-conscious way. The Kansas state leg-
islature had passed a statute outlawing "yellow-dog" contracts by which
employees agreed, as a condition of their employment, not to engage in
union activities.97 The Court addressed the constitutional question of
whether this statute invaded the private right of the parties to contract.
94. See Dawson, supra note 35, at 256.
95. "[A] present exchange of goods or promises is a pure expression of voluntarism. In turn, this
expression of voluntarism required intelligible legal rules to separate free bargains from those formed
under fraud, duress, or undue influence." Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology (Book Review),
33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 763 (1981) (footnotes omitted). Dawson provides an updated version of this
traditional legitimating rhetoric of conflation when he suggests:
If inequality in values is . . . traced to its source in the conditions or the relations of the
parties, the grant of judicial remedies seems no longer to endanger the economic foundations of
an individualistic society. On the contrary, the function of judicial remedies becomes a policing
function, the detection and correction of those factors which disturb and disrupt the "market."
Dawson, supra note 35, at 281.
96. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
97. See id. at 6-7.
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The state argued that since the outlawed contracts were the product of
coercion, the statute did not encroach on freedom. 8 The Supreme Court
disagreed. Readily acknowledging the fact of employer bargaining advan-
tage, the Court nonetheless held that economic coercion did not violate
objective notions of freedom of contract. The Court held the contracts at
issue to be "free" contracts under the law, and deemed unconstitutional
the legislature's intrusion into this "private" sphere.99
The Court's opinion evidences a highly sophisticated appreciation of the
irreconcilability of two constitutional guarantees: freedom of contract and
the right to property: °10
[W]herever the right of private property and the right of free con-
tract co-exist, each party when contracting is inevitably more or less
influenced by the question whether he has much property, or little,
or none; for the contract is made to the very end that each may gain
something that he needs or desires more urgently than that which he
proposes to give in exchange. And, since it is self-evident that, unless
all things are held in common, some persons must have more prop-
erty than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold
freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the
same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that
are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.1 °1
The Court therefore acknowledged that its resolution of the problem of
duress in Coppage was a matter neither of logical necessity nor of intellec-
tual inevitability, but represented the simple choice of a route of delimita-
tion. °2 The Court chose as its paradigm of duress the situation in which
98. See id. at 4 (argument for defendant-in-error).
99. The Court in Coppage stated:
So the right of the employ6 to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the
same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such
employ6 . . . . In all such particulars the employer and the employE have equality of right,
and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of
contract which no government can legally justify in a free land.
Id. at 10-11 (quoting Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908)); see also Mensch, supra
note 11, at 23-26 (describing classical approach to contract dispute resolution whereby courts adhered
to "objective" notions of freedom defined independently of real-world power relations); Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205, 361 (1979) (questioning Court's
ability in Coppage to apply "objective" criteria distinguishing between free will and coercion).
100. For a parallel discussion of the way in which the law of property sets the parameters for
freedom of contract, see Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. Sci. Q. 470, 471-74 (1923).
101. Coppage, 236 U.S. at 17.
102. For an analogous analysis of the law of rape, see MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 22, at 649:
Having defined rape in male sexual terms, the law's problem, which becomes the victim's
problem, is distinguishing rape from sex in specific cases. The law does this by adjudicating
the level of acceptable force starting just above the level set by what is seen as normal male
sexual behavior, rather than at the victim's, or women's, point of violation. Rape cases finding
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the hand was forcibly guided over the paper, or the gun held at the tem-
ple, to produce a signature. Physical force, in short, was the model, with
other forms of coercion, such as the force of economic circumstances, going
unrecognized.' 03
2. Duress as Substantive Unfairness
The arbitrariness of the choices made by formalist duress doctrine, and
particularly its exclusion of economic duress, made it exceptionally vul-
nerable to attack. As early as the 1920's, Hale noted that all contracting
involves a measure of coercion, and that the advantaged person enjoys that
position because the legal system has created entitlements for him.1G4 This
was not only an attack on "free will" as the paradigm of private contract,
but was simultaneously an attack on the vaunted neutrality of the state as
enforcer of the will of the parties.' 0 5 Following Hale's line of reasoning,
one would have to suppose instead that the state actually endorses the
imposition of one party's will on the other.'0 6
Hale's extremely radical critique calls into question the entire structure
insufficient force reveal that acceptable sex, in the legal perspective, can entail a lot of force.
103. See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 15:
[Iln this case, the Kansas court of last resort has held that Coppage . is a criminal...
simply and merely because, while acting as the representative of the Railroad Company and
dealing with Hedges, an employ6 at will and a man of full age and understanding, subject to
no restraint or disability, Coppage insisted that Hedges should freely choose whether he would
leave the employ of the Company or would agree to refrain from association with the union
while so employed.
104. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 100, at 472:
The owner can remove the legal duty under which the non-owner labors with respect to the
owner's property. He can remove it, or keep it in force, at his discretion. To keep it in force
may or may not have unpleasant consequences to the non-owner-consequences which spring
from the law's creation of legal duty. To avoid these consequences, the non-owner may be
willing to obey the will of the owner, provided that the obedience is not in itself more unpleas-
ant than the consequences to be avoided.
See also Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603, 612 (1943)
("[A]ll money is paid, and all contracts are made, to avert some kinds of threats.").
105. "What is the government doing when it 'protects a property right'? Passively, it is abstaining
from interference with the owner when he deals with the thing owned; actively, it is forcing the non-
owner to desist from handling it, unless the owner consents." Hale, supra note 100, at 471.
106. See Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 104, at 627-28:
Bargaining power would be different were it not that the law endows some with rights that are
more advantageous than those with which it endows others.
It is with these unequal rights that men bargain and exert pressure on one another....
There may be sound reasons of economic policy to justify all the economic inequalities that
flow from unequal rights. If so, these reasons must be more specific than a broad policy of
private property and freedom of contract.
See also Mensch, supra note 11, at 28-29 (because ownership is product of legal entitlement, every
bargain is function of legal system); Mensch, supra note 95, at 764 (same). Dawson, for example,
pays tribute to "the complex issues of ethics and economic policy that constantly intrude themselves
and on which courts, like other agencies of organized society, must take a positive stand." Dawson,
supra note 35, at 289.
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of a contract law that purports to be "private,"' 7 but the critique's revolu-
tionary potential has never been fully realized. Hale's themes were echoed
by the Realists, but only to support change in areas where formalism's
limited definition of coercion had come to seem inhumane and unrealistic.
Employing Hale's insights, the Realists argued that the scope of the doc-
trine of duress could readily be expanded, and that the doctrine should
reflect sensible policies plainly articulated rather than some metaphysical
notion of "free will." The Realist message was, "If contract law is to be
'public,' let us be clear what public concerns are being met."' 0 8
Hale's argument also provided the basis for Dawson's seminal article
on economic duress. Dawson began by paying homage to the multiplicity
of legal and equitable sources that had historically contributed to common
law notions guiding duress and related doctrines.'09 But he also identified
the increasing role that the concepts of free will and of will overborne
played in these diverse strands of doctrine." 0 Using Hale's critique as his
starting point, Dawson discussed particular problems inherent in decisions
about whether will is or is not free in particular circumstances."' But in
shifting the emphasis away from the reality of assent, Dawson did not
reformulate duress doctrine around the hitherto buried standard of bad
behavior. Instead, he contested the law's traditional expressions of reluc-
tance to judge equivalence in exchange; he argued both that equivalence
could be measured and that courts had long successfully done so."
2
Although Dawson wanted to make the substance of the bargain a cen-
tral feature of duress doctrine, he was not prepared to confront directly
the theory of "subjective value" so central to bargain theory. He argued
that his suggestions did not "involve any expectation that the methods of
private litigation will be used to overhaul the immense range of transac-
tions involving the sale or exchange of goods and services in a competitive
society.""' In order to ensure that such an overhaul would not occur,
Dawson proposed limiting restitution to situations of impaired bargaining
107. See Mensch, supra note 95, at 764.
108. Thus, Hale writes:
We shall have governmental intervention anyway, even if unplanned, in the form of the en-
forcement of property rights assigned to different individuals according to legal rules laid down
by the government. It is this unplanned governmental intervention which restricts economic
liberty so drastically and so unequally at present.
Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 104, at 628; see also Dawson, supra
note 35, at 289 ("The limited range of judicial action makes it no less important, however, that the
issues raised in private litigation be correctly identified and placed in proper perspective.").
109. Dawson, supra note 35, at 254-62.
110. Id. at 256.
111. Id. at 257, 264, 266.
112. Id. at 277-82.
113. Id. at 290.
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power: "[I]n the absence of specific countervailing factors of policy or ad-
ministrative feasibility, restitution is required of any excessive gain that
results, in a bargain transaction, from impaired bargaining power,
whether the impairment consists of economic necessity, mental or physical
disability, or a wide disparity in knowledge or experience. "114
Unfortunately, the introduction of the concept of impaired bargaining
power ultimately committed Dawson to replicating the underlying struc-
ture of the formalist duress doctrine he sought to displace. The factual
inquiry into impaired bargaining power depends upon distinguishing real
from unreal assent, and acceptable from unacceptable behavior: "the spe-
cific conditions which affect the bargaining power and the motivations of
individuals in particular transactions."11 5 Because it provides neither im-
proved access to party intent nor an improved basis for judging acceptable
behavior, Dawson's scheme leaves us where formalism did: We are unable
to draw the line between freedom and coercion, either as a matter of logic
or as a matter of policy.
One final piece of analysis brings us full circle. If the mere fact of
impaired bargaining power, in combination with an inequivalence of ex-
change, were enough to invoke duress doctrine, impaired bargaining
power would not serve the purpose Dawson acknowledges it still must:
isolating just those kinds of impairment that the law is prepared to redress
without feeling that the whole structure of bargaining between unequals
is put in jeopardy. Dawson essentially recognizes this when he concludes
that even in the face of impaired bargaining power and inequivalence,
"factors of policy or administrative feasibility . . . may lead to refusal of
judicial relief . ."I"" At one level, this acknowledgement of the "pub-
lic" nature of the assessment repairs the difficulty of subjectively assessing
intent; but it implicates the decisionmaker all over again in the question of
what the basis of the decision is to be. Thus, Dawson ultimately fails in
his attempt either to explain or constrain the public intrusion of duress
doctrine into the supposedly private world of contract.
3. Modern Times
The preceding examination of classical and Realist thinking on contract
law reveals both a private and a public way of articulating the bases of
duress. The private way is to say that what makes some bargains shocking
is the way one party is manipulated into an assent that is not "real." The
public way is to say that some bargains are so shocking to our norms of
114. Id. at 289.
115. Id. at 282.
116. Id. at 290.
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decency or equality that we will not enforce them. Classical theorists re-
lied primarily on the private articulation; the Realists shifted the basic
articulation of these doctrines to a public mode. In classical doctrine, how-
ever, private bumps into public: Doctrinal commitment to a market system
based on the exploitation of inequality makes it impossible to judge as
"unreal" the majority of coerced assents. Under the Realist view, public
bumps into private: The conflict between subjective and objective value,
between individualistic policies premised on inequality and dedicated to
maintaining the basic market structure, and policies designed to minimize
advantage and promote fairness in contractual relationship, can be re-
solved only by reintroducing a private analysis of assent. In both schemes,
standards of good behavior are invoked as a mediating device, without an
explicit recognition that they, too, are problematic in the absence of any
defined way to sort out those situations requiring altruistic rather than
individualistic conduct.
The central question guiding an analysis of current doctrine must
therefore be whether it has moved forward in identifying either those pub-
lic norms that must invalidate private contracts, or those instances in
which private intention requires the protection provided by public inter-
vention. I conclude that it has not. I plan to look, briefly, at two areas: the
current law of duress and the comparatively new doctrine of unconsciona-
bility. My claim is that regardless of whether these doctrines present
themselves as "more private" or "more public," they continue to wrestle
with both the difficulty of ascertaining subjective intent, and the conflict
among policy commitments to subjective and objective value, individualism
and altruism.
a. The Modern Law of Duress
The Second Restatement provides, in three of its sections, a representa-
tive account of current formulations of duress doctrine. Section 174 is a
vestige of the classical approach; it provides that assent obtained through
physical constraint renders the resulting contract "void." ' The following
two sections of the Restatement reflect the expanded conception of un-
freedom which has been a part of the common law of duress since Hale's
critique. The Second Restatement's attempt to define duress, however, is
constrained by the three approaches we have already seen operating in
earlier models: the assent of the disfavored party, the behavior of the fa-
vored party, and the terms of the exchange.
Section 175 adopts the first approach and focuses on assent; it makes
voidable the contract to which a manifestation of assent has been induced
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 174 comment a.
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by "an improper threat. . .[that] leaves the victim no reasonable alterna-
tive." ' 8 The commentary discusses what counts as "inducement"" 9 and
what counts as a "reasonable alternative." 20 Section 176 addresses coer-
cive behavior; it defines what counts as an "improper threat."
Predictably, Section 175 is bedeviled by the problem of knowledge. The
commentary notes that the Restatement has chosen the "reasonable alter-
native" standard over other standards, including "such fear as precludes a
party from exercising free will and judgment," and such fear as "would
induce assent on the part of a brave man or a man of ordinary firmness,"
because of the "vagueness and impracticability" of the latter standards.'
In rejecting the latter two standards, the Restatement has rejected both a
subjectively and an objectively conceived standard, as applied to the emo-
tive (and, to that extent, overridingly subjective) concept of "fear." In
comparison to "fear," "reasonable alternatives" has a reassuringly ra-
tional and objective ring. And yet the Restatement actually straddles the
subjective-objective divide, both by coupling the objective "reasonable al-
ternatives" with the subjective requirement that assent be induced by the
threat, 2' and then by its internal treatment of both reasonable alternatives
and inducement.
The "objectivity" of the "reasonable alternatives" standard is supported
by the commentary's formulation of general rules. Defending a civil claim
is "ordinarily" a reasonable alternative to succumbing to the pressure im-
posed by threat of a civil suit;' finding alternative sources of funds is,
"absent a showing of peculiar necessity," a reasonable alternative in face
of a threat not to pay money owed.124 On the other hand, the commentary
partially subjectivizes the standard by requiring that the circumstances of
the particular victim be considered. 25 The slide to subjectivity is halted
only at the point where we might otherwise ask whether the victim him-
self perceived the alternative as reasonable." 6
118. Id. § 175(1).
119. See id. § 175 comment a.
120. See id. § 175 comment b.
121. Id.
122. See id. § 175 comment c: "A party's manifestation of assent is induced by duress if the duress
substantially contributes to his decision to manifest his assent .... The test is subjective and the
question is, did the threat actually induce assent on the part of the person claiming to be the victim of
duress."
123. Id. § 175 comment b.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. For an example of the manipulability of the reasonable alternative standard in operation, see
Austin Instrument v. Loral Corp., 35 A.D.2d 387, 316 N.Y.S.2d 528 (App. Div. 1970), rev'd in part,
modified in part, 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971). While the lower court
found no duress, the appellate court found that duress was established as a matter of law, based in
part on its assessment that reasonable alternatives had been pursued but were lacking. See infra note
128.
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If the identification of reasonable alternatives proceeds as an objective
exercise inevitably tainted by strong elements of subjectivity, then the
identification of induced assent proceeds as a search for subjective states of
mind inevitably guided by objective signposts. For instance, we are told
that "although it is not essential that a reasonable person would have be-
lieved that the maker of the threat had the ability to execute it, this may
be relevant in determining whether the threat actually induced assent." 127
These new and slippery criteria are no better than the standards rejected
by the Restatement as vague and impractical. The interplay of subjective
and objective creates a framework within which the decisionmaker can
readily justify either finding or not finding a coerced assent in a given
situation.128
Because they run up against our conflicting ideas about what responsi-
bilities we owe to one another in the contractual setting, the Restatement's
definitions of improper threat are similarly underdetermined. The Re-
statement here incorporates both of the regulatory ideas already advanced
in this context: a focus on the prohibition of some types of coercive behav-
ior, and a focus on the equivalence of the resulting exchange. This explicit
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 175 comment c. According to the Second Restate-
ment, "[T]he availability of disinterested advice and the length of time that elapses between the mak-
ing of the threat and the assent may also be relevant in determining whether the threat actually
induced the assent." Id. But for an illustration of the competing interpretations that may be put upon
deliberation and the lapse of time, see Austin Instrument, 29 N.Y.2d at 131-32, 272 N.E.2d at 536,
324 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
128. For an example of the manipulability of these standards in operation, see Austin Instrument
v. Loral Corp., 35 A.D.2d 387, 316 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1970), rev'd in part, modified in part, 29 N.Y.2d
124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971).
The plaintiff subcontractor, Austin, brought suit for a balance owing under its contract with the
defendant, Loral. Loral in turn sued to recover damages for economic duress. At issue were some
price increases made in the course of performance of the subcontracts, which Austin claimed were
agreed upon, but which Loral argued were the product of coercion. The lower court found no duress,
but the New York Court of Appeals found that duress was established as a matter of law.
Austin claimed to be working at a loss in its initial contract with Loral. It then demanded to be
awarded a second subcontract and to be paid a higher price for its performance of the first subcon-
tract, and threatened a work stoppage unless its demands were met. The month of the threatened
stoppage was in any case a month in which Austin's work force traditionally took annual vacations.
Loral responded to Austin in a letter which said that Loral had no alternative but to submit to the
demands, because of the harm that might otherwise be done to Loral's relationship with its con-
tracting party-the United States Navy.
The lower court emphasized that a threat to break a contract does not necessarily constitute duress.
It stressed the tradition of renegotiation of prices in contracts of this type and declined to interpret
Austin's threatened stoppage as a firm threat to discontinue performance. It found Loral's letter "self-
serving," and questioned whether Loral's relationship with the Navy was threatened. It thought
Loral's efforts to secure an alternative source of supply desultory, and concluded that Loral had re-
viewed its options "calmly and with considerable deliberation," and reached a voluntary decision to
stay the course with Austin. Austin Instrument, 35 A.D.2d at 389-90, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
The New York Court of Appeals, in contrast, saw the threatened stoppage as a firm threat. It took
Loral's letter as a bona fide statement of its position. It thought Loral's fears of damaging its relation-
ship with the Navy rational, and its efforts to secure an alternative supply adequate. See Austin
Instrument, 29 N.Y.2d at 130-34, 272 N.E.2d 535-37, 32 N.Y.S.2d at 25-28. On precisely the same
record as that before the lower court, therefore, the appeals court reached the opposite conclusion.
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reliance on standards of behavior is new to the Restatement, but its rise to
prominence is not accompanied by any better account of how judges are to
make individual determinations.
The Restatement divides threats into two categories: those so egregious
as to be improper even without any analysis of the resulting bargain, and
those offensive only when allied to a resultant unfair exchange. 29 The
more egregious category is composed of conduct already defined as unac-
ceptable by the criminal law or the law of torts, and conduct that breaches
the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. Threats to commit
crimes or torts do not necessarily influence the threatened party more than
other threats not singled out for special treatment; Dawson had earlier
lamented the "distinction between legal and illegal means" as "misdi-
rected, a survival from an earlier period in which duress doctrines were
merely an adjunct of the law of crime and tort."130 The only advantage of
this strategy is that it displaces the problem of identifying unacceptable
behavior over to some other area of the law, leaving the law of contract
apparently free of the need for making such controversial normative
choices.131
The problem with identifying conduct that breaches a contractual duty
of good faith and fair dealing as the remaining category of egregious
threat is that our doctrine has not developed reliable guidelines for distin-
guishing this unacceptable conduct from the kind of self-interested and
self-reliant conduct on which the contractual system is based. Here the
problem of normative choice is not displaced, only deferred until an indi-
vidual judge is required to make an individual decision.
The less egregious category of threat is rendered problematic both by its
dependence on the identification of the "unfair exchange," and by its use
of highly uncertain measures of appropriate conduct, such as "unfair deal-
ing" or "the use of power for illegitimate ends." These raise the very
questions they were supposed to answer: What uses of power are illegiti-
mate, what kinds of pressure are unfair, in the contractual context?
If duress is indeed a "public" limitation on freedom of contract, then, at
129. This is the distinction between threats grouped under § 176(1) and those grouped under
§ 176(2).
130. Dawson, supra note 35, at 287.
131. This is reminiscent of the following "economist joke." An economist was on his hands and
knees under a street lamp, evidently searching for something, when a policeman came by. He told the
policeman he had lost his keys, and for some time they searched together. Finally, discouraged, the
policeman asked: "Are you sure you lost them here?" "Why no," replied the economist, "I lost them
over there in that dark alley. But it's easier to look here."
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one level, breach of societal norms is a perfectly legitimate basis for invok-
ing the doctrine. Linking the presence of an improper threat to the subjec-
tive requirement of actual inducement can then be viewed as an appropri-
ate way of limiting public intervention to protection of the private sphere
of autonomy. In practice, however, apart from a somewhat arbitrary list
provided by other areas of law, we have as much trouble identifying a
breach of societal norms as we do identifying autonomy and its absence.
Standards of appropriate behavior prove as elusive as standards of their
exchange.
b. Unconscionability
In both the U.C.C.132 and the Restatement,133 unconscionability doctrine
is directed to the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise. In its focus
on oppression, it has obvious and strong links to duress; in its focus on
unfair surprise, it has similarly obvious and strong links to fraud. One
way of explaining the place of unconscionability in the body of contract
doctrine is to describe it as the public face of a concern for which duress
and fraud then appear as the private expressions. An unconscionable con-
tract is one that shocks the public conscience. Duress and fraud concen-
trate, by comparison, on the effect of the coercive or fraudulent conduct on
the contractual capacity of the affected party. Another explanation is that
unconscionability is the area in which the Realist insight about coercion is
finally enshrined in contract doctrine, as the focus shifts from the model of
bad behavior largely unconnected with the operation of the market system
to the model of exploitation of economic advantage.
132. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) reads:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to
its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
The principle of unconscionability is described as "one of the prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." Id. offi-
cial comment I (citation omitted). The decision about whether a contract is tainted by unconscionabil-
ity is to be kept from the unruly hands of the triers of fact; it is a question of law for the court. Id. §
2-302(1) and official comment 3. The latter reads, in part: "The present section is addressed to the
court, and the decision is to be made by it. . . . Only the agreement which results from the court's
action on these matters is to be submitted to the general triers of the facts."
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 208 reads:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon-
scionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
Here, too, the question is reserved to the court, although it is not specifically described as a matter
of law rather than one of fact. See id. § 208 comment f.
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Unconscionability doctrine, however, contains the same tension between
public and private, the same preoccupation with the problem of power,
that we have already seen characterizes duress. As a result, rather than
finally clarifying when the acceptable manipulation of economic advantage
shades into unacceptable dealing, unconscionability doctrine reverts to the
same endless play around reality of assent, standards of behavior, and ine-
quivalence of exchange.
The newest idea in unconscionability doctrine is inequality of bargain-
ing power. The U.C.C. version of unconscionability expressly disclaims
any concern with this notion,134 but the Restatement suggests that while
"mere" inequality does not make for unconscionability, "gross" inequality
does have a role to play.1"5
Even gross inequality is not a conclusive indicator of unconscionability.
It is to be used only in conjunction with "terms unreasonably favorable to
the stronger party,"138 an analysis that presumes the possibility of sub-
stantive measurement. As yet another qualification, the combination of
gross inequality of bargaining power and unreasonably favorable terms
will only lead to a finding of unconscionability if it demonstrates a failure
of process rather than substance: "confirm[ing] indications that the trans-
action involved elements of deception or compulsion," or alternatively
demonstrates a lack of real assent, showing "that the weaker party had no
meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear
to assent to the unfair terms.113 7
This treatment of unequal bargaining power is paradigmatic of the un-
easy way unconscionability doctrine brings together individualism and al-
truism, public and private. Inequality of bargaining power cannot of itself
invalidate agreements, because the Restatement recognizes the truth of the
Realist insight that every contract is the product of an inequality of bar-
gaining power with respect to the subject of the bargain. The promise that
we can correct for "gross" inequality is simply the promise that the worst
features of the system can be held in check without threatening the regu-
lar operation of the system. The commentary suggests that we could agree
on the point at which inequality becomes unacceptable, but it fails to offer
any guidance for performing such a calculation. Diverting attention from
the issue of equality to the presence or absence of other features of the
agreement forestalls the overtly political decisions required to establish
such a standard.
134. See U.C.C. § 2-302 official comment 1.
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The commentary also directs our attention to the feature of substantive
equivalence. It turns out, however, that this standard must be treated ex-
actly the same way as inequality of bargaining power, and for exactly the
same reasons. Mere inadequacy of consideration does not invalidate an
exchange; only "gross disparity" is important.13 And the suggestion that
gross disparity must be linked to other features distracts us from the polit-
ical nature of drawing lines between the grossly and the merely dispar-
ate-even while we are assured that the exercise could be undertaken.
In addition to inequality of bargaining power and inequivalence of
terms, the Restatement provides only one further guide to recognizing un-
conscionability: the stronger party's state of mind. According to the Re-
statement, we should be influenced by:
belief by the stronger party that there is no reasonable probability
that the weaker party will fully perform the contract; knowledge of
the stronger party that the weaker party will be unable to receive
substantial benefits from the contract; knowledge of the stronger
party that the weaker party is unable reasonably to protect his inter-
ests . 139
This returns us to the behavior of the favored party, and does so in a
fashion that is particularly problematic because of its emphasis on subjec-
tive standards. It seems that when we search for the objective manifesta-
tions of the culpable state of mind, we only return to the inquiries from
which we have so recently fled.
D. Summary
In the implied contract story, we saw how public and private were con-
founded, how our understanding of implied-in-fact and express contracts
requires us to draw on a fund of public information and values that influ-
ences our judgment of what we see. Similarly, our imposition of a public
quasi-contractual obligation requires us to look for private signals from
the parties about their conception of their relationship. Rather than ban-
ishing quasi-contract as a dangerous public exception to a private law of
contract, therefore, we embraced its lesson that all contract is as public as
it is private. This theme is elaborated in the discussion of manifestation
and intent in Part II.
The lessons of duress and unconscionability are similar. The efforts to
incorporate these doctrines into the world of private contract through a
138. Id. § 208 comment c. As with equality of bargaining power, there is no effort to suggest
concretely how the line between mere and gross disparity might be drawn.
139. Id. § 208 comment d.
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focus on contractual "will," or to situate them as public exceptions to a
rule that traditionally rejects interference in private exchanges, necessarily
end in failure. Furthermore, the lessons of duress and unconscionability
have the same direct bearing on consideration doctrine that the lessons of
quasi-contract have on doctrines of contract formation and interpretation.
These lessons reveal consideration doctrine to be as public as the doctrines
of duress and unconscionability-as preoccupied with norms of fairness,
as concerned to deny that preoccupation by recourse to identification of
party will or intention. This theme is also taken up in the discussion of
form and substance in Part III.
II. MANIFESTATION AND INTENT:
COMMUNICATION IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT
Underlying the realms of contract doctrine concerning how agreements
are formed, how they should be interpreted, and how contractual risks are
allocated are models of how the parties communicate with one another
and construct the meaning that is their contract, as well as models of how
courts gain access to that meaning. In the previous section I suggested that
it is not in practice possible to separate out a court's understanding of the
parties' meaning from a meaning made for and imposed on the parties by
the court. Here I elaborate on that theme, through an analysis of doctrinal
categories including offer and acceptance, the parol evidence rule, disclos-
ure, misunderstanding, and mistake.
My goal in this section is to articulate precisely how, according to con-
tract doctrine, meaning is made and communicated. I suggest that close
examination reveals the doctrinal model to be at once unconvincing and
incomplete. To the extent judges attempt to describe communication in
doctrinal terms, they are forced into accounts that tend to distort what we
imagine the actual process of communication between the contracting par-
ties to have been. To the extent the doctrinal model leaves judges without
guidance, they are left ascribing meaning according to unarticulated crite-
ria. Both these problems emphasize the gap between the contract as the
parties may have understood it and the contract as ultimately described by
the court.
At the root of these difficulties lies the problem of knowledge-the gulf
between self and other, subject and object. Translated into doctrinal dis-
course, this becomes the distinction between subjectivity, substance, and
intent on one hand, and objectivity, form, and manifestation on the other.
Our legal culture appreciates the difference between what someone sub-
jectively intends, and the form in which he makes that intention available
to others (the objective representation of his thought or wish). That we
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concede the possibility of "mis-understanding" demonstrates our aware-
ness of this dichotomy and our recognition that the signs can be read to
manifest something other than the "actual" or "real" intent of their au-
thor. Appreciating the difference, our legal culture has explicitly opted to
favor objective over subjective, form over substance, and manifestation
over intent, in the areas of doctrine with which this Part deals. Yet the
suppressed subjective constantly erupts to threaten the priority accorded
the objective, is subdued, and erupts again. The details of this dynamic
occupy the following pages.
Doctrinal obsession with the competing claims of objective and subjec-
tive, manifestation and intent, dates perhaps from the time at which a
"will theory" of contract, initially conceived as emphasizing the subjective
"meeting of the minds," 40 was "objectivized" by the likes of Holmes and
Williston."" In this second incarnation, while the subjective intentions of
the parties were still felt to provide the legitimating basis of contractual
obligation, the measure of intention became overwhelmingly objective.
The tension between these two aspects of doctrine and the need to recon-
cile them did not become urgent until a couple of decades into the twenti-
eth century.142
The Second Restatement provides an up-to-the-minute account of how
that tension is managed today. We see that objectivity is still accorded an
initial priority. Take, for example, the Restatement's formulation of
"promise" as "a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in
a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a
commitment has been made."14 Here the Second Restatement directs us
to focus, not on all intentions, but only on manifested ones. The commen-
tary elaborates on the significance of this distinction: "The phrase 'mani-
festation of intention' adopts an external or objective standard for inter-
preting conduct; it means the external expression of intention as
distinguished from undisclosed intention." 44 At first glance, this con-
strained notion of intent seems pragmatic. To base contract interpretation
on undisclosed intention is surely to invite chaos, perjury, a whole catalog
of evils. At a more theoretical level, we might also imagine a concern with
undisclosed intention to be senseless. At some point the undisclosed must
be disclosed or we can have no concrete knowledge of it. Intent, in this
view, is wholly dependent on manifestation-the only questions left are:
140. See KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 35-38.
141. G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 41-44; see infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., Costigan, supra note 61; Whittier, supra note 63, at 442-44.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 2(1).
144. Id. § 2(1) comment b.
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What count as manifestations? To whom must they be made? In what
form? At what time?
But even while objectivity retains its priority, subjectivity is accorded a
vital and subversive supplementary role. According to the Restatement
scheme, recognizing a manifestation requires a knowledge of intent. The
Restatement demands that we categorize manifestations: Only manifesta-
tions of intent qualify as promises,1 5 only manifestations of assent qualify
as assent. 14" Doctrinally we cannot, it turns out, sort or interpret manifes-
tations without reference to an intent we have already acknowledged to be
beyond our grasp save through the graspable reality of manifestations that
we cannot comprehend without recourse to an unknowable intent . ..
and so on.
In the various doctrinal areas rendered problematic by this basic conun-
drum, the Restatement attempts three different, although related, solu-
tions. One proposed escape route treats "intent," in the formulation
"manifestation of intent," as mere verbiage, not as an indication that the
decisionmaker in fact needs to take account of intent.147 A second route
suggests that in concrete disputes the problem of recognizing manifesta-
tions is reduced to the problem of choosing between two competing sets of
manifestations, so that the adoption of a formal hierarchy that privileges
certain classes of manifestations will provide criteria of choice not depen-
dent on intent." 8 It is clear how these two devices can work together:
Having dismissed the idea of "actual" intent from the rule formulation,
the formal hierarchy purports to provide the substitute criteria. The third
proposed escape route attempts to resolve the set of "communication"
problems by reference to a standard of "responsibility," as a substitute for
reliance on "manifestations of intent.' 49
Just as the basic conundrum is unresolvable, so the proposed escape
routes turn out to be dead ends. All three routes lead to endless struggle
with the unknowability of intent on the one hand, and the legitimation
problems involved in the use of non-consensual or non-intent-based crite-
ria on the other. Each leads to a choice between basing liability on an
unreliable assertion of private intention, or admitting and justifying the
imposition of public law on the parties. I shall demonstrate how this dy-
namic operates to ensure that: (1) any standard that begins by emphasiz-
ing intention winds up depending on equally unsatisfying models of for-
mal hierarchy or responsibility; (2) any standard that begins by
145. Id. § 2(l).
146. Id. § 18.
147. See the account of the objective theory of contract which follows at text accompanying notes
149-173.
148. See the account of formal hierarchy which follows at text accompanying notes 174-213.
149. See the account of responsibility which follows at text accompanying notes 214-270.
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emphasizing formal hierarchy winds up depending on equally unsatisfy-
ing models of intention or responsibility; and (3) any standard that begins
by emphasizing responsibility winds up depending on equally unsatisfying
models of formal hierarchy or intention.
A. Intention Ousted: The Objective Theory of Contract
A standard history of contract doctrine represents that, from the six-
teenth to the early nineteenth century, contract formation depended upon
a subjective "meeting of the minds. '150 Despite the accordance of this sub-
jective theory with the nineteenth-century "will theory" of contract, by the
middle of the nineteenth century "the tide had turned in favor of an objec-
tive theory of contract." ' To see the sequence as one in which objectivism
replaced subjectivism is to discount the crucial, although supplementary,
role that subjective will as a source of obligation continued to play. But
the story accurately portrays the increased insistence on objectivity as an
interpretive standard.
Holmes' article, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, illustrates the fun-
damental challenge of objectivism to the subjective theory it came to over-
shadow.152 According to Holmes, the "intent" of the parties was never the
issue in any case of contract interpretation. To determine the meaning of
a word used in a contractual situation, Holmes believed the first step
should be to consider its meaning in the context of surrounding words.
But this was an exercise in applying the "general usages of speech" and
did not reflect any concern with the "idiosyncrasies of the writer."'153 Ad-
mitting evidence of circumstances, and reading a contractual document in
light of them, was also not about divining the intent of the parties. We
were to ask instead, Holmes suggested, what the words used by the
speaker would mean "in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using
them in the circumstances in which they were used.' 5 4 In the case where
the speaker uses a proper name that could refer to more than one person
150. See Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 943-45 (1967).
This subjective theory of formation was firmly established by the end of the eighteenth century. See,
e.g., Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra
note 8, at 268; Cooke v. Oxley, 100 Eng. Rep. 785 (K.B. 1790), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE,
supra note 8, at 239; Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 368 (1921).
151. Farnsworth, supra note 150, at 945. Gilmore stresses the extent to which residual reliance
on the subjective "meeting of the minds" standard continued to characterize such later cases as Raffles
v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at
709, and Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (Ch. Div'l Ct. 1876), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE,
supra note 8, at 240. G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 35-44.
152. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899).
153. Id. at 417.
154. Id. at 417-18.
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or thing (because there are, for example, two Blackacres or ships Peer-
less), 155 Holmes saw the inquiry into circumstance revealing which of two
different words the speaker used, rather than revealing the speaker's
intention.15
Mainstream twentieth-century thinkers came to accept the most ex-
treme manifestations of the Holmesian doctrine. "It is even conceivable,"
Williston observes, "that a contract may be formed which is in accordance
with the intention of neither party."'157 Learned Hand puts it more vividly
when he suggests:
A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to cer-
tain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany
and represent a known intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty
bishops that either party, when he used the words, intended some-
thing else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon them,
he would still be held [to the usual meaning] .... '58
This analysis forces us to ask what justifies the departure from intent.
The central argument advanced is that replacing the unknowable and pos-
sibly idiosyncratic intentions of the contracting party with "that stubborn
anti-subjectivist, the 'reasonable man,' "15 is an advance. It seems insuffi-
cient to suggest that this substitution merely satisfies an aesthetic im-
pulse.16 0 At one level the substitution can be seen as a shift to a "responsi-
bility" model: You are responsible for what you would appear to the
reasonable man to be saying, rather than for what you actually meant to
say. In this sense the standard seems tortious rather than contractual, even
155. See Raffles, 159 Eng. Rep. 375.
156. See Holmes, supra note 152, at 417-18. As Gilmore comments, "The magician who could
'objectify' Raffles v. Wichelhaus ... could, the need arising, objectify anything. But why bother?" G.
GILMORE, supra note 29, at 41.
157. 1 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 95 (3d ed. 1957), reprinted in KESSLER & GIL-
MORE, supra note 8, at 707.
158. Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd, 201 F. 664 (2d
Cir. 1912), affd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 707.
By making bishops his oracles, Hand has fudged the issue of how they would show that their
divination of intent was the correct one; if they were mere humans with no special access to higher
authority, we might imagine that they too would have to rely on manifestations. This would change
the nature of the exercise from a simple privileging of manifestation (and disregard for intent) to an
exercise in which certain manifestations were given priority over others by a standard other than that
of intent. The parol evidence rule is a perfect example of this. Williston's objectivism turns out to have
very specific implications for the application of that rule, but they are implications that depend notjust on the privileging of manifestation over intent, but also the privileging of some manifestations
over others. See infra text accompanying notes 182-206 (treatment of parol evidence rule).
159. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring).
Judge Frank's concurrence is excerpted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 707.
160. "[I]n part at least, advocacy of the 'objective' standard in contracts appears to have repre-
sented a desire for legal symmetry, legal uniformity, a desire seemingly prompted by aesthetic im-
pulses." Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 761 (Frank, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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as "reliance" strikes us as a tortious notion. But at another level it can be
reconciled with intention and the contractual model. If the reasonable man
is a businessman assessing the words and conduct of businessmen, then in
most instances appearance and reality will converge. Alternatively, if the
ranking of manifestations is seen as a tool available to businessmen in
their contract planning, they will be sure to shape in the proper legal
form the deal they intended to make.'
It seems fair to say that the credibility of these arguments depends on
two things: First, on the extent to which we can believe in the "reasonable
man," as represented by his interpreters, the jurors and trial judges. As
Frank puts it:
[W]e must recognize, unless we wish to fool ourselves, that although
one area of subjectivity has been conquered, another remains unsub-
dued. . . . We ask judges or juries to discover that "objective view-
point"-through their own subjective processes. Being but human,
their beliefs cannot be objectified, in the sense of being
standardized.112
Second, the credibility of these arguments depends on our valuing objectiv-
ity and stability (to the extent we think the rule does or can promote
them) more than we value the effort at divining "real" intention, in situa-
tions where the intention appears from the evidence to have been under-
stood by both parties, but is different from the intention objectively con-
structed. It is this latter concern, more than anything else, that appears to
have evoked the conviction that the objectivists went "too far."'6 3
Hayden v. Hoadley,14 decided in 1920, is an example of an objectivist
position that seems extreme by today's standards. The parties exchanged
property through a written agreement that bound Hoadley and his co-
seller to make certain repairs on the property conveyed to the Haydens. 165
Nothing in the agreement spoke to the timing of the repairs, the amount
to be expended, or the quality of materials to be used. The trial court
excluded evidence of oral agreement as to these matters in a decision up-
held by the Supreme Court of Vermont. 6'
161. These arguments suggest, first, that for most people there is no coercion in imposing an
external standard on their behavior, since that standard is one they have already internalized and,
second, that even when the external standard has not already been internalized, it can be, without
notable cost, and indeed with advantage. The first argument assumes that law follows fact, the second
that fact follows law.
162. Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 647 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 709 (1944)
(per curiam), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 679.
163. Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 761 (Frank, J., concurring).
164. 94 Vt. 345, 111 A. 343 (1920).
165. Id. at 347-48, 111 A. at 344.
166. Id. at 348, 111 A. at 344.
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Justice Powers, for the court, began his analysis with an unexceptional
statement of the parol evidence rule: "A written contract which contains
no latent ambiguity cannot be qualified, controlled, contradicted, enlarged,
or diminished by any contemporaneous or antecedent understanding or
1I67agreement ....
In Powers' view, however, the rule governs not merely the express
terms of the contract, but also its "legal intendment."' 6 This view se-
verely erodes the role of the parties' intentions. In the absence of any
express provision as to the timing of the repairs, for example, the law
would imply a requirement that they be completed within a reasonable
time.169 Because any oral supplementary term as to timing would contra-
dict the "reasonable time" provision, it may not be included: "To admit
the testimony offered by the defendants to the effect that the parties
agreed upon October 1 as the limit of the time given for the repairs would
be to allow the plain legal effect of the written contract to be controlled by
oral evidence. That is not permissible. 1 °70
While Justice Powers is firm in asserting the "unquestioned sound-
ness" of the rule that "an incomplete writing may be supplemented by
parol,' 1 7 1 his conclusion that this contract is "unequivocal and com-
plete"172 makes clear that the exception is to be narrowly construed.1 73
Powers, like Holmes and Williston, disregards the particular parties and
their intentions in the name of a "legal intendment," the justification for
which is apparently so obvious to the author that it goes virtually
unarticulated.1 7 4
167. Id., 111 A. at 344-45.
168. Id., 111 A. at 345.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citation omitted).
171. Id. at 349, 111 A. at 345.
172. Id. at 348, 111 A. at 345.
173. Justice Powers' fervor for the rule is further demonstrated by his refusal to consider the
evidence as demonstrating what time would be reasonable under the circumstances, because the par-
ties had not offered it on that basis, id. at 349, 111 A. at 345, and his assumption that the oral
conversations referred to took place before the written contract was executed, despite the silence of the
record on that point, id.
174. Powers does stress the primacy of the "rule," id. at 348, 111 A. at 344, as well as the fact
that it would be "illogical and wrong" to decide otherwise, id. at 348, 111 A. at 345.
A nice counterpoint is provided by Garden Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 78 N.J. Super. 485, 189
A.2d 448 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963):
[E]xperience teaches that language is so poor an instrument for communication or expression
of intent that ordinarily all surrounding circumstances and conditions must be examined before
there is any trustworthy assurance of derivation of contractual intent, even by reasonable
judges of ordinary intelligence, from any given set of words which the parties have committed
to paper as their contract.
Id. at 496, 189 A.2d at 454. The judge justifies the fullest consideration of "surrounding and antece-
dent circumstances and negotiations." Id. If "intent" has thus been raised to primacy, however, the
necessity for a residual commitment to "manifestation" finds expression in the limitation-exactly
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B. Formal Hierarchy: Manifestations Multiplied
In the cut and thrust of contract disputes, we imagine the abstract,
open-ended problem of finding manifested-intent reduced to the concrete
restricted choice between the different versions that the two contracting
parties urged upon the decision-maker. This gives credibility to a formal
model of determining contractual content: Some manifestations simply
take precedence over other manifestations, so that conflicts of interpreta-
tion can be resolved by favoring the hierarchically superior manifestation.
Thus, as I explore below, speech is superior to silence, while final writ-
ings are superior to earlier writings or speech.
Current contract doctrine, as reflected by the Second Restatement, re-
acts to the perceived excesses of objectivism by consistently invoking intent
as the ultimate justifier of hierarchy. In general terms, the justification is
that hierarchy reflects intention because intention corresponds to hierar-
chy. This general statement, however, hides the existence of two quite
separate themes: Intention may correspond to hierarchy because the rules
carefully mirror what people ignorant of the rules intend, or because peo-
ple take account of the legal rules in expressing their intentions. While
these two accounts contain dramatically different visions of the relation-
ship between law and life, judges cheerfully adopt one or the other as it
suits their purpose. They may even adopt both at once, which leads to
entirely circular reasoning. 175
The re-connection of formal hierarchy with intention, in whatever
form, serves to subdue the argument that rules that arbitrarily accord pri-
ority to some manifestations of intention take contract doctrine too far
from party intention and voluntary obligation. But modern doctrine must
still wrestle with the problem created by convincing evidence that the in-
terpretation yielded by the formal hierarchy is not the "real" interpreta-
tion. If the hierarchy triumphs, then the question reemerges of what-if
not intent-legitimates it; if the hierarchy does not triumph, then its value
as a constraint on decision-making is undercut.
I examine how this dynamic plays itself out in three examples. An
analysis of Restatement section 203, "Standards of Preference in Interpre-
tation," yields a crude understanding of the difficult relationship between
formal hierarchy and intention. My second example is the parol evidence
converse to Powers' statement of the exception to his version of the rule-that the court's interpreta-
tion must be "one 'which the written words will bear.'" Id. at 497, 189 A.2d at 455 (quoting Deer-
hurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, Inc., 64 N.J. Super. 134, 149, 165 A.2d 543, 551 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1960)).
175. I have already identified the first version as a "fact leading law" argument, and the second as
a "law leading fact" argument. See supra note 161. For an illustration of the two themes conflated to
provide a perfectly circular argument, see Baron Alderson's opinion in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex.
341, 355, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 1023.
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rule, where final writings take precedence over other evidence, most com-
monly earlier speech. The Restatement treatment of the rule provides an
elaborated statement and attempted resolution of the same problem, intro-
ducing the way in which a second level of doctrinal play between form
and substance can mediate the primary tension between hierarchy and
intention. My final example is the group of rules about silence as assent,
where speech or writing takes precedence over silence. This last analysis
presents the way in which the paradigm of responsibility can play a medi-
ating role, a subject that I then pursue in more detail in the areas of
misunderstanding, disclosure, and mistake.
1. Standards of Preference in Interpretation
Restatement section 203 is an elaborate, painstaking, and thorough at-
tempt to create a formal hierarchy of manifestations. It is a miracle of
orderly privileging: Whole interpretations win over partial, and specific
terms over general; relevant categories of interpretive context are identi-
fied and ranked.1 76 Unfortunately, however, the commentary undermines
whatever sense of order and security the text conveys.
According to comment a, "The rules of this Section are applicable to all
manifestations of intention and all transactions. They apply only in choos-
ing among reasonable interpretations. They do not override evidence of
the meaning of the parties, but aid in determining meaning or prescribe
legal effect when meaning is in doubt. '17 7 The first two sentences of the
comment confirm our sense of what the section is about: It allows us to
choose between and among possible meanings. It provides the way to sort
conflicting evidence of the content of the parties' agreement. Then the
comment proceeds to contradict itself, and negate the text of the section:
The formal hierarchy may not be employed to "override evidence of the
meaning of the parties. '178 But the hierarchy was supposed to produce the
meaning of the parties. The rules of the hierarchy were applicable to "all
176. Section 203 reads:
In the interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, the following standards of
preference are generally applicable:
(a) an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is
preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect;
(b) express terms are given greater weight than course of performance, course of dealing, and
usage of trade, course of performance is given greater weight than course of dealing or usage of
trade, and course of dealing is given greater weight than usage of trade;
(c) specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general language;
(d) separately negotiated or added terms are given greater weight than standardized terms or
other terms not separately negotiated.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 203.
177. Id. § 203 comment a (emphasis added).
178. Id.
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manifestations of intention," 179 which are our only sources of intention. If
the meaning they produce is now open to challenge, how are we to derive
the alternative meanings that might challenge it, and by what criteria are
we to assess the success of the challenge?
At one level we appreciate the realistic "flexibility" in ascertaining
meaning that the section and comment combine to give us: It accords with
our sense that the formal hierarchy is not sufficient to explain how judges
derive meaning when they decide cases. The structure of section 203 de-
ceives us, however: The text of the section stands as an affirmation of
formal hierarchy, while the comment does not spell out the full extent of
its undermining function. We are not told what the real story of section
203 demands we be told: "The formal hierarchy is a reliable guide to
what manifestations should count, except when it isn't. It can be trumped
by other evidence of the parties' meaning." What other evidence? When?
No answers are forthcoming.
1 80
Underlying the undermining language of the comment is the concern
that manifestations, after all, are empty unless they signify intent, and
that without some such qualification the "real" intent will lurk in the
wings to delegitimate the device of formal hierarchy. At one level the fear
is a groundless one: All intent requires manifestation to be known, while
all manifestations are threatened by irrelevance without reference to the
intent they signify. If the text of section 203 were truly to limit the scope
of our inquiry, it would inhibit us from finding other evidence of the
"meaning of the parties." ' It would not, of course, protect us from
doubts and fears that we had looked at empty vessels and missed the boat.
These same doubts and fears are what have guided the interpretation and
application of the parol evidence rule in its development from the classical
period to the present.
2. The Parol Evidence Rule
The thrust of the parol evidence rule is that an "integrated" writing, 82
or one that contains the "final expression" 83 of the parties with respect to
any terms of their agreement, cannot be contradicted or even supple-
mented with respect to those terms by other writings, speech, or conduct
of the parties. 84 While the most frequent issue in application of the rule is
179. Id.
180. Cf id. § 154, which, in the area of mistake, provides just such a candid expression of the
limitations of the rule formulated. See infra text accompanying notes 262-271.
181. Id. § 203 comment a.
182. See id. § 209.
183. See id.
184. See, e.g., id. §§ 215-216.
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perhaps the priority of later writing over earlier speech, the priority is
more accurately that of final writing over other types of evidence. The
very use of the adjective "final" suggests that the hierarchy is at the same
time based on intention, that it applies where the parties see the writing
as their "last word" on the subject.
The standard story about the parol evidence rule is that, while designed
to prevent fraud and introduce stability by permitting businessmen to rec-
ord their transactions, it has a disturbing tendency to promote fraud by
allowing one party to limit a liability which attention to all evidence of
agreement would indicate is more substantial than the integrated writing
alone reflects. The standard story, told in a tone of exasperation, is that
efforts to prevent fraud both by exaltation of the final writing and by
subversion of the final writing necessarily make the rule one riddled with
exceptions, virtually incapable of being applied.185
We should begin our examination of the rule with a quick survey of the
principal ways in which evidence external to the writing is admissible.
Since the writing does not announce its finality or its scope, external evi-
dence is needed on the question of whether and to what extent the writing
is integrated.18 In addition to these qualifications, the final writing does
not interpret itself, so reference to evidence external to the writing is re-
quired for interpretation.1 81 7 Finally, the writing cannot be conclusive as to
its legitimacy, so evidence can be admitted to show mistake, fraud, duress,
lack of consideration, or the existence of a condition precedent.188
This tedious taxonomy demonstrates how a rule that purports to be
about the privileging of "final writings" turns out to be surrounded by
rules that reverse the privilege, so that prior evidence of a condition can
supersede the written testament of the agreement, or so that prior evidence
of trade usage can supersede the dictionary meaning of the written
terms. 89 It is important to realize, however, that the precise formulation
185. E.g., Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 609-10 (1944).
186. On the use of external evidence to show that a writing is integrated, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 6, § 209 comment c. Such evidence is inadmissible even when the writing
purports to announce its integrated nature: "Written contracts, signed by both parties, may include an
explicit declaration that there are no other agreements between the parties, but such a declaration may
not be conclusive." Id. § 209 comment b. On the use of external evidence to show whether the writing
is a complete or only a partial integration, and whether collateral agreements exist, see id. § 210. "[A]
writing cannot of itself prove its own completeness . . . ." Id. § 210 comment b.
187. Id. § 212. As § 212 comment b explains, "[Mieaning can almost never be plain except in a
context."
188. Id. §§ 214, 217. Section 214 provides that "evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements
and negotiations" is available for the purpose of establishing "illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of
consideration, or other invalidating cause." Section 217 excludes orally agreed-upon conditions to a
written agreement from the ambit of the integrated agreement.
189. Cf Hurst v. Lake & Co., 141 Or. 306, 315, 16 P.2d 627, 630 (1932), reprinted in KESSLER
& GILMORE, supra note 8, at 673 (evidence of custom should not be excluded, even though instru-
ment is nonambiguous on its face).
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of the rule with its exceptions represents a second-level effort to sustain
the very hierarchy that has, at the first level, proved unsatisfactory.
The first sustaining device, exactly analogous to the relationship be-
tween the text and the comment of section 203,190 is a reversion to the idea
of intent. When the formal hierarchy seems insupportable, intent is rein-
troduced in an attempt to legitimate it. This occurs, for example, when
the Restatement talks about proving an integration,' proving a complete
integration, 192 and distinguishing an integrated from a completely inte-
grated agreement. 93
It is easy to state the anxiety that underlies the reintroduction of intent
in this subversion of formal hierarchy. To call an agreement integrated
purely because of its length, complexity, or apparent completeness, seems
an arbitrary statement of judicial or legal preference. To call it integrated
because most people who write such agreements intend them to be final
statements, allows the unscrupulous to exploit some particular people
with a definition drawn from the abstract "most people." Interpreting
such contracts according to their dictionary meaning is a similarly arbi-
trary exercise of authority with similar potential for exploitation. Yet, in-
exorably, the reintroduction of intent undercuts the hierarchy of form
without yielding firm guidelines for deciding cases.
Having created this subjective threat to the rule's objective hierarchy,
the Restatement then shores up the rule by recreating formal hierarchy at
a second, "softer" level. Where the first level of formal hierarchy directly
ranked the expressions of the parties-privileging writings over words or
conduct-this second level works more indirectly through three devices we
could loosely call procedural: (1) using presumptions that favor certain
manifestations over others, while avoiding any absolute privileging; (2)
ordering the different tasks that constitute application of the parol evi-
dence rule, so that evidence may be included in one stage of the proceed-
ings but legitimately excluded in another; and (3) dividing issues of proof
between law and fact, judge and jury, in a fashion that diverts attention
from the evidence-to-be-considered to the identity of the decisionmaker. 194
190. See supra text accompanying notes 176-181.
191. "Whether a writing has been adopted as an integrated agreement is a question of fact to be
determined in accordance with all relevant evidence." RESTATEMENT (SECoND), supra note 6, § 209
comment c.
192. "[W]ide latitude must be allowed for inquiry into circumstances bearing on the intention of
the parties." Id. § 210 comment b.
193. "Writings do not prove themselves; ordinarily, if there is dispute, there must be testimony
that there was a signature or other manifestation of assent." Id. § 214 comment a.
194. Ironically enough, this increased reliance on procedural devices is allied, as already sug-
gested, with an increased concern for the protection of party intent. It further corresponds with what
is commonly described as a shift from viewing the parol evidence rule as a "rule of evidence" to
viewing it as a "rule of substantive law."
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Let me first illustrate the use of presumptions. While the apparently
integrated agreement does not necessarily qualify as an integrated agree-
ment, it is presumed to be integrated.195 In interpreting an integrated
agreement, the written words, while not the only admissible evidence of
the parties' meaning, are given a similar procedural priority. 9 6 Any ap-
parent reassurance provided by the "weighting" technique evaporates
once you ask what other evidence would establish that a writing was not
integrated, or what other evidence of the transaction could override the
apparent meaning of the written words of the agreement.
The next device is that of sequencing. In the context of the parol evi-
dence rule, the Restatement suggests that the first decisions must be
whether the writing is an integration, 197 and if so, whether it is a complete
or only a partial integration. 98 The next decisions are whether the agree-
ment reflected by the writing is affected by an invalidating cause and,
provided it is not, how it should be interpreted.' 99 Only a written agree-
ment duly identified, validated, and interpreted "renders inoperative prior
written agreements as well as prior oral agreements. '20 0
The message of this task management scheme appears to be that the
decisionmaker need not be swamped by the boundless context of the
agreement. Although the privileged position of the final writing in the
hierarchy of interpretive sources has not completely isolated the writing
from the context of the agreement, the specificity and temporal spacing of
the questions posed can limit the impact of that context on interpretation.
No matter that each preliminary question requires the decisionmaker to
consider "all relevant evidence, including the circumstances in which the
writing was made or adopted."' 0 ' We have still "managed" the context
and, most critically, have prevented it from completely undermining the
sanctity of the integrated agreement.
The final re-creation of hierarchy is achieved by the division of issues
between judge and jury. Unlike other areas of law, there is no clear link,
in this context, between judge and law, jury and fact; the Restatement is
quite clear that some of the issues reserved for the judge are nonetheless
issues of fact. For example, the question of whether there is an integrated
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 209(3) provides that the apparently complete
writing "is taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is established by other evidence that the
writing did not constitute a final expression."
196. "[Alfter the transaction has been shown in all its length and breadth, the words of an inte-
grated agreement remain the most important evidence of intention." Id. § 212 comment b.
197. Id. § 209.
198. Id. § 210.
199. Id. §§ 212-218.
200. Id. § 213 comment a.
201. Id. § 214 comment a.
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agreement "is to be determined by the court,"20 2 even though it is "a ques-
tion of fact to be determined in accordance with all relevant evidence.
203
Interpretive questions with respect to an integrated agreement are to be
decided as questions of law, unless they depend on the credibility of ex-
trinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn
from extrinsic evidence, in which case they go to the "trier of fact."2 4
There are at least two messages of reassurance here. The first is that
while in some cases application of the parol evidence rule requires an
expanded and complex inquiry into circumstance, there are still easy
cases. For example, the claim of section 212(2) that some writings can be
interpreted without reference to any evidence extrinsic to the document
comes close to being a reincarnation of the "plain meaning" rule so ex-
plicitly abandoned by the Restatement elsewhere. Section 212(2) perpetu-
ates the idea of the writing being independent, in at least some instances:
It avoids the recognition that the writing is truly never self-limiting.20 5
The second message of reassurance is that the task of implementing the
rule as a rule about party intention need not devolve into idiosyncratic
instability. In this story the jury becomes the scapegoat. While unruly
fact-finders, constantly tempted "to exercise a dispensing power in the
guise of a finding of fact,"208 need the constraining influence of the hierar-
chy, we can trust our judges reliably and objectively to weigh all the evi-
dence of party intention. We are asked to transfer our faith from the ob-
jectivity of the written document to the objectivity of the decisionmaker.
Facts are made law-like, stable, not manipulable; indeed, facts recover the
characteristics the objectivists imbued them with when they held the final
writing to be the only source of evidence.
But this story diverts us from the real lesson of these provisions. The
unruliness of the inquiry does not arise from the level of objectivity, disci-
pline, or good faith exercised by the decisionmaker. Rather, it is the result
of our inability to identify intention in any reliable way, and our equal
incapacity to live with a rule structure that resolutely disregards intention.
Instead of openly acknowledging this difficulty, the Restatement presents
us with a system that turns irresolutely between the poles as it pretends to
provide a determinate guide to decisionmaking.
202. Id. §§ 209(2), 210(3).
203. Id. § 209 comment c.
204. Id. § 212(2). The commentary elaborates that this reservation of interpretive authority to the
judge "has the effect of limiting the power of the trier of fact to exercise a dispensing power in the
guise of a finding of fact, and thus contributes to the stability and predictability of contractual rela-
tions." Id. § 212 comment d.
205. See also Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 78 N.J. Super. 485, 189 A.2d 448
(1963).
206. REsrATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 212 comment d; see also supra note 193 and
accompanying text (discussing Restatement's conception of proof needed to validate a writing).
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3. Silence as Assent
Just as the parol evidence rule sought to privilege the "final writing" as
evidence of agreement, so the rules about when silence can function as
assent create a hierarchy that delegitimates silence. As with the parol evi-
dence rule, however, the attempt to invoke this formal hierarchy fails,
forcing doctrine either back into the rhetoric of intent or into another me-
diating rhetoric-in this case, that of responsibility. Since the hierarchy
was initially invoked to rescue decisionmakers from the problems of in-
tent, the reversion to intent is plainly unsatisfactory. The parallel
problems with responsibility are the subject of the next section. The par-
ticular force of this analysis, therefore, is the way in which it shows the
rhetorics of intent and responsibility working together to shore up a frail
appeal to formal hierarchy.
Restatement section 19 provides that a manifestation of assent may take
the form of written or spoken words, or of acts or failures to act.20 7 Failing
to act, however, is an underprivileged form of conduct, since silence and
inaction are generally disqualified as manifestations of assent.208 If abso-
lute, the rule would appear to solve a (perhaps limited) set of assent puz-
zles in a purely "formal" way, but without any pretense that intent was
the crucial criterion; some other "public" justification would have to be
invoked for such a rule.2" 9 The disqualifying presumption is a qualified
effort in the same direction.
The question now is how we apply the rule, how we recognize the
"exceptional" 210 case where silence may be assent. According to the Re-
statement, there are in fact two classes of exceptional cases: "those where
the offeree silently takes offered benefits, and those where one party relies
on the other party's manifestation of intention that silence may operate as
acceptance."21 The first type of case shifts us from "contract proper" into
"restitution," and introduces the theme of unjust enrichment.2"2 But, as it
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 19.
208. Id. § 69. Section 69(1) provides that "[w]hcre an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his silence
and inaction operate as an acceptance in the following cases only." Section 69(1) comment a confirms
that "[a]cceptance by silence is exceptional."
209. The same is true of the "plain meaning" rule classically used to prohibit the use of external
evidence in interpreting the integrated agreement unless the contractual language was ambiguous.
Under that rule, an unambiguous dictionary definition could replace the actual significance intended
by the parties.
210. Id. § 69 comment a.
211. Id.
212. It is worth noting the way in which the language "silently takes offered benefits" jars with
the category "silence and inaction" of which it is supposed to be an example. Inaction here has been
transmuted into "action" on the basis of a judgment that the offeree has "benefited." The instability
of the terms is thereby illuminated. This is an illustration of the maxim that could be said to haunt
this whole discussion: Action, and sometimes inaction, speaks louder than words.
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turns out, the enrichment is defined as unjust according to models of in-
tent and responsibility: The offeree must have a "reasonable opportunity"
to reject the services, and "reason to know" that they were offered with
the "expectation of compensation.121 3 The "expectation" idea is a rever-
sion to an intent standard, the intent of the offeror to receive compensa-
tion. The "reason to know" and "opportunity to reject" formulae reflect
responsibility notions: They incorporate a standard based on what the
reasonable person might be expected to know, and how that reasonable
person might be expected to act.
The second type of exceptional case exactly replicates the moves of the
first. Silence may operate as assent
[w]here the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason to under-
stand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction, and the
offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept the offer,
[or w]here because of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable
that the offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to
accept.21
Thus one situation depends on making the offeror responsible, by his
manifestation of intent, for the offeree who by his silence actually intends
to accept. The other depends on making the offeree responsible for com-
municating his non-acceptance.
To summarize, one way of explaining this doctrinal corner is to say
that section 69 creates a (by now familiar) refuge from the conundrum of
intent-formal hierarchy: In disputes over assent, words or action trump
silence or inaction. But the internal structure of section 69 subverts the
formal hierarchy with exceptions: Words or actions trump silence or inac-
tion except when the reverse is true. The reverse is true, in part, when
dictated by standards of intent; the exorcised ghost reappears in the heart
of the mansion. Alternatively, the reverse may be true when dictated by
standards of responsibility. It is to this analysis that we now turn.
C. The Responsibility Model
This section explores another technique for resolving the problem of
unknowable contractual intention-measuring contractual obligation by
reference to the party's appropriate responsibility for his conduct and for
his contract partner. The question is whether this technique is free of the
difficulties we have identified not only in the "intention" model of obliga-
tion, but also in the model of formal hierarchy. The analysis draws on the
213. Id. § 6 9 (1)(a) (emphasis added).
214. Id. § 69(1)(b)-(c) (emphasis added).
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Restatement provisions defining promise, manifestation of assent and mis-
understanding, the rules about disclosure, and the doctrine of mistake. It
confirms what we have already learned about the attempt to regulate con-
tracting parties' behavior towards one another in the context of duress and
unconscionability: Our norms of behavior, of contractual responsibility,
are as conflicted and contradictory as our competing commitments to ob-
jectivity and subjectivity, on the one hand, and our competing trust and
distrust of formal hierarchy on the other.
1. From Intent to Responsibility
The Restatement introduces the idea of responsibility as a basis for ob-
ligation (and a prop for intention) in its definition of promise. A promise
is "a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified
way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment
has been made. '2 15 Manifestations may take the form of words, acts, or
failures to act, but conduct cannot be effective as a manifestation of assent
unless the actor "intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has rea-
son to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he
assents." 216
In defining the promise, the Restatement thus shifts the focus from the
promisor to the promisee and back. What the promisor does is capable of
binding him if it presents itself to the promisee (justifiably) as capable of
creating obligations. 2 7 But, at the same time, what ultimately governs is
the promisor's assessment, measured objectively rather than subjectively,
of what his conduct might mean to the promisee. 2"8 Here the Restatement
simply replicates the manifestation-intent dilemma in new forms. We do
not demand as either necessary or sufficient that the promisee subjectively
understand the promisor to have made a commitment: How could we
know save through outward manifestations of the promisee's understand-
ing? Nor do we demand that the promisor subjectively understand that his
conduct would lead a reasonable promisee to infer assent. We demand
instead that the promisor's manifestations be such that we, and therefore
he, might conclude as an external and objective matter that a reasonable
promisee could understand that a commitment was made. We are given
no guidance about when that might be-nothing, that is, to fill the empty
"manifestation of intent" formulation.
The Restatement definition of assent contains a variation of the same
215. Id. § 2(1).
216. Id. § 19(2).
217. See id. §§ 2(1), 2 comment b.
218. Id.
1055
The Yale Law Journal
formulae: A contracting party manifests assent when he knows or has rea-
son to know that the other party may infer assent.2"9 The knowledge of
the contracting party, like his intent, is ultimately unavailable to us, so
both inquiries actually revolve around the question of whether the con-
tracting party has reason to know how his conduct will be interpreted.220
Presumably the other party may infer assent when, to borrow from the
definition of promise, he would be "justified in understanding" '221 that as-
sent had been given. But, again, the Restatement gives no guidance for
determining when such a justification exists.
Even as the Restatement in this definition of assent moves inexorably
away from an "intent-based," subjective model of obligation, there is a
move to reintroduce subjectivity into the standard by insisting that the
assentor will under no circumstances be obligated unless he "intends" '222 to
engage in the conduct that is interpreted as manifesting assent. This weak
intent is surely kin to the "general intent" of criminal law under which
everything short of somnambulation qualifies as "intentional"; it has no
bearing, in other words, on the subjective intent of the assentor to assent.
Yet the formulation allows the Restatement to reassert its commitment to
contractual obligation as, in some sense, voluntarily undertaken, thereby
avoiding a more thorough exploration of the objective standard introduced
to supplement the subjective one.
The question now is whether other provisions of the Restatement give
us more insight into what the objective standards of responsibility are and
how they should be applied. The Restatement offers two separate visions:
In one, responsibility is based on fault;22 in the other, on assumption of
risk.224 The fault version recognizes that the standard is indeed an objec-
tive, external, or public one, but does not resolve the problem of its con-
tent.225 Specifically, running before the problem of power, it founders on
219. Id. § 19(2).
220. Our assessment of knowledge, like our assessment of intent, is based on objective manifesta-
tions and circumstances. The colloquialism "he must have known" expresses exactly the nature of the
conclusion we draw. But precisely those same manifestations and circumstances determine our conclu-
sion that someone had "reason to know." The analyses diverge only where the evidence is ambiguous.
If our object is to ascertain knowledge, we weigh the credibility of the knowledge claim against the
credibility of the lack-of-knowledge claim. When our object is to decide what someone had reason to
know, however, we may ultimately disregard evidence of lack of actual knowledge as irrelevant, al-
though credible. In a particular verdict rendered by a jury, or a particular decision by a judge, it may
not be clear which route has been chosen.
221. See id. § 2(1).
222. Id. § 19(2).
223. See infra text accompanying notes 226-258. I use the Restatements treatment of misunder-
standing and disclosure as my principal examples of the operation of a fault-based model of
responsibility.
224. See infra text accompanying notes 259-271. 1 use the Restatement's treatment of mistake as
my principal example of the operation of assumption of risk as a model of responsibility.
225. It is no accident that Holmes was advocating an objective theory of fault for torts at the same
time he was advocating an objective theory of intent for contract. See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON
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conflicting commitments to self-reliance and to regard for others. The as-
sumption of risk version equates responsibility with agreement and there-
fore with intent; it consequently reproduces, in a roundabout way, the
defective model it sought to fix.
2. Responsibility as Fault
The possession of knowledge and the existence of relationship are both
potential sources of duty, and therefore of culpable dereliction of duty, in
the contractual contexts of misunderstanding, disclosure, and mistake. The
central question here is when and why one contractual party should be
responsible for protecting the other from ignorance, whether by searching
out the other party's interpretation of the agreement or by sharing infor-
mation with him. The central difficulty is that the law contains contradic-
tory impulses without providing determinative guidelines for the relevant
scope of application of each principle. The law suggests that each party to
a contract must look out for his own interest without concern for that of
the other party, while simultaneously suggesting that this self-interest
must have limits.
2 6
The Restatement's treatment of misunderstanding focuses on the re-
sponsibility of one contractual party to understand the meaning attached
to the contract by the other.227 Where neither party knows or has reason
to know the different meaning attached by the other, or both parties know
or have reason to know the different meaning attached by the other, there
is no contract. 2 Where one party neither knows nor has reason to know
the meaning attached by his partner, but the other party knows or has
LAw 63-129 (M. Howe ed. 1963). In torts, as in contracts, it seemed crucial that liability be in some
way voluntarily undertaken. In torts, as in contracts, voluntarism seemed to require a subjective ap-
preciation by the actor that his conduct entailed liability. In torts, as in contracts, this was reflected in
terms such as "intent" or "fault," terms amenable to interpretation as subjective concepts. But in torts,
as in contracts, the potentially subjective was inevitably tamed and co-opted as the terms were actively
"objectified." See, e.g., id. at 116-21. In the arena of fault-based liability, this plays itself out in
judicial manipulation of the "reasonable man" marionette. As Holmes comments, "The difficulty of
distinguishing rules based on other grounds of policy from those which have been worked out in the
field of negligence, will be particularly noticed." Id. at 121. In torts, as in contracts, the remaining
question is what standard of behavior will be imposed.
226. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 20.
228. According to the Restatement:
(1) There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties attach materially
different meanings to their manifestations and
(a) neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached by the other; or
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reason to know the meaning the first party attaches, the contract is formed
according to the meaning attached by the first party.2
As already suggested,230 what a contractual party knew is always a con-
jecture based on objective manifestations and circumstances that lead us to
conclusions about what he knew. Those same manifestations and circum-
stances become our guide to what he had reason to know so that, as a
practical matter, the two inquiries are very much the same. The crucial
point here is that the "reason to know" standard explicitly contains both a
self-regarding and an other-regarding element. "Reason to know" is cho-
sen by the Restatement in place of "should know" precisely because it
applies "both where the actor has a duty to another and where he would
not be acting adequately in the protection of his own interests were he not
acting with reference to the facts which he has reason to know.281 Thus,
although misunderstanding depends on the idea of fault,282 and the various
vocabularies of fault are invoked to explain its operation, 3 3 the nature of
"fault" in this context remains fundamentally ambiguous." 4
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp.23 5 il-
lustrates the potential difficulties with the "reason to know" standard. A
Swiss buyer sued an American seller in breach of warranty for supplying
old stewing chicken or fowl, in lieu of young broiling or frying chicken,
under a contract that called simply for the supplying of "chicken." The
seller was comparatively new in the poultry business.28 The buyer at-
tempted to establish a trade usage whereby "chicken" was understood to
mean "young chicken," in order to bring the case within the principle that
229. The Restatement provides:
(2) The manifestations of the parties are operative in accordance with the meaning attached to
them by one of the parties if
(a) that party does not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other
knows the meaning attached by the first party; or
(b) that party has no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the
other has reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.
Id. § 20(2).
230. See supra note 220.
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 19 comment b.
232. "The basic principle. . . is stated in Subsection (1): no contract is formed if neither party is
at fault or if both parties are equally at fault. Subsection (2) deals with cases where both parties are
not equally at fault." Id. § 20 comment d.
233. "If one party knows the other's meaning and manifests assent intending to insist on a differ-
ent meaning, he may be guilty of misrepresentation . . . . Under Subsection (2) (b) a party may be
bound by a merely negligent manifestation of assent, if the other party is not negligent." Id.
234. The illustrations provided in the commentary to § 20 detail the consequences that follow
from one party either knowing or having reason to know the meaning attached by the other. None
discusses how the fact-finder should arrive at that initial assessment.
235. 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at
711.
236. 190 F. Supp. at 119.
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where a usage is "so generally known in the community" the defendant's
"actual individual knowledge of it may be inferred."23
First, it is interesting that Judge Friendly seemed prepared to apply the
principle urged by the plaintiff as long as such usage could be shown to
exist, even though other evidence clearly indicated that the defendant was
unaware of the usage.238 Creating this irrebuttable presumption of knowl-
edge involves a shift from an intent-based model to a responsibility model:
The defendant is liable because of what he should have known rather
than what he knew, even though the language of intent is artificially
preserved.
Within the responsibility paradigm, it remains to decide whose the re-
sponsibility is, and whence it derives.2" 9 The possibilities are manifold.
One argument would be that when two contracting parties deal in a com-
modity frequently traded, each is responsible for checking whether his un-
derstanding of the contractual language comports with trade usage. Any
different interpretive claim would therefore be rejected unless the parties
had explicitly agreed on an alternative use. But then what of the situation,
as in Frigaliment, where one party is an experienced trader in the com-
modity and the other is not? Does the inexperienced party have a respon-
sibility to check on any trade usages of which he may be unaware, or a
responsibility to reveal his lack of experience to his partner? Are those
responsibilities to himself, so that he is protected from his own ignorance,
or are they responsibilities to his partner who may otherwise be caught off
guard with a liability greater than he anticipated? This obviously depends
on how a court will allocate the risk of the mistake. Does the experienced
party have a responsibility to explain any specialized usages to the less
experienced party? Is that responsibility a responsibility to his partner or
to himself? This too depends on how a court will later interpret the situa-
tion and allocate the risk; the inquiry thus circles back on itself. In an
alternative formulation, is it the party who first introduces a term into the
negotiations who has a responsibility to see that the term is understood?
Or is it the responsibility of the person to whom the term is suggested to
237. Id. (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2464 (3d ed.
1940)).
238. The plaintiffs urged the principle in a stringent New York reformulation requiring that,
"'the usage is of so long continuance, so well established, so notorious, so universal and so reasonable
in itself, as that the presumption is violent that the parties contracted with reference to it, and made it
a part of their agreement.'" 190 F.Supp. at 119 (quoting Walls v. Bailey, 49 N.Y. 464, 472-73
(1872)).
239. This analysis is suggested by the facts of the case, but not derived directly from it, because
the case is resolved without an allocation of responsibility for knowing the contract's meaning. See
infra note 241.
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ensure that his understanding of it is clear? The permutations seem end-
less 24 -not because we find the various articulations of responsibility un-
persuasive, but rather because too many articulations, suggesting different
outcomes, are persuasive.241
In disclosure cases, the issue shifts from when one person should be
sensitive to the meaning the other party is ascribing to the contract
(whether for his own or the other's sake), to when one contracting party
has a responsibility to share information with the other so that their un-
derstandings of the contract coincide. The doctrine builds from the seduc-
tively simple, and shared, moral proposition that lying is wrong.242 But in
240. There are some parallels here to the long-winded and unsatisfying debate about the mailbox
rule, whereby an acceptance is valid upon dispatch. While there is more often an open recognition
that neither party is "at fault" when the letter of acceptance miscarries, see, e.g., Stimson, Effective
Time of an Acceptance, 23 MINN. L. REV. 776, 777 (1939), one resolution has been to attach "re-
sponsibility" to one party by making it responsible for the default of the agency of communication. Id.
See also Household Fire & Carriage Accident Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216 (C.A. 1879), reprinted
in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 284 (noting that both parties are "innocent," but placing
burden on offeror of ascertaining offeree's decision). More generally, there is a tendency to focus only
on the "difficulties of one party," Stimson, supra, at 782, which aids resolution of the particular case
but not the development of general principle.
At one stage removed from the focus on the parties, the argument shifts to the preferability of
judicial passivity over judicial activity: "Unless the court interferes, [the loss] will fall on the offeree.
In similar situations the equity doctrine is that a court will leave the loss where it falls, because there
is no reason for transferring it. . . ." Id. at 777 (footnote omitted). This ignores the way in which
the judge's passivity depends on the legal system's active allocation of entitlement. Or, similarly, pre-
serving the status quo is preferred, but without consensus as to what that requires. Compare C.
LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 20-21 (2d ed. 1880), reprinted in KESSLER &
GILMORE, supra note 8, at 287-88:
Adopting one view, the hardship consists in making one liable on a contract which he is igno-
rant of having made; adopting the other view, it consists of depriving one of the benefit of a
contract which he supposes he has made. Between these two evils the choice would seem to be
clear: the former is positive, the latter merely negative; the former imposes a liability to which
no limit can be placed, the latter leaves everything in statu quo.
with Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE L.J. 779, 795 (1939),
reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 288 ("[T]he offeree is already relying, with the
best reason in the world, on the deal being on; the offeror is only holding things open . . ").
241. It is interesting, in light of this discussion, to analyze what Judge Friendly actually did in
the Frigaliment case. He found no overwhelming trade usage, but a variety of usages supporting both
the plaintiff's and the defendant's position. Frigaliment, 190 F. Supp. at 119-20. Because the case
was brought not as a case of misunderstanding but as one of breach of warranty, Friendly was able to
resolve the issue by a procedural presumption. Since the plaintiff could not carry the burden of estab-
lishing its interpretation as the correct one, the defendant prevailed. Id. at 121. In a later case,
Friendly ruminated again on Frigaliment, and concluded that perhaps the case would have been
better disposed of as a case of fatal ambiguity, recognizing that neither party had reason to know of
the disparate interpretation of the other. Dadourian Export Corp. v. United States, 291 F.2d 178, 187
n.4 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J., dissenting). But then Friendly justified the actual outcome of his
earlier decision by suggesting that even as a case of ambiguity, the loss could be left on the plaintiff
because of the defendant's "not unjustifiable change of position." Id. Here, a trumping remedial idea
of reliance is used to serve the same function as the original trumping procedural device of the burden
of proof-with a convenient lack of regard for the fact that the plaintiff's change of position, given
that its interpretation of the contract was equally valid, was equally justifiable. In both analyses,
therefore, Friendly declined to engage in the responsibility debate as it affected interpretation of the
contract.
242. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 6, § 159. This section explains that "[a] misrepresen-
tation is an assertion that is not in accord with the facts." Under § 162(1), a misrepresentation is
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defining the lie it moves away from consensus and back into the contro-
versial territory where arguments for self-reliance compete with argu-
ments for the protection of others.
Under the Restatement scheme, the essential question is whether there
has been culpable non-disclosure.2 43 Traditionally, "mere" non-disclosure
has not entailed liability; 44 this is an expression of the more general prin-
ciple in our private law that passivity (omission) cannot be culpable-only
activity can generate liability.245 The Second Restatement therefore makes
non-disclosure culpable when it is "equivalent to an assertion. ' 246 The
task then becomes one of defining those instances where what appears to
be inaction or omission can be translated into action or commission by the
addition of some other variable.2 47 Unfortunately for determinability of
outcome in this area of doctrine, translation is easy or difficult according
fraudulent if:
the maker intends his assertion to induce a party to manifest his assent and the maker
(a) knows or believes that the assertion is not in accord with the facts, or
(b) does not have the confidence that he states or implies in the truth of the assertion,
or
(c) knows that he does not have the basis that he states or implies for the assertion.
Id. § 162(1). For purposes of contract law, the misrepresentation must also be material. See id. §
162(2).
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E. 2d 808 (1942), re-
printed in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 57. Commenting on the alleged nondisclosure, the
Swinton court observed:
There is no allegation of any false statement or representation, or of the uttering of a half
truth which may be tantamount to a falsehood. There is no intimation that the defendant by
any means prevented the plaintiff from acquiring information as to the condition of the house.
There is nothing to show any fiduciary relation between the parties, or that the plaintiff stood
in a position of confidence toward or dependence upon the defendant. So far as appears the
parties made a business deal at arm's length. The charge is concealment and nothing more;
and it is concealment in the simple sense of mere failure to reveal, with nothing to show any
peculiar duty to speak.
311 Mass. at 678, 42 N.E.2d at 808. The court proceeded to uphold "the rule of nonliability for bare
nondisclosure." Id. at 679, 42 N.E.2d at 809.
245. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 373 (5th ed. 1984). For general discus-
sion of this principle, see Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53 AM. L.
REG. 209, 273, 337 (1905); Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U.
PA. L. REV. 217 (1908); Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty of Care, 1 DE PAUL L.
REV. 30 (1951); McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272 (1949); Sea-
vey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L. REV. 913 (1951). For an
introductory philosophical treatment of the distinction, see C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 17-20
(1978).
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 161. Indeed, "active concealment" is not even
treated as non-disclosure but falls instead into the category of misrepresentation by action. See id. §
160.
247. See, e.g., Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 678, 42 N.E.2d 808, 808
(1942) (quoted supra note 244); W. PROSSER, supra note 245, at 374:
In theory the difference between the two is simple and obvious; but in practice it is not always
easy to draw the line and say whether conduct is active or passive. It is clear that it is not
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to competing but equally available criteria which depend, again, on no-
tions of self-reliance and responsibility for others.
An important version of this translation involves introducing a relation-
ship that turns the simple omission into a positive breach of duty.24 Even
when the relationship is merely that of contracting parties, they are bound
to act vis-a-vis one another "in good faith and in accordance with reasona-
ble standards of fair dealing."2 9 When the relationship is one of "trust
and confidence," it transcends the usual requirements." Yet the assump-
tion remains that, as a prima facie matter, contracting parties are not re-
sponsible for one another.25 The commentary is quite explicit about the
self-reliant element in the law:
A party may . . . reasonably expect the ot her to take normal steps to
inform himself and to draw his own conclusions. If the other is indo-
lent, inexperienced or ignorant, or if his judgment is bad or he lacks
access to adequate information, his adversary is not generally ex-
pected to compensate for these deficiencies.25 2
Note not only the comprehensive list of circumstances in which informa-
tional disadvantage can supposedly be safely ignored, but also the casting
of the contractual relationship as a basically adversarial one.
This conflict between self-reliance and responsibility leaves unresolved
when disclosure will be demanded by "good faith . . . and reasonable
standards of fair dealing, as reflected in prevailing business ethics,"2 3 or
when a relationship will be deemed to have heavier responsibilities at-
tached to it.2 "5
The courts that address these issues seek refuge from these uncertainties
in two principal ways: Either they retreat from the problem into the infi-
nitely manipulable distinction between act and omission, 55 or they appeal
248. See W. PROSSER, supra note 245, at 375:
The question appears to be essentially one of whether the defendant has gone so far in what he
has actually done, and has got himself into such a relation with the plaintiff, that he has begun
to affect the interests of the plaintiff adversely, as distinguished from merely failing to confer a
benefit upon him.
(footnotes omitted). A potent analogy from the law of tort is the presence or absence of a duty to
rescue. See id. at 340-50.
249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 161(b).
250. Id. § 161(d).
251. See, e.g., id. § 161 comment a.
252. Id. § 161 comment d.
253. Id.
254. Id. § 161 comment f.
255. See, e.g., Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 451-52, 353 P.2d 672, 674 (1960) (pest
control specialist made repairs so no external evidence of termites, but sellers unwilling to pay for
complete eradication; court harnessed good faith standard to action-omisson distinction); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 161 comment d, illustrations 10, 11 (cases involving same business
context differentiated by means of action-omission distinction).
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to standards of behavior established by the business community or in other
areas of the law.2 56 This latter device allows judges to overcome the prob-
lem of legitimacy involved in imposing a public norm by lodging the au-
thority for that norm elsewhere, 257 even while the array of standards avail-
able from those other sources leaves them in fact responsible for choosing
whether to impose liability. 58
As in the other areas in which a responsibility model is employed to fix
contractual liability, therefore, the decision of when to fault a failure to
disclose may be evaluated according to contradictory criteria. Rather than
curing the indeterminacy of the models of intent and formal hierarchy, the
model of responsibility thus adds yet another layer of indeterminacy to the
decisionmaking process.
3. Responsibility as Assumption of Risk
In the foregoing exploration of responsibility as a model of resolving
problems of contractual liability, I touched upon the way in which pri-
marily objective measures of externally imposed responsibility can be re-
cast as subjective and voluntary undertakings of responsibility. Judge
Friendly's analysis of the effect of long-standing usage on contractual in-
terpretation, for example, adopted this approach.259 In further pursuing
the technique by which responsibility analysis circles back to rely on ideas
of intent and agreement, I focus on the idea of "assumption of risk" as it
operates in the doctrine of mistake.26 0
Section 152 of the Restatement provides that a contract is voidable
when a mistake of both parties is a mistake "as to a basic assumption on
which the contract was made," and when it "has a material effect on the
agreed exchange of performances."26 1 But there is an additional require-
ment: The contract is still not voidable if the adversely affected party
"bears the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in section 154. 1 2 6
This occurs when:
256. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, §161 comment d; Keeton,
Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REv. 1, 11 & nn.23-25 (1936).
257. This is analagous to the reliance of duress doctrine on crime and tort law for its categories of
improper threat. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
258. Keeton describes, for example, how non-disclosure law relies on special relationships already
defined by other bodies of law for other purposes, but determines whether the relationship in the
particular case falls into or out of the special category based on the articulation of reasons for promot-
ing either self-regarding or other-regarding behavior in the particular situation. Keeton, supra note
256, at 11 & nn.23-25.
259. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 152(1). The doctrine of impracticability has pre-
cisely the same structure. See id. §§ 261, 265, 266.
261. Id. § 152(1).
262. Id.
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(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has
only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake
relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient, or
(c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it
is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.26
The central question here is the content of assumption of risk. Mistake
doctrine deals with circumstances the contract did not anticipate, but
which nonetheless impinge on the performance of the contract. When
these circumstances adversely affect one of the parties, either in his ability
to perform or in what he can expect from the contract, then the question
is raised whether he must still perform, or still pay for the other party's
performance. The doctrinal answer is no, unless that party has borne the
risk of these adverse circumstances. Rather than raising the responsibility
paradigm to any new level of sophistication or workability, section 154
simply restates the choice between an unsatisfactory "manifestation of in-
tent" model2 4 and an equally unsatisfactory "objective fault" model, 265
and concludes with the frank recognition that, after all, the judge is free to
choose.2 6
Section 154(a) imagines that the parties share a basic assumption about
a circumstance of their deal (in which they are both mistaken), but that
their deal also focuses on the question of what should be done if they are
mistaken, and incorporates an allocation of the costs of the mistake. This
unlikely scenario requires a large-scale inquiry into manifestations of in-
tent: to know what are and are not basic assumptions of the contract, and
to know what language or circumstance is evidence of risk allocation. We
have already explored the risks of this sort of inquiry, risks compounded
where, as here, we acknowledge that we are investigating how the parties
have regulated a situation rather different from the one they came to-
gether to regulate.
Section 154(b) focuses on the individual party and not the agreement,
and within that framework adopts a "fault" standard: The party who
walks into a deal aware that his knowledge of the circumstances is incom-
plete, but goes ahead with the deal and then suffers when things turn out
other than he had hoped, has only himself to blame. In this sense he has
taken responsibility on himself. But we can never know that someone is
"aware" of his limited knowledge; at best we objectify the standard and
263. Id. § 154.
264. See id. § 154(a).
265. See id. § 154(b).
266. See id. § 154(c).
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ask whether the circumstances indicate awareness, or whether he should
have been aware.2 67
Section 154(c) can be seen as the final honest moment of section 154, a
moment not without parallels elsewhere in the Restatement."'8 In section
154, as elsewhere, an initial attempt is made to constrain judicial discre-
tion by articulating standards governed by one or more of the basic dichot-
omies. The concession to reality does not appear until the end, when the
judge is provided with another option: In unspecified circumstances, he
may make his decision on some "other" basis, which must be "reasona-
ble" or "just. 269
Here, for example, subsection (c) tells us that the court may allocate the
risk when it is reasonable to do so.270 By what criteria could the court
make this judgment and still avoid the charge that it has merely exercised
an illegitimate dispensing power? Could it ever be reasonable to allocate
risk save on the basis of the manifested agreement, as subsection (a) sug-
gests, or on the basis of objectified fault, as subsection (b) provides? Fur-
ther, has not our investigation of the particular failures of subsections (a)
and (b) shown them to be merely more elaborately disguised versions of
subsection (c)? If so, the candor of section 154 presents a microcosm of the
form of discourse I have been describing.
D. Summary
I have been describing the dynamic that operates in areas of doctrine
caught between the commitment to objectivity expressed as reliance on
"manifestation," and the commitment to subjectivity expressed as reliance
on "intent." I have suggested that while contract doctrine on occasion re-
lies squarely on divining intent, and ignores the gulf between subjective
intent and the communication of that intent to others, by and large those
acknowledged difficulties of communication drive doctrine to use other in-
terpretive or liability-fixing devices. Formal hierarchy and standards of
responsibility are two such devices.
267. This again raises the question of how responsibility should be allocated between the con-
tracting parties.
268. See, for example, § 351 which establishes in subsection 1 that damages are not recoverable
for unforeseeable loss, and defines in subsection 2 what qualifies as foreseeable loss, but then, in
subsection 3, provides that recovery for foreseeable loss may be limited "by excluding recovery for loss
of profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if it concludes that in
the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation." Id. § 351(3).
269. The text of § 154(c) uses "reasonable," while comment d to that section amplifies that the
court here is to use criteria "other" than those articulated in earlier subsections. Id. § 154(c) & §
154(c) comment d. Section 351(c) permits the limitation of recovery of foreseeable loss in some specific
drcumstances, but than adds that the same limitation is available "otherwise," if "justice so requires."
Id. § 351(c).
270. Id. § 154(c).
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The central problem in this area is that of knowledge-of access to
intent, or understanding. But if contract doctrine is no longer to rely on
intent and understanding as the basis of liability, then contract becomes
something other than a system of voluntary obligation. And as a body of
public rather than private obligation, it then must articulate the public
norms on which it rests. In relying on formal hierarchy, doctrine occasion-
ally makes a weak appeal to the public values of certainty and stability.2"'
More often, doctrine completes a circle by justifying hierarchy as the ex-
pression of intention. In relying on responsibility, doctrine attempts to
evade the problem of knowledge by straying into territory made equally
treacherous by the problem of power. As suggested by our earlier look at
the doctrines of duress and unconscionability, and affirmed here, we have
no reliable, and therefore no legitimate, basis for allocating responsibility
between contracting parties. Finally, then, it is the interaction of the
problems of power and knowledge that leaves these areas of doctrine with-
out a determinate basis for resolving contractual disputes.
III. FORM AND SUBSTANCE:
CONSIDERATION AND THE QUESTION OF VALUE
If the problem of knowledge is the central problem for those areas of
doctrine concerned with contract formation and interpretation, then the
problem of power is the central problem of both consideration doctrine
and the related doctrine of reliance. The consideration requirement can be
presented as consistent with a view of contractual obligation as essentially
voluntary and private. But consideration is inevitably seen as serving a
policing function-sorting out those agreements that will be enforceable as
legal obligations. It therefore raises two questions: Why is such a policing
mechanism necessary? Under what circumstances should the state inter-
vene in agreements privately reached between individuals? These are the
same questions we asked in the area of duress and unconscionability.
The problem of power is expressed concretely in consideration doctrine
through the question whether consideration should be viewed as a doctrine
of form or of substance. The attempt to view consideration as a doctrine of
form serves the same function as the attempt to view duress and uncon-
scionability as doctrines of process: Each appeals to assertedly neutral or
consensual standards. But any attempt to cast consideration as a require-
ment of form leaves us asking "Form of what?"-a question that demands
a substantive answer. Similarly, if we were to insist that consideration be
271. Even the investigation of certainty and stability reveals them to be fatally dependent on pre-
dictions about understanding and about allocations of responsibility.
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exclusively a doctrine of substance, we would have to ask what represen-
tations or forms would satisfy us that the substantive requirement had
been met.
This dilemma exactly parallels that of manifestation and intent. The
manifestation-intent dichotomy is in fact just a special case of the form-
substance dichotomy, its version of substance being the subjective content
of the parties' intentions or understandings. In the consideration context,
the interplay between form and substance is more complex. Initially, it
seems that consideration doctrine is most concerned to avoid the substance
of objective value-the courts, as already illustrated in the duress and un-
conscionability context, abhor the idea that they should police the equiva-
lence of the parties' exchange. But in the effort to answer the "Form of
what?" question without reference to objective value, doctrine is forced
back to the alternative substance of subjective intent.2 72 Value, in this
view, is a subjective matter, knowable only by party expression of intent
to bargain. Fleeing before the problem of power, doctrine finds itself
trapped once more in the realm of the problem of knowledge.
My exploration is designed to show that the mutual dependence of form
on substance, and substance on form, is the threat against which doctrinal
formulations (unsuccessfully) attempt to defend themselves. I suggest that
determinacy of outcome is impossible as long as the debate is cast in terms
of form and substance (whether substance means objective value or subjec-
tive intent). I use reliance doctrine and cases principally for what they tell
us about the consideration doctrine from which they would distinguish
themselves.
A dominant theme in our current doctrine of consideration is the "bar-
gain theory," which was an integral part of the classical model of contract
law developed by Holmes and Williston.2 73 The "bargain theory" replaced
a more inchoate conception of consideration loosely tied to benefit on the
part of the promisor, or detriment on the part of the promisee.2'" This
earlier conception, in turn, was linked to a focus on executed and partially
272. Consideration doctrine contains no internal mechanism for shifting the focus to standards of
behavior. Rather, disputes in which behavior questions predominate are seen as more suitable for
resolution under the "process" doctrines of duress and fraud. Good examples are provided in the area
traditionally conceived as contractual modification. See, e.g., Austin Instrument v. Loral Corp., 35
A.D.2d 387, 316 N.Y.S.2d 528 (App. Div. 1970), rev'd in part, modified in part, 29 N.Y.2d 124,
272 N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971). Indeed, during the shaping of the classical law of contract,
a concern with standards of behavior was sometimes recast as a more "neutral" concern with the
presence or absence of consideration. See, e.g., Stilk v. Myrick, 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (K.B. 1809),
reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 478.
273. G. GiLMORE, supra note 29, at 18-34.
274. Id. at 19; see also Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 929, 933
(1958).
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executed contracts,2 7 5 which usually involved a party who had benefited,
or one who had suffered a loss in reliance on the deal.2 76
The standard story tells us that the bargain theory of consideration re-
flected and supported a commitment to liberal, laissez-faire economic
theory.277 Like that theory, the bargain model of consideration insisted
that only the participants could measure the value of a deal, and that a
system of such subjectively assessed values would produce the markets re-
quired for a smoothly functioning and efficient economy.27 Individualism
and the predominance of will are seen as natural ideological corollaries of
such a system.27
The standard story also tells us that the bargain theory never com-
pletely replaced its more inchoate predecessor theories."' The idea of det-
riment and benefit as alternative reasons for enforcing contracts persisted
as an influence in the First Restatement. And in the move from the First
to the Second Restatement, detriment and benefit have come to play an
even larger role, at the expense of bargain theory.8 l
This story does not challenge the internal coherence of a formal bargain
theory of consideration. It accepts the idea that notions of benefit and det-
riment could be excised if we, as a society, decided to excise them. My
hypothesis, in contrast, is that it is impossible to construct a bargain
theory of consideration that does not supplement its commitment to a sub-
jective theory of value either by reference to a subjective theory of intent,
or by reference to an objective theory of value. Given the repudiation else-
where in doctrine of the theory of subjective intent,282 reliance on such a
theory in the realm of consideration is found only in disguised forms, fre-
quently "objectivized" by derivation from notions of objective value. Simi-
larly, given doctrine's repudiation of objective value, 8 3 its appearance in
this arena is also disguised, often by reference to the intention of the
parties.
For an initial demonstration, I use Holmes' own formulation of the
consideration requirement, and a case in which Williston's account formed
the basis of the court's decision. Then I look at more recent materials,
275. P. ATIYAH, supra note 27, 139-54, 167-89, 419-48 (1979).
276. Id., especially at 167-89.
277. See, e.g., id. at 398-405; Patterson, supra note 274, at 945-46.
278. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, supra note 27, at 448-54.
279. See, e.g., id. at 260-61, 405-08; Patterson, supra note 274, at 946.
280. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 60-66, 69-77.
281. Id.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 150-174 (my account of objectification of intent).
283. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 6, § 79 comment c; see infra text accompa-
nying notes 323-330.
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with two questions in mind: first, whether the basic structure of the prob-
lem has changed in the Second Restatement or in more current cases; sec-
ond, how the articulation of the problem and proposed resolutions have
changed, if the basic structure of the problem has not.
A. A Bargain Theory of Consideration
In The Common Law, Holmes sets forth his classic exposition of the
bargain theory of consideration:
[I]t is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agree-
ment, it is given and accepted as the motive or inducement of the
promise. Conversely, the promise must be made and accepted as the
conventional motive or inducement for furnishing the consideration.
The root of the whole matter is the relation of reciprocal conven-
tional inducement, each for the other, between consideration and
promise.284
It is equally clear, however, that consideration "must not be confounded
with what may be the prevailing or chief motive in fact."' 28 5 As Holmes
comments, "[T]he whole doctrine of contract is formal and external. 286 In
sum, then, it is the appearance of the form of bargain in the terms of the
agreement which satisfies the consideration requirement.
Holmes applies this definition of consideration in Wisconsin & Michi-
gan Railway v. Powers.287 A statute of 1893 exempted from a railroad tax
any railroad that built and operated a particular line. The plaintiff com-
pany fulfilled the statutory condition. When the exempting provision was
repealed four years later, the plaintiff complained that the government
had broken its contract. Holmes found that the so-called contract lacked
consideration. 8
Holmes reasoned that building the railroad was certainly a sufficient
detriment or change of position to constitute consideration, but the agree-
ment lacked "an adequate expression of an actual intent on the part of the
State to set change of position against promisee. ' "89 Thus, although "[n]o
doubt the State expected to encourage railroad building, and the railroad
284. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 225, at 230.
285. Id.
286. Id. (marginal annotation made by Holmes, reproduced as lettered footnote in the Howe
edition).
287. 191 U.S. 379 (1903), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 206.
288. 191 U.S. at 386-87. The case could equally as well have been decided on the alternative
ground articulated in his opinion; namely that the legislature was not engaged in making contracts,
but in framing a scheme of public revenue and public improvement. Id. at 387.
289. Id. at 386-87.
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builders expected the encouragement, . . . the two things are not set
against each other in terms of bargain."29
This seems a confirmation of Holmes' position that consideration is a
matter of form. It seems that the "expression" '291 of intent, rather than the
actual intent, is lacking. Holmes does not doubt the relationship of mutual
expectation, but the promise and the consideration must actually "pur-
port"'2 92 to be the motive for each other. Presumably, it would have been
enough if the statute had said, "In return for a railroad company building
and operating this line which the state is interested in seeing in operation,
the state will exempt the company from the tax."
That hypothetical language, however, is hardly different from the ac-
tual language of the statute: "[T]he rate of taxation fixed by this act...
shall not apply to any railway ... hereafter building and operating space
.... ,,.3 What form do we imagine would satisfy the requirement, if this
does not? Further, what are we supposed to make of Holmes' very ambig-
uous sentence, "No matter what the actual motive may have been, by the
express or implied terms of the supposed contract, the promise and the
consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other . . ."?294
Does the parenthetical "by the express or implied terms of the supposed
contract" 295 refer to our discovery of the actual motive of the parties?
Since we are not supposed to be interested in those motives, it seems more
likely that it refers to the promise and consideration, and means that they
may take on their relationship of conventional inducement through either
express or implied terms of the contract. But if the latter were true, con-
sideration could not be exclusively a doctrine of form, since it is hard to
see how implied terms could satisfy formal requirements.
These doubts suggest another interpretation of the case: Holmes is look-
ing for, and not finding, an actual, subjective intent to bargain. This gives
a different significance to Holmes' conclusion that the agreement lacks
"an adequate expression of an actual intent on the part of the State to set
change of position against promise."29 Surely that "actual intent" itself
requires expression or manifestation to be known. But just as the building
of the railroad could have been consideration if the form of the contract
had been that of bargain, so too it seems that the form of the contract
could have been interpreted as a form of bargain if there had been evi-
dence of the intent of the State to be bound. In the final analysis, Holmes'
290. Id. at 387.
291. Id. at 386-87.
292. Id. at 386.
293. Id. at 384.
294. Id. at 386.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 386-87 (emphasis added).
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opinion employs an essentially circular argument, and-despite Holmes'
desire to separate form and substance-the opinion ultimately depends on
the substance of intent to validate the form of bargain.29
The case of Maughs v. Porter""8 illustrates the way in which a second
notion of substance-objective value-is used to give meaning to the oth-
erwise empty notion of form of bargain. In explicating the bargain theory,
the Maughs court relied on Williston, who, like Holmes, was a major
exponent of the theory and who increased its influence by codifying it in
the First Restatement.299 In Maughs, the defendant planned to auction
lots of residential land. He advertised that every adult white attending the
sale would have a chance to win a new Ford; it was not necessary to bid
on the real estate to qualify for the prize. Although the plaintiff attended
the auction, received a lottery ticket, and was declared the winner of the
automobile, the defendant refused to give her the car.
The court's task was to determine whether the defendant's advertise-
ment was an offer of a unilateral contract, accepted when the plaintiff
attended the auction, and thereafter binding on the defendant, or rather
an offer conditioning a gift promise, revocable by the defendant at any
time prior to execution. The court's decision depended on finding a con-
sideration passing from the defendant to the plaintiff.
The court cites an example used by Williston: "[A] benevolent man
says to a tramp-'if you go around the corner to the clothing shop there,
you may purchase an overcoat on my credit.' "o300 Williston concedes that
the tramp's walk to the shop "is in its nature capable of being considera-
tion."30' 1 But the reason it does not qualify, says Williston, is that "the
walk was not requested as the price of the promise, but was merely a
condition of a gratuitous promise." 02 How do we know? Williston ac-
knowledges that it will often be difficult to tell.303 The case of the tramp is
obviously made easier for him because he has already defined the donor as
"a benevolent man,"304 a move which begs the question if our inquiry is
297. Once the presence of consideration is revealed to depend on intent to bargain, Holmes' con-
sideration argument is revealed as identical to his alternative ground for decision-that the legislature
was not making promises, but framing a scheme of public revenue and public improvement which
would only be pursued as long as the state thought it prudent to do so. Id. at 387. See supra note 288.
298. 157 Va. 415, 161 S.E. 242 (Sup. Ct. App. 1931), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra
note 8, at 210.
299. G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 62-63.
300. Id. (citing 1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 112, at 232 (1st
ed. 1920), quoted in Maughs, 157 Va. at 419, 161 S.E. at 243).
301. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 300, § 112, at 232.
302. Id. § 112 at 233, quoted in Maughs, 157 Va. at 419, 161 S.E. at 243.
303. Id.; see also Patterson, supra note 274, at 933 ("If a court need only look for a promise and
a detriment to the promisee, it will have a hard time distinguishing a detriment-for-promise exchange
from a conditional gratuitous promise.").
304. Maughs, 157 Va. at 419, 161 S.E. at 243.
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whether, in the absence of other information, we can determine whether
this is bargain or gift. But Williston tells us that in these cases, "An aid,
though not a conclusive test in determining which construction of the
promise is more reasonable is an inquiry whether the happening of the
condition will be a benefit to the promisor. If so, it is a fair inference that
the happening was requested as a consideration."30' 5
Relying on the Willistonian view, the Maughs court found for the
plaintiff. Since the defendant "unquestionably" ' 6 wanted to attract people
to the auction, and stood to gain from the mere chance that if someone
attended he or she was more likely to bid than if he or she had stayed
home, there was a bargain and the plaintiff was entitled to recover. To
summarize Maughs' teaching, we recognize the form of bargain in the
formulation "Come to the auction and you may win a car" because, after
investigation, we understand that this was a promise that named its price.
We have found an "objective value" to the defendant in having people
come to the auction.
What is the combined lesson of Powers and Maughs? That a bargain
theory of consideration, which purports to be able to test for bargain for-
mally and externally, in fact depends for its application upon one of two
possible supplements. The form turns out to be undecipherable unless we
also look to either the intent of the parties to bargain, or the objective
value of the promise or performance to the party who requests it. If the
supplement is of the first kind, we have simply another demonstration of
how manifestations-here forms of bargain-cannot be interpreted with-
out reference to the intent they manifest. This seems to be the dilemma as
it presents itself to Holmes in Powers.30 7 If the supplement is of the second
kind, we have an example of how forms-here forms of bargain-cannot
be interpreted without reference to the substance they supposedly reflect.
"Has the promise named its price?" is a question that requires us to be
able, substantively, to distinguish a price from not-a-price. As Williston
and Maughs show, an objective theory of value is required to make the
latter distinction.308
How do these two supplements of formal bargain theory work to-
gether? The express rhetoric of contract doctrine for the most part rejects
both the subjective theory of intent, which we have shown to be one hope
for avoiding the impossibility of formal bargain theory, and the objective
theory of value, which we have shown to be the other. What we might
305. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 300, § 112, at 233, quoted in Maughs, 157 Va. at 419, 161
S.E. at 243.
306. 157 Va. at 420, 161 S.E. at 244.
307. See supra notes 287-97 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 298-306 and accompanying text.
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expect to see in the doctrine, therefore, is a constant shuffling between
these two saving devices, and the use of each in an attempt to legitimate
the other, even as our attention is diverted from both by doctrine's empha-
sis on form rather than substance. This play of doctrine suggests that, as
in other areas of contract law already discussed, decisionmaking in the
area of consideration will be rendered thoroughly open. Ultimately, this
openness reflects the uncertainty created by the underlying problems of
knowledge and power.
B. Consideration Pursued: Modern Times
1. Form and Substance in the Second Restatement
Section 71 of the Second Restatement presents a current formulation of
a bargain theory of consideration:
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise
must be bargained for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought
by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the
promisee in exchange for that promise.309
Nothing in the text of these subsections suggests how to resolve the
difficulties suggested by the previous analysis of the bargain theory of con-
sideration. We could imagine section 71 favoring the view that considera-
tion be "sought by the promisor in exchange .. ."310 either in a purely
formal sense, or "actually," in the sense that he subjectively intended to
seek it. Similarly, the consideration could be "given by the promisee in
exchange . . .,"" either formally, by the terms of his response, or "actu-
ally," in the sense that he provided it with the intention of responding to
the promisor's invitation to bargain.
Comment b, which purports to elucidate, initially suggests that consid-
eration is primarily a requirement of form.$1" Specifically, it advances a
formal interpretation of when consideration occurs: We look for the mani-
festation of "intention to induce" and intention "to be induced." 13 Even
309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 71.
310. Id. § 71(2).
311. Id.
312. Comment b states:
Here, as in the matter of mutual assent, the law is concerned with the external manifestation
rather than the undisclosed mental state: it is enough that one party manifests an intention to
induce the other's response and to be induced by it and that the other responds in accordance
with the inducement.
Id. § 71 comment b.
313. Id. The comment also betrays its commitment to manifestation when it talks about the
"other's response" rather than "manifestation of response," which would presumably be the proper
1073
The Yale Law Journal
here, evidently enough, substance as subjective intent plays the same sup-
plementary role it did in the area of contract formation. But much more
problematic is the last sentence of the comment, which tells us that a
"mere pretense" of bargain, in the form of a "false recital of considera-
tion," or merely "nominal" consideration, cannot qualify under section
71. 11 This passage entirely resists being recast in formal terms. While the
idea of a recital of consideration is formal, the distinction between false
and true recital imagines that consideration has a real essence or sub-
stance-whether conceived in terms of objective value, or of subjective in-
tent to induce-that the false recital does not reflect. Similarly, the dis-
qualification of nominal consideration requires distinguishing it from
consideration that is real, in the sense of "having real value" or "really
inducing."
Section 81 deals with "Consideration as Motive or Inducing Cause"3 15
and, like Holmes, distinguishes consideration from "motive in actual fact"
in order to stress the objectivity of consideration and rescue it from con-
tamination by a theory of subjective intent.3 6 But, just as in Holmes' for-
mulation, subjective intent in section 81 resists the effort to oust it, and
remains a supplementary but acknowledged feature of the doctrine.
To appreciate this, one might ask how the language of section 81,
stressing that consideration need not correspond with motive or inducing
cause, can be made consistent with the language of section 71, particularly
the insistence of comment b of that section that mutual inducement "must
be present, or there is no bargain.13 17 One interpretation is that since the
dominant theme in section 71 is formal manifestation of inducement,
nothing in section 81 is inconsistent; since inducement obviously can be
manifested without being real, section 81 is simply a reminder of that
distinction.
Another interpretation is suggested by the commentary to section 81,
which says that "[t]his Section makes explicit a limitation on the require-
ment that consideration be bargained for.""' In this version, section 71
would appear to contain the general requirement that consideration be
parallel to a manifestation of intention. Id.
314. "Moreover, a mere pretense of bargain does not suffice, as where there is a false recital of
consideration or where the purported consideration is merely nominal." Id.
315. Id. § 81. The text of the section reads:
(1) The fact that what is bargained for does not of itself induce the making of a promise does
not prevent it from being consideration for the promise.
(2) The fact that a promise does not of itself induce a performance or return promise does not
prevent the performance or return promise from being consideration for the promise.
This protestation is exactly parallel to the portion of § 19 that provides for the possibility that assent
could be manifested without actual assent. Id. § 19.
316. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 225, at 230.
317. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 71 comment b.
318. Id. § 81 comment b.
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bargained for, while section 81 states an exception to that rule. This
presents section 71 as being about substance and not form; Section 81's
provision for merely "manifested" inducement is exceptional only if sec-
tion 71 demands substantive consideration in the sense of actual
inducement. 19
The commentary to section 81 reiterates the problem of choosing be-
tween a formal and a substantive interpretation of the text. Acknowledg-
ing the substantive proposition of section 71 that a "false" recital is not
consideration, 20 it attempts to distinguish between the pretended consider-
ation that is not consideration, and the consideration that is consideration
although not bargained for: "Unless both parties know that the purported
consideration is mere pretense, it is immaterial that the promisor's desire
for the consideration is incidental to other objectives and even that the
other party knows this to be so." '21 The distinction turns out to be merely
the distinction between part and whole. As long as the promisor is even
partly induced by the purported consideration, it will qualify under sec-
tion 81. This theme is suggested even earlier in the comment with the
observation that "the promisor may have more than one motive .... -"
Paradoxically, instead of supporting the view of consideration as form,
this explanation of section 81 emphasizes consideration as substance, in
the sense of subjective intention to bargain, subjective desire for the
consideration.
The commentary to section 81 concludes by referring us to section 79323
and its illustrations. Whereas section 81 can sustain the idea of considera-
tion as a formal requirement only by a backhanded reference to the sub-
stance of subjective intent, section 79 attempts to sustain a formal theory
of consideration by creating a supplementary role for the substance of ob-
jective value.
Section 79 begins with vigorous commitment to a theory of subjective
value:
If the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional re-
quirement of
(a) a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss, disad-
vantage, or detriment to the promisee; or
(b) equivalence in the values exchanged; or
(c) "mutuality of obligation. '324
319. See id. § 81 comment a.
320. Id. § 71 comment b.
321. Id. § 81 comment b.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. § 79.
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In support of this commitment, the commentary makes the traditional
connection between subjective value and the market economy.325
The commitment to a theory of subjective value is not, however, sus-
tained. The most interesting qualification suggests that "[g]ross inade-
quacy of consideration may be relevant to issues of capacity, fraud and the
like, but the requirement of consideration is not a safeguard against im-
prudent and improvident contracts . ".3.."26 This suggests that there is
no objective basis for judging the merely imprudent and improvident con-
tract; those adjectives should therefore be subject to further qualifications
such as "allegedly" or "apparently." But it also suggests that while value
is principally a private and subjective matter, there may come a point
somewhere beyond the imprudent and improvident contract where there is
room for objective judgment after all.
Even with respect to those cases where there is grossly inadequate con-
sideration, however, the comment refrains from open commitment to a
substantive disqualification: These contracts are not invalid because of the
inadequacy of the consideration. Rather, the substantive inadequacy of
consideration in these cases becomes evidence of the procedural failure of
the contract because of "issues of capacity, fraud and the like."' 2" Thus,
the comment maintains the integrity of the formal vision of consideration
by invoking another formal set of doctrines, doctrines that address the in-
tegrity of the bargaining process. 8" This move defers any further discus-
sion of what constitutes "gross inadequacy," '29 and thus defers the slide
from form to substance, until it reemerges in accounts of the supposedly
formal doctrines where its relevance has been identified. There, as already
suggested by the preceding analysis of duress and unconscionability, the
avoidance continues.830
A further example of the interplay between subjective and objective the-
ories of value in the Restatement's account of consideration derives from
the purported negation of any requirement of "mutuality of obligation."33
The older doctrine of mutuality held that a content-less promise by one
party to an agreement could not serve as consideration to bind the other.
In that form, the doctrine appears to contradict the earlier proposition of
section 79 that consideration need involve no "gain, advantage, or benefit
325. "To the extent that the apportionment of productive energy and product [sic] in the economy
are left to private action, the parties to transactions are free to fix their own valuations ....
Ordinarily, therefore, courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration." Id. § 79 comment c.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. This includes not just fraud, but also "mistake, misrepresentation, duress or undue influ-
ence." Id. § 79 comment e.
329. Id. § 79 comment c.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 94-139, especially 94-95.
331. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 79(c).
1076
Vol. 94: 997, 1985
Deconstructing Contract Doctrine
to the promisor, '  which explains why the Restatement rejects it. But
the commentary provides the by-now-expected clue that mutuality is not
quite extinct, and substance not quite extinguished. A residuum of mutu-
ality survives in both sections 76 and 77.33'
What sections 76'34 and 77335 provide is, in slightly differing formula-
tions, that "[w]ords of promise do not constitute a promise if they make
performance entirely optional with the purported promisor." ''"6 In other
words, a form of promise is not sufficient unless it is a manifestation of
the "real" promise. Nor is the reality of the promise, in this instance, to
be tested exclusively by the subjective intent of the promisor; the prom-
isor's sense of being bound does not make the promise binding if it is an
empty promise.337 Rather, the test is of the objective content or value of
the promise.
Thus the Second Restatement's account of consideration, of the role of
motive, and of the lack of any role for doctrines of adequacy or mutuality
turns out to replicate the problems of the structure of the bargain theory
of consideration as formulated by Holmes and Williston. 8" The starting
point is still a commitment to the idea that the value of a contractual
exchange is best left to the judgment of the parties; since the courts are
held to have no justifiable role in imposing standards of equivalence or
fairness, consideration must be principally a formal requirement. Inevita-
bly, however, a formal theory of consideration requires some substantive
input to answer the question, "Form of what?" As we have seen, one way
to supply an answer without backtracking on the commitment to subjec-
tively assessed value is to look to the subjective intent of the parties to
bargain. Another way to supply an answer is to invoke the notion of ob-
jective value.
Each of these answers creates its own questions. A focus on "intent"
threatens to jeopardize the social-wealth-enhancing function of considera-
tion to which doctrinal rhetoric also pays allegiance. Such a focus also
revives the dilemma of how intent is to be divined."' 9 As the focus shifts
inevitably to manifestations of intent, the debate becomes once more a
debate about form, but a debate no more conclusive. There is also a sense
in which the move to intent may only disguise the slide to objective value;
332. Id. § 79(a).
333. Id. § 79 comment f ("The only requirement of 'mutuality of obligation' even in cases of
mutual promises is that stated in §§ 76-77.").
334. Id. § 76 (entitled "Conditional Promise").
335. Id. § 77 (entitled "Illusory and Alternative Promises").
336. See id. §§ 76, 77.
337. See, e.g., id. § 77 comment a, illustrations 1, 2.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 284-308.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 140-149.
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it may very well be the court's determination of mutual advantage that
provides the requisite manifestation of intent to bargain. 4
In stressing the societal advantage of wealth-enhancing transactions,
however, the focus on objective value threatens to eclipse both the intent of
the parties and the image of contract law as essentially private. Nor is it
an easy matter to assess objective value. Just as the intent-based escape
from form frequently ends up invoking objective value, so the objective
value escape frequently winds up invoking intent. Courts often move from
an assessment that the contracting parties did indeed seriously intend to
bargain, to a decision that each party did indeed stand to profit by the
transaction." 1 These various mediations of form and substance, their in-
terplay and their ultimate failure to resolve the conundrum they address,
are explored in the next section in some characteristic case law.
2. Intent and Value in the Cases
In 1967, the Supreme Court of Washington decided the case of
Browning v. Johnson,"4 2 described by the opinion's author, Judge Lan-
genbach, as "the tale of two osteopaths who attempted a business transac-
tion."'34 3 More specifically, it is the tale of how Browning contracted to
sell his practice to Johnson but changed his mind before the effective date
of the contract. By promising to pay Johnson $40,000, Browning per-
suaded him to enter another contract canceling the prior contract of sale.
Browning later took Johnson to court, seeking to recover the $40,000. The
trial court found that the contract of sale had lacked mutuality, and was
unenforceable. 44 That court nonetheless concluded that the contract of
cancellation was supported by "adequate consideration," and denied
Browning recovery of the $40,000.""5 Browning appealed.
The supreme court thus faced the issue whether Johnson's agreement to
cancel a contract under which the trial court had held that he had no
entitlements could be consideration for Browning's promise to pay him
$40,000. The supreme court, like the trial court, held that the agreement
to cancel constituted consideration. 346 En route to that conclusion, the
court invoked the various strands of consideration doctrine identified in
my prior analysis.
340. For a converse example, treating the lack of objective value as undermining any manifesta-
tion of intent to bargain, see supra notes 300-306 and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., infra notes 358-361 and accompanying text.
342. 70 Wash. 2d 145, 422 P.2d 314 (1967).
343. Id. at 146, 422 P.2d at 315.
344. See id.
345. Id. at 147, 422 P.2d at 315.
346. See id. at 148, 422 P.2d at 316.
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Langenbach begins by "correcting" some of the trial court's terminolog-
ical confusion.3,7 The question to be answered is whether Johnson's
promise is supported by consideration, not whether it is supported by "ad-
equate" consideration. 4" "Adequacy" involves discussion of comparative
values, an inappropriate inquiry. "Sufficiency" is the appropriate inquiry.
The quest for sufficiency is uncomplicated by measures of value. It is sim-
ply a search for "that which will support a promise." 4" It is enough for
the supreme court to find, as it does, that Browning's promise is sup-
ported by consideration.
The adequacy-sufficiency distinction purports to safeguard the theory
of subjective value by renouncing any attempt to decide if the exchange
entered by the parties was objectively fair. The hope is that "sufficiency"
can be assessed by some means other than the objective assessment of
value. At one level the message is that the difference is simply one of
degree: Sufficiency means just a little bit of consideration, while adequacy
would mean an amount of consideration equal to the promise made. But
because this distinction acknowledges the court's ability to assess objective
value at the minimal end, it threatens the claim that objective value cannot
be measured. This threat is reflected in court decisions that, according to
commentators, confuse the two tests. In part for this reason, the Second
Restatement abandons the sufficiency-adequacy distinction, and talks in-
stead about the presence or absence of consideration. 5
The threat to the theory of subjective value persists despite such talk:
Measuring the absence of consideration still involves knowing when a
promise is empty, and still leaves the question of how a scale could meas-
ure emptiness but not fullness. The resolution of this problem is to main-
tain that the difference between emptiness and fullness is one of kind
rather than degree. To measure sufficiency, or absence, of consideration
thus requires a formal test, where measuring adequacy, or the presence of
consideration, seemingly requires a substantive test.
Langenbach implicitly adopts this approach. 5 ' He thus faces the task of
conducting a search for the "form" of sufficient consideration. He imme-
diately seems to imperil the enterprise by suggesting that he must look for
a benefit received by the promisor, or a detriment incurred by the prom-
isee. But the fact that he relies on Williston protects him from any crass
assertion that he is looking for objectively measurable benefit or detriment.
First, Williston tells him that it is not necessary to look for benefit; the
347. See id at 147-48, 422 P.2d at 315-16.
348. See id. at 147, 422 P.2d at 316.
349. See id.
350. See, e.g., REsrATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 71 comment a.
351. Browning v. Johnson, 70 Wash. 2d at 147-48, 422 P.2d at 316.
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presence of detriment is enough. 352 Williston then defines detriment as
"the giving up of 'something which immediately prior thereto the prom-
isee was privileged to retain, or doing or refraining from doing something
which he was then privileged not to do, or not to refrain from doing.'"
3 53
This is virtually identical to the Second Restatement's definition of consid-
eration, which manages to avoid any reference to benefit or detriment. 5 4
Langenbach also makes clear that "legal" detriment is quite divorced from
"whether there is any actual loss or detriment to [the promisee] or actual
benefit to the promisor . . .""' Langenbach then explicitly ties this
commitment to form to the court's inability to assess Browning's "objects
and motives."3 58 Browning's subjective intention, and therefore the subjec-
tive value to him of Johnson's performance, are unavailable to the deci-
sionmaker and therefore out of bounds.
So far Langenbach has attempted to legitimate as sufficient considera-
tion a promise that has a real look of emptiness about it. He has stressed
the "formality" of the consideration requirement, so that the the cancella-
tion of the contract of sale can be of the necessary "form" regardless of its
legal effect.35 7 But Langenbach also feels required to justify the decision as
upholding an agreement that was indeed in Browning's interests at the
time the deal was made. Langenbach's very emphasis on the difficulty of
knowing Browning's objects and motives invites the reader to consider that
Browning might have benefited from the agreement, despite its lack of
legal significance. 58 Then, shortly after renouncing any inquiry into
Browning's objects and motives, Langenbach returns to reconstruct those
same objects and motives. He uses the "form of bargain" entered into
between the parties, and the absence of defects in the bargaining process,
to reach the conclusion that the deal must have been beneficial to Brown-
ing. Thus form supports form. 59
352. See id. at 148, 422 P.2d at 316 (quoting 1 S. WILLSTON, supra note 300, § 102 (3d ed.
1957)).
353. Id., quoting 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 300, § 102A (3d ed. 1957).
354. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 71(3) states, "The performance may consist of (a)
an act other than a promise, or (b) a forbearance, or (c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a
legal relation."
355. Browning v. Johnson, 70 Wash. 2d at 149, 422 P.2d at 316 (quoting Harris v. Johnson, 75
Wash. 291, 295, 134 P. 1048, 1050 (1913)).
356. 70 Wash. 2d at 149, 422 P.2d at 317 (quoting Haigh v. Brooks, 113 Eng. Rep. 119, 123
(Q.B. 1839)).
357. See 70 Wash. 2d at 149, 422 P.2d at 317. Langenbach also adds credibility to his argument
by presenting the second agreement as a unilateral one. In this formulation, Browning promises to
pay $40,000 for Johnson's act of cancellation. This act seems more likely to qualify as consideration
than would a promise by Johnson not to enforce a non-existent right, which would be the alternative
way of characterizing the second agreement.
358. This is accentuated by the footnote Langenbach appends, which contains excerpts of a letter
from Johnson to Browning, detailing why Browning is unwilling to go through with the sale. Id.
359. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
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The formal validity of the bargain allows Langenbach to hypothesize
its substantively satisfying nature, and to invoke the adage that no man
bargains against his own interest.3 60 Such treatment, however, begs the
question, for it is certainly true that men, and women too, occasionally act
against at least some conceptions of their interest. Whether there has been
a bargain is the question for decision. That the transaction looks like a
bargain is certainly enough to satisfy one aspect of consideration doctrine,
but ignores the aspect that asks courts to distinguish the empty or illusory
promise from the promise that counts as consideration. 6'
In sum, then, Browning inquires into whether formal requirements
have been met by moving from form to "substance as intent." The persua-
sive manifestation of intent is the business-like form of the parties' agree-
ment. This form also provides reassuring evidence that the deal has sub-
jective value to both parties, even if its objective value is somewhat
obscure.
This strategy is identical to that found in cases such as Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon6 2 involving agreements described by Kessler and Gil-
more as being "instinct with obligation." ' In Lucy, and like cases, the
presence of an apparently serious agreement provides all the necessary
proof that consideration is present. The consideration is then found; if it
cannot be milked out of the express terms, it is readily implied. 64
As D.C. v. T. W.3 15 illustrates, however, the presence of an apparently
serious agreement is not always protection against a finding of no consid-
eration. In that case, the mother and father of a child born out of wedlock
entered into an "Agreement for Child Support '" 6 under which the father
360. Langenbach writes:
It is clear that at the time of contracting, the parties, equally informed, of equal bargaining
power and equally assisted by able counsel, freely bargained for, and freely settled upon an
exchange which each felt would be beneficial to him. Their mutual assent proved this mutual
expectation of benefit for the law must presume that no man bargains against his own interest.
70 Wash. 2d at 151, 422 P.2d at 318. The judge's emphasis on the equality and freedom of the
parties surely has to do with his unease at awarding the plaintiff $40,000 in return for his renuncia-
tion of non-existent rights.
361. The Restatement provides that release of an invalid claim may be consideration in only two
situations: where the surrendering party believes the claim may fairly be determined to be valid (a
situation dependent on the court's knowledge of subjective intent), or where the surrendering party
actually executes a written instrument to that effect (an arbitrary recognition of formality). RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 74.
362. KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 362.
363. 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at
363.
364. 222 N.Y. at 90-92, 118 N.E. at 214-15. The courts' treatment of requirements contracts
also fits into this category. See, e.g., Lima Locomotive & Mach. Co. v. National Steel Castings Co.,
155 F. 77 (6th Cir. 1907), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 344; In re United
Cigar Stores Co. of America, 8 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE,
supra note 8, at 348.
365. 480 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
366. Id. at 476.
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was to provide support to the child until it reached the age of majority or
married, whichever came first. The agreement was signed and sworn to
by both parties before a notary public, and included the statement that the
minor child was the father's child, and that he was "therefore, and in
consideration thereof, entering into the following support agreement."6
The mother agreed that the contract would be the basis of "all child sup-
port obligations" of "the father of my said child." '68 At the time of the
suit, the father was in default under the agreement to the extent of
$7,500, and claimed that the agreement lacked consideration. The trial
court upheld the agreement and the father appealed.
Each step of Langenbach's analysis in Browning3 69 is transferable to
T.W. There is again every indication that the agreement was entered into
freely and equally by both parties, and that no defects in the bargaining
process tainted its legitimacy. As in Browning, it could be asserted that
the mutual assent proved the mutual expectation of benefit, and that any
more particular investigation into the father's objects and motives was an
inappropriate intrusion by the court into the world of subjective intent.
Had the mother done something she was "then privileged not to do?"
37 0
Yes, she had signed her name to the agreement, which acknowledged that
the other party was the father of her child, and committed her to relin-
quishing any support claim not based on the agreement.
Unpersuaded by such reasoning, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals had
no difficulty finding that the agreement lacked consideration and was un-
enforceable. Starting from the premise that consideration requires a find-
ing either of benefit to the promisor or of detriment to the promisee, the
court failed to find either.37 1 Under 1972 Texas law, the father of an ille-
gitimate child had no obligation to provide support;1 2 the mother had le-
gal custody of the child and the legal obligation to support it. By signing
the agreement, the court reasoned, the mother was not taking on any re-
sponsibility beyond that required of her by law, and the father had not
relieved himself of any legal obligation, since he had none.37 3 The agree-
ment therefore neither benefited the father, nor resulted in detriment to
the mother. Since the mother's was an empty promise, the agreement was
unenforceable. The court considered it unimportant that this conclusion
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See supra note 342.
370. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 300, § 102A, at 382 (3d ed. 1957), quoted in Browning v.
Johnson, 70 Wash. 2d at 148, 422 P.2d at 316.
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contradicted the father's statement that his promise was supported by con-
sideration. Formality is not all, the court said. The court investigated the
recited consideration in light of undenied facts, and made a substantive
decision that the recital was false.374
All the court has done here is draw upon a different set of possibilities
created by the difficulty of sustaining a formal consideration doctrine. The
absence of objective value was used to decide that consideration too was
absent; the form of bargain was illusory; the promise named a condition
but not a price. In this context, the seriousness of the parties' intent to
contract, the evidentiary solemnity of signature before a notary, was all to
no avail. To me, at least, this seems a repugnant and unnecessary result,
but not an "incorrect" one under the current rules of the doctrinal
game.3 7 5
C. Consideration and Reliance, Sameness and Difference
Our focus now shifts to the doctrine of reliance or promissory estoppel,
conceived as an alternative basis for fixing liability, and therefore as a
substitute for consideration in appropriate circumstances. To the extent
that reliance rhetoric recognizes reliance as "substantive" rather than
"formal," reliance can be viewed as an attempt to exorcise the substantive
ghost from the law of consideration. In this view, reliance embodies the
threat of a supplanting, substance-conscious doctrine, but at the same time
contributes to the survival of formal consideration doctrine. To show how
reliance ultimately fails in this rescue attempt, I analyze the relationship
between Restatement section 71,376 which concerns consideration, and sec-
tion 90,377 which concerns reliance, and discuss some illustrative cases. I
then demonstrate that the relationship between these two sections is ex-
actly mirrored in the relationship between Second Restatement sections
4538 and 87, which further illuminates the problematic co-existence of
the models of consideration and reliance.
Because I suggest that consideration and reliance either are not, or need
not be, as different from one another as they are generally perceived to be,
a few caveats are in order. I do not mean to assert the insignificance of
374. Id. at 479.
375. See, e.g., Bernstein v. W.B. Mfg. Co., 238 Mass. 589, 131 N.E. 200 (1921), reprinted in
KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 375; Reinert v. Lawson, 113 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 374.
376. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 71.
377. Id. § 90.
378. Id. § 45.
379. Id. § 87.
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either the appearance of liability based on detrimental reliance as a doc-
trine in its own right, 8 ' or its appreciable increase in influence on the
formulation of doctrine between, say, the First and Second Restatement.381
In fact, it seems important to ask, if not possible to answer, questions
about why our society has become so much more comfortable with a reli-
ance-based rhetoric.
In a sense, I hope to contribute to the very inquiry I doubt we are in a
position to conclude. Any theory of the emergence or resurgence of reli-
ance as rhetoric must account for the fact that reliance rhetoric, as incor-
porated in doctrine, merely replicates, both internally and in dialogue
with consideration rhetoric, a debate that was already central to, but in-
ternal to, consideration rhetoric. These tensions must be part of any fi-
nally satisfying story about the history and role of reliance in contract
doctrine.
1. Second Restatement Sections 71 and 90
The historical story of detrimental reliance is that, as incorporated in
the First Restatement,82 it illustrates how the bargain theory of consider-
ation failed to oust concrete notions of benefit and detriment from the
common law of contract. As Gilmore tells the story, 8 3 Corbin marshalled
the body of case law recognizing the promisee's experienced detriment as
a basis for enforcing the promisor's promise, and threw it in the teeth of
bargain theory proponents. Confronted with this intractable material,
Williston and his cohorts were forced to include the detrimental reliance
principle in the First Restatement scheme, alongside bargain theory.384 Ja-
nus-like, these two heads of promissory liability stared out in different
directions, barely acknowledging one another's existence. Neither text nor
commentary addressed the knotty questions of how their coexistence
should be imagined.
This problematic relationship continues in the text of the Restatement,
although an attempt to "situate" the two ideas with respect to one another
makes section 71 the cornerstone of the discussion of contracts based on
consideration, 85 while section 90 falls into the category of "Contracts
380. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 62-65.
381. See, e.g., id. at 69-72.
382. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
383. G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 57-65.
384. Id. The bargain theory of consideration was originally encapsulated in RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS, supra note 382, § 75.
385. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, ch. 4, topic 1.
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without Consideration. 8 6 This makes explicit the "exceptional" charac-
ter of liability based on detrimental reliance.38 7 It also replicates the struc-
ture of the First Restatement in making it possible, indeed almost neces-
sary, to talk about one section without talking about the other. The
relationship between sections 71 and 90 is, however, close and critical:
They do and must speak to and comment on one another.
For purposes of this discussion, the importance of section 71 lies in its
requirement that a promise, to be enforceable, induce the furnishing of a
consideration, which may be another promise, action, or forbearance. Sec-
tion 71 further requires that the consideration reciprocally induce the
making of the promise. Section 90, in contrast, provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injus-
tice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. 8
Under either section, a promise can be binding if it induces action or
forbearance. The most obvious difference between the sections is the recip-
rocal or "bilateral" formulation of section 71, contrasted with the "unilat-
eral" formulation of section 90.89 Under section 71, the consideration
must induce the making of the promise and the promise must induce the
consideration. This requires some interpretation. In the case of the prom-
ise for performance, which is the contractual mode most closely corre-
sponding to liability for detrimental reliance, it is misleading to say that
the performance induces the promise, since the promise temporally pre-
cedes the performance. A better formulation is that in these circumstances
the promisor is induced, or appears to be induced, to promise by the pros-
pect of performance.
While section 71 requires that the promisor manifest the intention of
inducing action or forbearance, section 90 requires the promisor to con-
duct himself (manifest himself) in a fashion that he expects will induce
the action or forbearance. Under what circumstances would the section 90
386. Id. ch. 4, topic 2.
387. The role of reliance doctrine is actually expanded in the Restatement, appearing not just in §
90, but also, for example, in connection with option contracts in § 87, and in connection with the
Statute of Frauds in § 217. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 69-72, where Gilmore argues
that detrimental reliance has "in effect, swallowed up the bargain principle . Id. at 72.
388. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 90(1).
389. By this I mean, as the text which follows elucidates, that § 71 on its face asks us to conceive
of the relationship between the parties as one of mutual inducement, while § 90 appears to require
only that the promisee be induced by the promisor's conduct.
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requirement be met? Certainly where the promisee is persuaded, reasona-
bly, that the promisor is calling for performance and has tied his promise
to the prospect of performance. 9 ' Under this circumstance, section 90 is
no different from section 71; for all its unilateral formulation, section 90
has a hidden bilateral or reciprocal aspect.
Could the section 90 requirement be met under other circumstances as
well? Not unless the promisee was justified in acting or forbearing, and
the promisor had induced and should have expected the promisee's action
or forbearance, even though the promisor was not calling for either and
had not even used language or conduct that could reasonably be inter-
preted as calling for either. It is extremely difficult to imagine such a
situation.391
We are thus left with a conundrum: How can we distinguish the per-
formance of section 90 from the consideration of section 71? First, we can
distinguish the two situations by reference to the promisor's subjective in-
tent. If the promisor subjectively desires or requests the performance
called for, and is subjectively induced by the prospect of it to make his
promise, then we are dealing with the consideration of section 71. If, on
the other hand, the promisor's relationship to the performance is not one
of subjective desire or request, then we are dealing with the performance
of section 90.39'
Second, we can distinguish the consideration of section 71 from the per-
formance of section 90 on a substantive basis. If we imagine a content-
based measure of consideration, such as benefit to the promisor, then ac-
tions and forbearances can theoretically be sorted according to whether
they objectively benefit the promisor, and are therefore consideration, or
merely result in detriment to the promisee, and are therefore not
consideration.
The structure of the relationship between sections 71 and 90 therefore
replicates the internal structure of consideration doctrine. Once again, a
390. By "calling for" action or forbearance I intend to suggest a manifestation that could be
interpreted as "requesting" or "desiring" either the "performance" of § 71, which can in turn be
either action or forbearance, or the action or forbearance required by § 90. The reason for making
these distinctions, and using terms which encompass both, is made clear in the text that follows.
391. Such a situation would involve the promisor saying something like this: "I neither request
nor desire you to do as I am suggesting, and my promise to you is in no way dependent on your doing
as I suggest," and yet the promisee being justified in following the suggestion in reliance on the
promise.
392. Conditions attached to gifts, or preparations for performance that are not themselves per-
formance are presumably actions or forbearances not subjectively desired or even requested by the
promisor, under this theory. But even to state this proposition is to render it vulnerable. See supra
text accompanying notes 286-329.
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distinct formal bargain theory of consideration turns out to be an impossi-
bility unless reinforced by renegade notions of substance, substance as ei-
ther subjective intent or objective value. Here, the rescuing notions of sub-
jective intent and objective values are needed to hold apart the dominant
world of bargain theory from the supplementary and residual world of
liability for detrimental reliance.
To reiterate: To distinguish a section 90 situation of detrimental reli-
ance from a section 71 bargain situation requires finding the absence of
either the substance of subjective intent or the substance of objective value.
How otherwise would we know how to characterize Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores,3 93 for example, as a reliance and not a consideration case? In
Hoffman, Red Owl Stores wanted Mr. Hoffman to prepare to become a
franchisee. In return for Hoffman's action, Red Owl Stores made their
promises of support. Hoffman, in turn, was induced by Red Owl's
promises to take the steps they demanded. We seem to have precisely the
relationship of "reciprocal inducement" Holmes envisioned. 94 What pre-
vents this from being a consideration case is the court's sense that Red
Owl Stores got nothing out of the steps taken by Hoffman (no objective
value), or the sense that those preparatory steps, while suggested, were
still not desired or requested by Red Owl Stores (no subjective intent). 9 '
But if "absence" marks the section 90 reliance case, "presence" must
mark the section 71 consideration case. From the perspective of section 90,
then, consideration becomes a matter of substance and not of form.
2. The Swallowing Relationship of Second Restatement Sections 71
and 90
If section 71 requires the presence of substance and section 90 depends
on the absence of substance, the next question is how doctrine can regu-
late the dividing line between cases where there is no liability without
presence, and cases where there can be liability despite absence. Gilmore
talks glancingly about this recurring problem of the contradictory charac-
ter of consideration and reliance, about the way they must swallow up one
another. 9 ' I plan to show in some detail how this threat is constantly
present in doctrinal discourse, and the particular forms that it takes. I
then identify mechanisms that operate to prevent, finally, the collapse of
consideration into reliance or vice versa. This last is the story of how what
appears impossible is made possible.
393. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8,
at 171.
394. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 225, at 230-32. See also supra text accompanying note 284.
395. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d at 697-98, 133 N.W.2d at 274-75.
396. G. GILMORE, supra note 29, at 72.
1087
The Yale Law Journal
What room does the doctrine of consideration, as either form or sub-
stance, leave for reliance? If consideration were taken seriously as a doc-
trine of substance, people would have no business relying on promises for
which they had not paid. But if consideration is taken seriously as a doc-
trine of form, it would appear to cover all instances of detrimental reli-
ance, making an additional doctrine of reliance unnecessary.
In James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros. ,97 Judge Learned Hand suggested
that section 90 could not be applied in the standard commercial contrac-
tual context, but only in the marginal areas of gift, charitable subscrip-
tion, and the like. 98 His point was a simple one. The theory of considera-
tion imagines that offers unsupported by consideration are not binding
promises. They become binding only when the performance or return
promise has been received. It would therefore never be reasonable for an
offeree to rely on an offer or treat it as a promise if he had not provided
consideration. Thus, the conditions required by section 90-reasonable
reliance on a promise unsupported by consideration-can never be met.
Consideration has swallowed reliance.3 99
Hand's solution was skillful but ultimately illogical. He pushed the un-
welcome section 90 off into a corner of contract-related law remote from
the problem he was dealing with, namely the law of gift.400 But we can
expose the fragility of this solution by applying his own reasoning to it.
Under the law of gift, an unexecuted, undelivered gift-a mere gift prom-
ise-is not binding on the giver. Under these circumstances, how could the
beneficiary ever rely, reasonably, on the promise? Reliance turns out to be
incompatible with gift, just as it was incompatible with consideration. 01 If
we took consideration doctrine seriously, then, we would not have room
for section 90.402
397. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 246.
398. 64 F.2d at 346.
399. This swallowing argument can have either a private (intention-based) or a public (policy)
formulation. In the private formulation, the unsupported promise cannot sustain reasonable reliance
because people (promisors) actually intend not to be bound in the absence of consideration, and other
people (promisees) know or should know that. See, e.g., Baird, 64 F.2d at 346. In the public formula-
tion, reliance on unsupported promises contradicts our social commitment to wealth-enhancing trans-
actions. See, e.g., Prescott v. Jones, 69 N.H. 305, 41 A. 352 (1898), reprinted in KESSLER & GiL-
MORE, supra note 8, at 173. If we take seriously the intention-based argument about consideration,
we cannot accept thefact of reliance. Actually, in giving reliance-based relief, judges tend to use the
public argument about consideration-they accept the fact of reliance, and impose a policy exception
to the policy of not enforcing promises without consideration. Interestingly, while this move reveals
reliance as inevitably public, the fact that it also reveals consideration as public is lost sight of.
400. Baird, 64 F.2d at 346.
401. Saving arguments would have to stress either that the facts are different here-that people do
in fact rely on gift promises in a way they do not rely on commercial-type promises-or that the
policies are different. The factual argument seems hard to make, and the policy distinction threatens
an unwarranted public intrusion.
402. This is different from the argument that if we took consideration seriously as a purely formal
doctrine we would have no need for reliance. Under the latter argument, the apparent presence of
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Just as consideration swallows reliance, reliance swallows considera-
tion. If we take seriously the idea of reliance as a basis for enforcing
promises, it is hard to see why we would ever invoke the doctrine of con-
sideration, even in situations where we currently think consideration
would be found. This is most obviously true where the offeree has per-
formed his part of the deal "in reliance" on the offeror's promise. It is
almost as obviously true where the offeree takes other concrete action on
the basis of the paid-for promise of the offeror. The hardest case concep-
tually is that of the wholly executory contract, where the offeree, at the
time of breach, was simply waiting without other obvious change of posi-
tion for the time of performance."' But even here the offeree is relying on
the deal to the extent of not seeking another similar one, or by foregoing
other opportunities in order to be able to follow through on this one.4 "
The next stage of our inquiry concerns how, given the tendency of these
two doctrines to encroach upon and engulf one another, judges in fact
apply doctrine so as to maintain each in its "proper" sphere. The initial
reciprocal inducement, as in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965),
would also yield recovery under consideration theory without recourse to a supplemental reliance
theory. Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891), reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE,
supra note 8, at 413, is another good example. This case was decided as a consideration case, but
today is often recast as "really" a reliance case. Among the authorities cited for the result in that case
is Pollock, who states precisely the reciprocal inducement theory: "Consideration means not so much
that one party is profiting as that the other abandons some legal right in the present or limits his legal
freedom of action in the future as an inducement for the promise of the first." 124 N.Y. at 546
(quoting F. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 167 (2d American ed. 1885)).
403. There are obvious parallels betweeen this analysis and Fuller and Perdue's analysis of the
reliance interest in contract damages. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:
1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936). They suggest, for example, that the restitution interest can generally be
seen as a special case of the reliance interest, id. at 54-55, and that both interests present a stronger
claim for vindication than the expectation interest, id. at 56-57.
404. Again, Fuller and Perdue offer a similar analysis when they suggest that "the reliance inter-
est must be interpreted as at least potentially covering 'gains prevented' as well as 'losses caused."' Id.
at 55. They take the further step of explaining expectation recovery as the measure that will serve to
ensure recovery of all losses suffered in reliance:
[Expectation recovery] offers the measure of recovery most likely to reimburse the plaintiff for
the (often very numerous and very difficult to prove) individual acts and forbearances which
make up his total reliance on the contract. If we take into account "gains prevented" by reli-
ance, that is, losses involved in foregoing the opportunity to enter other contracts, the notion
that the rule protecting the expectancy is adopted as the most effective means of compensating
for detrimental reliance seems not at all far-fetched.
Id. at 60.
A similar sensitivity to the potential range of reliance is indicated in Hazlett v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n., 14 Wash. 2d 124, 131, 127 P.2d 273, 277 (1942): "Surely, forbearance [in Section 90]
was not intended to include the mere passive failure of the promisee to procure elsewhere, or by other
means, the service or the thing promised. If so, it would be difficult to imagine a promise which would
not be supported by some sort of 'forbearance'. ... "
When conjuring up those situations in which reliance is minimal, or the resultant damage appar-
ently non-existent, it is well to remember that expectation damages for breach of contract are also
occasionally non-existent; an example of a situation in which damages are inconsequential occurs
when substitute goods are readily available at the same price, without extra incidental cost to the
buyer. See, e.g., KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 1042.
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strategy is to view consideration as a doctrine of form, and reliance as a
supplemental doctrine of substance. But because reliance reveals consider-
ation as also a doctrine of substance, 0 5 the work of maintaining the dis-
tinction between reliance and consideration must proceed at another level.
First, courts apply the doctrines sequentially; only if they find no con-
sideration do courts invoke detrimental reliance.406 This ensures, however
precariously, that consideration will not lose out to reliance. Contracts
professors bemoan the common "error" of first-year students: Once intro-
duced to detrimental reliance, they apply it indiscriminately, preferring it
to the intricacies of consideration doctrine. According to my account, the
first-year students' perception of the potential range of application of det-
rimental reliance doctrine is perfectly correct, although it flies in the face
of the common law tradition, which protects consideration by insisting on
its procedural priority.
Secondly, the doctrines differ in the measures of recovery generally as-
sociated with consideration and reliance cases. 40 7 In fact, however, this dis-
tinction between reliance and consideration is relatively unimportant:
While any detailed account of damages is beyond the scope of this piece, it
is hardly novel to suggest that these supposed differences turn out to be
fairly trivial in constraining damage awards in particular cases. While
reliance recovery under section 90 may be "limited as justice requires," 40 8
nothing precludes the award of expectation damages, and there will of
course be situations where reliance and expectation measures appear iden-
tical. 40 9 Furthermore, since Fuller and Perdue's celebrated article, it has
been accepted wisdom that damages for breach of contracts supported by
consideration very often fall short of the expectation measure, and fre-
quently appear to be based on the plaintiff's loss in reliance.410 Certainly
nothing in the Second Restatement's treatment of available damage mea-
sures imagines any rigid distinctions, 4 ' and modern judicial practice ap-
pears to reflect the same flexibility. 41 2 All of this suggests that the attempt
405. See supra text accompanying notes 392-395.
406. See, e.g., Baird, 64 F.2d at 346; Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 413, 333 P.2d
757, 759 (1958). For the hornbook's treatment of reliance as a residual category, see sources cited in
Feinman, Promissoy Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 686 n.41 (1984).
407. The traditional view, reflected in many contemporary texts, is that expectation damages
should be awarded for the breach of contract supported by consideration, while reliance damages
should be the limit of recovery for reliance cases. For a collection of such messages, see Feinman,
supra note 406, at 686.
408. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 90(1).
409. See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); see also Fuller
& Perdue, supra note 403, at 73 (identifying three kinds of cases where reliance and expectation
interests "will furnish identical, or nearly identical, measures of recovery. ..").
410. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE LJ. 373,
373-417 (1937).
411. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, §§ 346-56, 370-77.
412. See Feinman, supra note 406, at 687-88.
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to distinguish bases of recovery by focusing on remedies is a deluded exer-
cise in conceptualism.
Finally, its generally "unilateral" character4 13 causes reliance rhetoric to
sound different from consideration rhetoric. When the rhetoric of reliance
explicitly recognizes the bilateral nature of the reliance relationship, how-
ever, reliance begins to appear indistinguishable from consideration.
Drennan v. Star Paving41 is one of a group of bidding cases in which
the subcontractor submits a bid to the general contractor, then wishes to
withdraw it after the general contractor has used the bid in submitting a
bid of its own.415 At the time of the suit, the general contractor has either
been awarded the contract, or is subject to penalty for withdrawing its bid.
Justice Traynor, the author of the Drennan opinion, begins his analysis
with a clear statement that consideration doctrine will not yield an irrevo-
cable option making the subcontractor's bid binding: "There is no evi-
dence that defendant offered to make its bid irrevocable in exchange for
plaintiff's use of its figures in computing his bid."44 6 Traynor finds that
the subcontractor, nonetheless, did have reason to expect that the general
contractor would use the bid and therefore had induced "'action. . .of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee [the general
contractor]' ")417 within the terms of section 90. This is enough in itself to
support a finding for the general contractor.
Traynor goes on, however, to elaborate the reciprocal limitations under
which the general contractor operates, once he is granted the general con-
tract. The general contractor is not free to delay acceptance while he
shops for a lower price. If he begins dickering with the subcontractor he
loses his right to accept the subcontractor's original bid.41 8 Once Traynor
has established this exchange of obligations, it seems less clear why they
could not equally be conceived as an exchange of considerations, the sub-
contractor granting an option in return for the general contractor's com-
mitment to play fair. When Traynor also throws into the balance the fact
that "[c]learly defendant [subcontractor] had a stake in plaintiff's [general
413. See the explanation of "unilateral" offered supra note 389. This is not to say that unilateral
consideration talk is not available; § 71 actually contains both models. The description of bargain as
something "sought by the promisor. . . and given by the promisee .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 6, § 71(2), is unilateral, but the notions of "bargain," id., and "exchange," id., seem more
bilateral. It is the general absence of "bilateral" reliance talk that is more striking.
414. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
415. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933), discussed supra at notes
397-402 and accompanying text, is another case in the same group.
416. Drennan, 51 Cal. 2d at 413, 333 P.2d at 759.
417. Id. (quoting § 90 of the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 382).
418. Id. at 415, 333 P.2d at 760.
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contractor's] reliance on its bid,"419 any sense of the boundaries between
consideration and reliance vanishes.
3. The Same Difference: Second Restatement Sections 45 and 87420
Second Restatement section 45 treats the unilateral contract, the prom-
ise for performance which so closely resembles the situation covered by
section 90.421 Section 45 provides that:
(1) Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a per-
formance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, an option con-
tract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the invited per-
formance or tenders a beginning of it.
(2) The offeror's duty of performance under any option contract so
created is conditional on completion or tender of the invited perform-
ance in accordance with the terms of the offer.422
As if underlining the close tie between section 90 and section 45, the
commentary suggests that "[t]he rule of this Section is designed to protect
the offeree in justifiable reliance on the offeror's promise, and the rule
yields to a manifestation of intention which makes reliance unjustified. 4 23
The section 45 option, however, is carefully distinguished from the situa-
tion in which only justifiable reliance warrants an imposition of liability
on the promisor. The latter situation is governed instead by section 87
which, like section 90, falls under the topic of "Contracts without Consid-
eration": "An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree
before acceptance and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice. '424
The question, therefore, is how to distinguish the performance or the
419. Id.
420. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, §§ 45, 87.
421. Section 45 has to be understood in relation to § 62. In the Second Restatement, unilateral
contracts are of two kinds: those in which the promisor provides the opportunity for response by
promise or performance, and those in which only performance will do. In the optional situation (§ 62)
a choice by the promisee to tender or begin performance operates as a promise to complete perform-
ance, at which point the contract becomes one of promise for promise. Section 45 deals with the
situation where the promisor demands performance only, and it operates to protect the promisee from
the possibility that the promisor might retract his promise prior to the complete performance which
can alone constitute acceptance.
422. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 45.
423. Id. § 45 comment b.
424. Id. § 87(2).
1092
Vol. 94: 997, 1985
Deconstructing Contract Doctrine
tender of performance that qualifies as consideration for section 45's op-
tion contract, from the action or forbearance that qualifies only as action
in reliance under section 87.
As the commentary elaborates, section 45 envisions a distinction be-
tween performance and preparations for performance: "Beginning prepa-
rations, though they may be essential to carrying out the contract or to
accepting the offer, is not enough. Preparations to perform may, however,
constitute justifiable reliance sufficient to make the offeror's promise bind-
ing under § 87(2)." ' 125
Why is this firm distinction drawn? A partial answer is that it is neces-
sary to maintain the divide between contracts with and without considera-
tion, or at least to reinforce that divide (precarious as the reinforcement
may be), given the concession that section 45(1) is essentially reliance-
based. This connection between consideration/no consideration and per-
formance/preparations-for-performance is borne out as the commentary
continues.
The commentary suggests several factors on which the distinction be-
tween preparing for performance and beginning performance may turn:
the extent to which the offeree's conduct is clearly referable to the
offer, the definite and substantial character of that conduct, and the
extent to which it is of actual or prospective benefit to the offeror
rather than the offeree, as well as the terms of the communications
between the parties, their prior course of dealing, and any relevant
usages of trade.428
Those factors common to both sections 45 and 87-the referability of the
conduct to the offer, and the definite and substantial character of the con-
duct-cannot be helpful in distinguishing the situations.2 7 We are then
left with two types of suggestion which, not surprisingly, turn out to de-
pend on the invocation of, respectively, objective value and subjective
intent.
The invocation of objective value takes the form of the suggestion that
conduct beneficial to the offeror will amount to performance or its
equivalent, producing an option contract, while conduct that is not benefi-
cial will at most provide a basis for reliance recovery, and constitute only
preparation for performance. 428 The invocation of subjective intent lies in
425. Id. § 45 comment f.
426. Id.
427. Presumably any action which the offer "does induce," in the language of § 87, is "referable
to" the offer. Section 87(2) explicitly requires that the action or forbearance induced by the offer must
be of a "substantial" character.
428. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 45 comment f.
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the suggestion that the answer can be found in "the terms of the commu-
nication," or in other sources of intent such as the course of dealing or
usages of trade.42 Thus, the tension between section 45 and 87(2) pre-
cisely replicates that between sections 71 and 90.
D. Summary
What does all of this go to show? Essentially that the area of contract
doctrine we identify as being about consideration and reliance is in funda-
mental conflict over the question whether consideration should be viewed
as a formal or a substantive requirement. Unlike the optimistic Fuller,430 I
do not believe it is enough to say that the doctrine serves each of these
admirable functions in appropriate situations; such optimism overlooks the
way consideration-as-form can be appropriately invoked to produce a re-
sult that consideration-as-substance could be counted on to prevent in pre-
cisely the same factual setting. And vice versa. Once it is appreciated that
consideration-based doctrines and reliance-based doctrines bear the same
relationship to one another as consideration-as-form bears to considera-
tion-as-substance, the area of doctrine afflicted with this particular variety
of indeterminacy becomes even larger.
I suggest that the play between form and substance comes about be-
cause of our inability to recognize form without reference to substance, or
to recognize substance without its embodiment in some form. But the re-
course to substance is itself bifurcated in this body of material; sometimes
the substance is that of subjective intent or desire, and sometimes that of
objective value. Our earlier exploration of the world of intent leads us to
understand this bifurcation as itself the expression of the difficulty we
have divining intent without recourse to manifestation, as well as the
threat to intention involved in measuring objective value without reference
to individual desire.
The conventional need to view consideration as principally a formal
requirement is a need of some urgency. It derives from the hope that,
taken as form, consideration doctrine will be seen as more private than
public, and that the state, in enforcing the doctrine, will not seem to be
intervening in private bargains by making substantive judgments about
what agreements are worthy of enforcement. Consideration doctrine, espe-
cially, shuns characterization as a mechanism for policing adequacy of
exchange. In the inevitable move from form to substance, it is therefore
429. Id. The reference here is not directly to subjective intent, but rather to objectified intent, or
intent as manifested. Nonetheless, essentially the same saving devices are in operation.
430. Fuller, supra note 31.
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tempting to substitute the quintessentially private substance of private in-
tent for the substance of objective value. But, as we have seen, the search
for subjective intent in its manifested forms partakes of precisely those
public aspects from which consideration doctrine hoped to extricate itself.
Thus, our concern with form and substance, and manifestation and intent,
are but particular expressions of our inability to resolve the tension be-
tween public and private, self and other.
IV. CONCLUSION:
DOCTRINE, THE COHABITATION CONTRACT, AND BEYOND
Doctrinal arguments cast in terms of public and private, manifestation
and intent, and form and substance, continue to exert a stranglehold on
our thinking about concrete contractual issues. By ordering the ways in
which we perceive disputes, these arguments blind us to some aspects of
what the disputes are actually about. By helping us categorize, they en-
courage us to simplify in a way that denies the complexity, and ambigu-
ity, of human relationships. By offering us the false hope of definitive
resolution, they allow us to escape the pain, and promise, of continual
reassessment and accommodation.
In this final section, I will illustrate the poverty of traditional doctrinal
arguments by examining the use of contract doctrine in recent cases in-
volving the agreements of non-marital cohabitants. These opinions deploy
many of the doctrinal maneuvers exposed in this Article. Distinctions be-
tween private and public realms, between contracts implied-in-fact and
contracts implied-in-law, play an important part in the decisions. Inter-
pretive questions and questions about the basis for enforcement-about
consideration-also loom large, reiterating the concern with private and
public, but couching that concern in the competing terms of subjective and
objective, form and substance.
Significantly, the opinions largely ignore the aspect of the public-private
debate that appears in contract doctrine as the set of rules governing du-
ress and unconscionability. The concerns of those doctrines-preventing
oppression of each party by the other, while preventing oppression of both
by the state-are nonetheless highly relevant. For at the heart of these
cases lies the problem of power. It is only because the exercise of power in
this context is not seen as fitting the traditional rubrics of duress and un-
conscionability that courts are able to ignore and avoid it.
Once the convoluted play of doctrine in this area has been exposed, we
can see that traditional doctrinal formulations are not the only means for
understanding how and why decisionmakers reach their decisions. At this
point, other inquiries become both possible and legitimate. In suggesting
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what some of those other inquiries might be, my conclusion points toward
possible ways of expanding our thinking about the issues of contract law.
A. The Cases
State courts have increasingly confronted cases involving various aspects
of the cohabitation relationship, and their decisions have attracted a fair
amount of scholarly attention.4 1 I focus on two such decisions: that of the
California Supreme Court in Marvin v. Marvin,432 and that of the Illi-
nois Supreme Court in Hewitt v. Hewitt.43 3
In Marvin,34 Justice Tobriner addressed the question of whether
plaintiff Michelle Triola, who had lived with the defendant, Lee Marvin,
for seven years, could recover support payments and half the property
acquired in Lee Marvin's name over the course of the relationship. The
court found that the plaintiff, in alleging an oral contract, had stated a
cause of action in express contract, and further found that additional equi-
table theories of recovery might be applicable. On remand,435 the trial
court found that there existed neither an express contract nor unjust en-
richment, but awarded the plaintiff equitable relief in the nature of reha-
bilitative alimony.438 The court of appeals then struck this award on the
theory that relief could be granted only on the basis of express contract or
quasi-contract.43 7
The alleged oral agreement provided that plaintiff and defendant
would, while they lived together, combine their efforts and earnings and
share equally any property accumulated. They agreed to present them-
selves publicly as husband and wife. Triola also undertook to serve as the
431. For illustrative cases, see Jones v. Daly, 122 Cal. App. 3d 500, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1981);
Donovan v. Scuderi, 51 Md. App. 217, 443 A.2d 121 (Ct. Spec. App. 1982); Kinnison v. Kinnison,
627 P.2d 594 (Wyo. 1981); see also Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspec-
tive, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1125, 1125 n.2 (1981) (collecting cases). For illustrative articles, see
Blumberg, supra; Crutchfield, Nonmarital Relationships and Their Impact on the Institution of
Marriage and the Traditional Family Structure, 19 J. FAM. L. 247 (1980-81); Deech, The Case
Against Legal Recognition of Cohabitation, 29 IN'L & CoMP. L.Q. 480 (1980); Fineman, Law and
Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wisc. L. REv. 275;
Case Comment, Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation: Marvin v. Marvin,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1708 (1977).
432. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). Marvin also generated a subse-
quent appeals court decision interesting in its own right. See Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d
871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981).
433. 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). The lower appeals court opinion in Hewitt, 62 Ill.
App. 3d 861, 380 N.E.2d 454 (1978) (reversing dismissal on grounds that public policy did not
disfavor grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants in non-
meretricious relationship), provides a perfect counterpoint to its supreme court successor.
434. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
435. Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981).
436. Id. at 873-74, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 557-58 (reciting facts found by trial court).
437. Id. at 875-77, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 558-59.
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defendant's companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook. A later al-
leged modification to the contract provided that Triola would give up her
own career in order to provide these services; in return, Marvin promised
to support Triola for the rest of her life. The relationship ended when
Marvin threw Triola out.
43 8
The plaintiff in Hewitt was in many respects a more sympathetic figure
than Michele Triola. When she and Mr. Hewitt were both college stu-
dents, she became pregnant. He then proposed that they live together as
man and wife, presenting themselves as such to their families and friends,
and that he thereafter share his life, future earnings, and property with
her. She borrowed money from her family to put him through profes-
sional school, worked with him to establish his practice, bore him three
children and raised them, and otherwise fulfilled the role of a traditional
wife. After over fifteen years he left her. She sought an equal division of
property acquired during the relationship and held either in joint tenancy
or in the defendant's name.439
The appeals court ruled that she could have an equitable share of the
property if she were able to prove her allegation of an express oral con-
tract, although it did not preclude the possibility of alternative equitable
theories of recovery in appropriate circumstances. 440 The Supreme Court
of Illinois reversed, basing its decision principally on considerations of
public policy.4 41
B. Express and Implied Agreement
The opinions in the cohabitation cases indicate that the distinction be-
tween the intention-based express contract and the public institution of
quasi-contract may be central to the question of whether to grant relief.
As I have earlier argued, however, techniques for interpreting the express
contract are indistinguishable from techniques used to determine the pres-
ence of a quasi-contractual relationship. If the interpretive techniques em-
ployed highlight factors external to the parties and their actual intentions,
even express contracts seem very public. If, in contrast, the techniques
used have as their stated goal the determination of the parties' intentions,
then quasi-contracts appear no less private or consensual than express
contracts. The cohabitation opinions employ both public-sounding and
private-sounding arguments to reach a variety of conclusions. In some
cases courts determine that the parties are bound by both real and quasi-
438. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
439. Hewitt, 77 IlI. 2d at 52-54, 394 N.E.2d at 1205.
440. Hewitt, 62 Il. App. 3d at 867, 380 N.E.2d at 459.
441. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 65-66, 394 N.E.2d at 1211 (effect of lower court's opinion would be to
reinstate common law marriage after legislature had expressly abolished it).
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contractual obligations, in others that they are bound by neither, in yet
others that they are bound by one but not the other. The arguments do
not determine these outcomes-they only legitimate them.
In these cases, as in the earlier-discussed Hertzog, there is a common
presumption that agreements between intimates are not contractual. 42
While this model of association was developed in husband-wife and par-
ent-child cases, non-marital cohabitants are assumed, for these purposes,
to have the same kind of relationship.443 As in Hertzog, express words are
taken to be words of commitment but not of contract;444 conduct that in
other circumstances would give rise to an implied-in-fact contract is in-
stead attributed to the relationship.445 These cases also reach a conclusion
only intimated in Hertzog: They find no unjust enrichment where one
party benefits the other.
One possible explanation for this presumption against finding contracts
is that it accords with the parties' intentions. It can be argued that cohabi-
tants generally neither want their agreements to have legal consequences,
nor desire to be obligated to one another when they have stopped
cohabitating.446 It can further be presented as a matter of fact that their
services are freely given and taken within the context of an intimate rela-
tionship. If this is so, then a subsequent claim of unjust enrichment is
simply unfounded.4 47
This intention-based explanation, however, coexists in the opin-
ions-indeed sometimes coexists within a single opinion-with two other,
more overtly public, explanations that rest on diametrically opposed pub-
lic policies. The first suggests that the arena of intimate relationships is
too private for court intervention through contract enforcement to be ap-
propriate. In Hewitt, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court suggests
that "the situation alleged here was not the kind of arm's length bargain
442. Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465 (1857), discussed supra text accompanying notes 38-60; see
also Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571, reprinted in KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 8, at 97.
443. See Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 668, 371 P.2d 329, 336, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 600 (1962).
444. See Hertzog, 29 Pa. at 470, discussed supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
445. Id. at 468-70, discussed supra text accompanying notes 52-53. Similarly, in Balfour, Lord
Justice Duke stated:
It was said that a promise and an implied undertaking between strangers, such as the promise
and implied undertaking alleged in this case would have founded an action on contract. That
may be so, but it is impossible to disregard in this case what was the basis of the whole
communications between the parties . . . .The basis of their communications was their rela-
tionship of husband and wife, a relationship which creates certain obligations, but not that
which is here put in suit.
Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 576 (Duke, L.J.).
446. Cf. Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943) ("Equitable consider-
ations arising from the reasonable expectation of the continuation of benefits attending the status of
marriage ... are not present in such a case.").
447. Id., 134 P.2d at 763.
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envisioned by traditional contract principles, but an intimate arrangement
of a fundamentally different kind."44
While it has some intuitive appeal, the argument that intimate relation-
ships are too private for court enforcement is at odds with the more gen-
eral argument that all contractual relationships are private and that con-
tract enforcement merely facilitates the private relationships described by
contract. 44' To overcome this apparent inconsistency, we must imagine a
scale of privateness on which business arrangements, while mostly private,
are still not as private as intimate arrangements. But then the rescue at-
tempt runs headlong into the other prevailing policy argument, which sep-
arates out intimate arrangements because of their peculiarly public and
regulated status. Under this view, it is the business relationship that by
and large remains more quintessentially private.
According to this second argument, the area of non-marital agreements
is too public for judicial intervention. The legislature is the appropriate
body to regulate such arrangements; courts may not help create private
alternatives to the public scheme. In Hewitt, the supreme court directly
follows its appeal to the intimate nature of the relationship with an ac-
knowledgement of the regulated, and hence public, character of marriage-
like relations."50 With respect to intimate relations conceived as public, the
judiciary can then present itself as either passive or active. The argument
for passivity is that judges should "stay out" of an arena already covered
by public law. The argument for activity is that judges should reinforce
public policy by deterring the formation of deviant relationships, either
because they fall outside the legislative schemes organizing familial enti-
tlement and property distribution,45 1 or because they offend public
morality.452
Neither the private nor the public arguments for the absence of contract
in this setting are conclusive. Both private and public counterarguments
are readily available. If the absence of contract is presented as flowing
from party intention, competing interpretations of intention can be used to
argue the presence of contract.4 53 If, within a more public framework, the
court categorizes the concerns implicated by the relationship as private,
then an argument can be made that within the boundaries expressly es-
tablished by legislation, the parties should be free to vary the terms of
their relationship without interference by the state. If the focus is the
448. Hewitt, 77 IM. 2d at 61, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
449. See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
450. Hewitt, 77 I11. 2d at 61, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
451. Id. at 56-58, 394 N.E.2d at 1207-08.
452. Id. at 58-59, 394 N.E.2d at 1208.
453. See infra notes 457-458 and accompanying text.
454. See, e.g., Hewitt, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 863-66, 380 N.E.2d at 456-59 (accepting reasoning of
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place of cohabitation agreements within the publicly-regulated sphere of
intimate relationships, then an argument can be made that certain kinds
of enforcement in fact extend and implement public policy rather than
derogate from it.455
The availability of this range of intention-based and policy-based argu-
ments makes possible virtually any decision. A court can find or not find a
"real" contract. It can decide that enforcement of a real contract is or is
not appropriate. It can decide that while real contracts should be enforced,
there is no basis for awarding quasi-contractual relief in the absence of an
expressed intention to be bound. It can decide that even in the absence of
real contract, the restitutionary claim of the plaintiff represents a compel-
ling basis for quasi-contractual relief. Further, the competing public and
private strands of argument-each of which connects to both enforceabil-
ity and non-enforceability arguments-can be used within the same opin-
ion or other legal text, without the inconsistencies being so apparent as to
undermine the credibility of the final result.
C. Manifestation and Intent
Some identifiable, particular patterns do emerge from this overall con-
fusion of public and private arguments. As with all agreements, for exam-
ple, every aspect of a cohabitation agreement raises interpretive questions
that will drive a court to search for the elusive correspondence between
subjective intent and manifested form. Even this most private exercise of
contractual interpretation thereby opens the doors to the imposition of
public values, norms, and understandings. Two interpretive issues in par-
ticular recur in the cases. The courts repeatedly consider how to evaluate
the relationships out of which the agreements arise. They also repeatedly
consider how to evaluate the role of sex in these relationships and in these
agreements. This section explores the very different ways in which the
opinions treat these issues, within the range of options made available by
current doctrine.
Courts frequently invoke the context of cohabitation relationships to
avoid enforcing agreements arising out of them. The argument here is
essentially that even if such agreements use language of promise, or com-
mitment, or reciprocal obligation, that language must be understood, in
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976)), reo'd 77 Il1. 2d 49,
394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
455. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 866 (1973)
(court's holding that property should be divided between unmarried couple would not necessarily
discourage marriages).
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the intimate context in which it is employed, as not involving any under-
standing that one party might use a court to enforce a duty forsaken, or a
promise broken."56
In theory, if the parties make perfectly clear their intention to be legally
bound by their agreement, then their intention governs.457 But this leaves
open the question of when a court will find objective manifestations of
such an intention to be bound. Will a written agreement be more suscepti-
ble to legal enforcement than an oral one? Will an agreement in which
the reciprocal obligations relate to a particular piece of property or to a
transaction that can be separated out, however artifically, from the affec-
tive context of the relationship convince a court that it has crossed the
boundary between intimate unenforceability and business-like enforceabil-
ity? These approaches all find some support in the cases, 58 although their
manipulability and their imperfect correspondence to questions of motiva-
tion and intention are obvious.
A second common theme employing notions of manifestation and intent
is the specific role of sex in the parties' arrangement. The boundaries of
this debate are set both by the tradition that precludes enforcement of
prostitution contracts for reasons of public policy,4"5 and by the acknowl-
edgement that even cohabiting parties may form valid contracts about in-
dependent matters.460 In the case of cohabitation agreements, the question
therefore becomes whether the sex contemplated by the parties contami-
nates the entire agreement to the point where it is seen to fall within the
model of the prostitution contract, or whether other features of the agree-
ment can be seen as independent and enforceable. 461
Judges' differing interpretations of virtually identical agreements seem
456. See supra notes 442-47 and accompanying text.
457. See Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. at 574 (Warrington, L.J.) ("It may be, and I do not for a
moment say that it is not, possible for such a contract as is alleged in the present case to be made
between husband and wife. The question is whether such a contract was made.").
458. For the suggestion that more weight has often been accorded a writing, see, for example,
Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 122, 577 P.2d 507, 510 (1978). For a discussion of evidence of agreement
about property distribution between unmarried cohabitants see, for example, Vallera v. Vallera, 21
Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943):
Even in the absence of an express agreement to that effect, the woman would be entitled to
share in the property jointly accumulated, in the proportion that her funds contributed toward
its acquisition. There is no evidence that the parties in the present case made any agreement
concerning their property or property rights.
(citation omitted.)
This was the court's conclusion despite at least a three-year period of cohabitation during which the
woman provided substantial services to the household. See id. at 686-87, 134 P.2d at 763-64 (Curtis,
J., dissenting in part) (when woman contributes her services in the home, her interest in property
accumulated should be protected).
459. See, e.g., Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825 (contract to pay
for sexual services would be unlawful).
460. See, e.g., Hewitt, 77 11. 2d at 59, 394 N.E.2d at 1208.
461. See, e.g., id. at 59-60, 394 N.E.2d at 1208-09.
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to depend quite openly on either their views of what policy should prevail
or their own moral sense. Rarely does a judge even appear to make a
thorough attempt to understand and enforce what the parties had in mind.
For Justice Underwood in Hewitt, for example, nothing but "naivete"
could explain the assertion that "there are involved in these relationships
contracts separate and independent from the sexual activity, and the as-
sumption that those contracts would have been entered into or would con-
tinue without that activity.
'462
Justice Tobriner in Marvin, on the other hand, rejects the idea that the
sexual relationship between parties to a cohabitation contract renders the
contract as a whole invalid. He explicitly uses the divide between objective
and subjective, form and substance, to carve out a much larger space for
enforceable agreements than that envisaged by Underwood.46 Tobriner's
test has two components: Contracts between non-marital partners are en-
forceable unless they explicitly rest "upon the immoral and illicit consider-
ation of meretricious sexual services." 464 Furthermore, such contracts are
unenforceable only "to the extent" that they rest on this meretricious
consideration.46 5
Tobriner is not so naive as to suppose that the Triola-Marvin agree-
ment did not contemplate a sexual relationship. But he feels that the
"subjective contemplation of the parties" is too "uncertain and unwork-
able" a standard."66 He relies instead on formal criteria of intent-on the
manifestations of agreement alleged by Triola-to determine if his two-
part test of enforceability has been met. For the purposes of this analysis
Tobriner describes the agreement as follows: "[T]he parties agreed to pool
their earnings, . . . they contracted to share equally in all property ac-
quired, and ...defendant agreed to support plaintiff.146 7 None of this
462. Id. at 60, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
463. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 672, 557 P.2d at 114-15, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 823-24.
464. Id. at 669, 557 P.2d at 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
465. Id., 557 P.2d at 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821 (emphasis in original). Severability as a device
for rescuing the cohabitation agreement has proved popular. See, e.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541,
544, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82-83 (1977) (Hill, J., dissenting); Donovan v. Scuderi, 51 Md. App. 217, 219,
443 A.2d 121, 123 (Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
466. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 672, 557 P.2d at 114, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
467. Id. at 674-75, 557.P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
Tobriner thus shifts his focus away from that involved in his two-part test. He moves from what
the parties intended to what consideration the cohabitants provided to support their agreement. He
says at one point: "By looking not to such uncertain tests, but only to the consideration underlying the
agreement, we provide the parties and the courts with a practical guide to determine when an agree-
ment between nonmarital partners should be enforced." Id. at 672, 557 P.2d at 114-15, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 823-24. And in concluding this analysis, he says again: "So long as the agreement does not
rest upon illicit meretricious consideration, the parties may order their economic affairs as they choose
. ... Id. at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
1102
Vol. 94: 997, 1985
Deconstructing Contract Doctrine
strikes Tobriner as necessitating a conclusion that sex invalidates the
agreement. 4e
Of course the formal criteria are themselves empty of significance until
given meaning by judicial analysis. The very same language construed by
Tobriner had been given very different effect in an earlier decision. In
Updeck v. Samuel, a California District Court of Appeal considered the
statement that the woman would make a permanent home for the man
and be his companion as indicating precisely the sexual character of the
relationship.," 9 Unwilling or unable to disapprove Updeck, Tobriner is
forced to distinguish this case in a fashion that directly undercuts the le-
gitimacy of his stated reliance on form or manifestation. He argues that
the Updeck agreement was found invalid because the Court "[v]iew[ed]
the contract as calling for adultery."4 " But the very act of "viewing" the
contract, or interpreting its terms, involves an explanation of substance.
The court in Updeck supplied sexual substance, while Tobriner supplies
economic substance. 47 1 Jones v. Daly,47 2 a case subsequent to Marvin, pro-
vides another striking illustration of the manipulability of form. In Jones,
which involved a homosexual partnership, a California Court of Appeal
denied relief on the ground that an agreement, in other respects almost
identical to the Marvin agreement, contained the word "lover."' 7'
468. Id., 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
469. Updeck v. Samuel, 123 Cal. App. 2d 264, 267, 266 P.2d 822, 824 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954)
(finding oral contract based on immoral consideration where both parties legally married to other
spouses).
470. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 671, 557 P.2d at 114, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 823. In Marvin, as in
Updeck, the defendant was legally married to another spouse during at least a portion of the term of
his contract with the plaintiff. Id. at 667, 557 P.2d at 111, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
471. The one case Tobriner feels compelled to disapprove rather than distinguish is that of Heaps
v. Toy, 54 Cal. App. 2d 178, 128 P.2d 813 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942). See Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 671 n.6,
557 P.2d at 114 n.6, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 823 n.6. In Heaps, the court found "contrary to good morals"
an agreement under which the woman was to leave her job, refrain from marriage, be a companion to
the man and make a permanent home for him, in return for economic support for herself and her
child. Tobriner seems to feel that even interpretation must have its limits, and that the Heaps court
overstepped its limits by reading immorality into this form of agreement.
472. 122 Cal. App. 3d 500, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981)
473. The court in Jones v. Daly stated, "These allegations clearly show that plaintiff's rendition
of sexual services to Daly was an inseparable part of the consideration for the 'cohabitors' agreement,'
and indeed was the predominant consideration." Id. at 508, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 133. In response to the
plaintiff's claim that neither the word "cohabitation," under California law, nor the word "lover,"
according to Webster's Dictionary, inevitably describes a sexual relationship, the court ruled that
"[v]iewed in the context of the complaint as a whole, the words . . . do not have the innocuous
meanings which plaintiff ascribes to them. These terms can pertain only to plaintiff's rendition of
sexual services to Daly." Id., 176 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
This determination is plainly dependent upon the provision of sexual substance to the form of the
agreement, although the court also relies upon arguments of form in finding that the sex cannot be
severed from the rest of the agreement: "Neither the property sharing nor the support provision of the
agreement rests upon plaintiff's acting as Daly's traveling companion, housekeeper or cook as distin-
guished from acting as his lover." Id. at 509, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Exactly the same could be said, of
course, about the agreement at issue in Marvin, although the Jones court is using the argument to
distinguish the case from Marvin.
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As the courts wrestle with these interpretive questions, we see them
apparently infusing a public element, external to the parties' own view of
their situation, into their assessment of cohabitation agreements. We also
can see how this is a necessary result of the tension between manifestation
and intent, of the way in which intent requires embodiment in manifested
forms, even while the forms require an infusion of substance before they
can yield meaning. Indeed, to accuse judges of moving from the private to
the public sphere is only to accuse them of the inevitable. If there is force
behind the accusation, it is not that they have made the transition from
private to public, but that they have made the transition un-self-
consciously, and that the particular values, norms, and understandings
they incorporate are different from the ones we would have favored, or
different from the ones we think would correspond with those of one or
both of the parties to the agreement.
D. Consideration: Its Substance
Consideration doctrine offers yet other opportunities for the conflation
of public and private, and the introduction of competing values, norms,
and understandings into the resolution of these cohabitation cases. Just as
in the area of interpretation, the crucial additions are judicial conceptions
of sexuality, and of woman's role in her relationship with man. Two as-
pects of consideration doctrine recur in the cases. Each illustrates the pro-
position that formal consideration doctrine cannot be implemented without
recourse to substance. Substance, here as elsewhere, can be provided by
assessments of objective value or by investigations into subjective intent. It
is with respect to these substantive inquiries that ideas about sexuality and
relationship come to play so potentially important a part.
The first use of consideration doctrine in this context shows up in the
disinclination of courts to enforce contracts based on "meretricious" con-
sideration.4" 4 Courts frequently search beyond the express language of the
In Donovan v. Scuderi, 51 Md. App. 217, 443 A.2d 121 (Ct. Spec. App. 1982), the trial court said
that the agreement in question was made for no "'reason other than the promotion of [the parties']
meretricious relationship,"' id. at 221, 443 A.2d at 124 (quoting trial court), while the court of
appeals found the agreement "only remotely related" to sex between the parties. Id. at 224, 443 A.2d
at 125. In Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977), the complaint alleged that the
appellant "'cooked for, cleaned for, and in general cared for the comforts, needs, and pleasures of the
[appellee]."' Id. at 541-42, 238 S.E.2d at 81 (emphasis in original). While the emphasis on pleasures
is in the original, it seems safe to assume that it is supplied by the opinion writer. As the dissent
points out:
This court has simply presumed that sex was agreed to. We will not guess at the terms of
contracts in other cases but here we knowingly imagine what the terms of this agreement were.
In my opinion we should not use conjecture to imagine what the parties agreed to do.
Id. at 544, 238 S.E.2d at 83 (Hill, J., dissenting).
474. See, e.g., Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 603, 213 P.2d 727, 730 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1950); Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. at 543, 238 S.E.2d at 82; Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Il. 2d at
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agreement in order to "find" that sex is at the heart of the
deal-specifically that the woman is providing sexual services in return
for the economic security promised by the man.47 Insofar as this investi-
gation depends on divining what the parties had in mind, consideration
turns on subjective intent. For these purposes, it matters not at all that
"intent" has been derived from the judge's own feelings about such rela-
tionships, even when the express language of the parties would appear to
point in an opposite direction.
The treatment of meretricious consideration also illustrates how consid-
eration may depend on a finding of objective value. When courts refuse to
enforce contracts based on the exchange of sexual services for money, they
are, for long-standing policy reasons, declining to recognize sexual services
as having the kind of value that they will honor. This decision, based on
an objective measure of value, is no different from the decision that "nom-
inal" consideration will not support a contract."" There, too, courts disre-
gard intention in the name of a policy that depends upon societal recogni-
tion of certain sorts of values and delegitimation of others.
The second aspect of consideration doctrine of interest in this context is
the traditional conclusion that the woman's domestic services cannot pro-
vide consideration for the promises made to her by the man. This is usu-
ally linked to the idea that the relationship itself is not one the parties see
as having a legal aspect. The standard explanation is that the woman did
not act in expectation of gain, but rather out of affection, or that she in-
tended her action as a gift.'77
Tobriner in the Marvin decision rejects this conclusion by recasting the
issue as one properly belonging in the selfish world of business."7 Unless
58-59, 394 N.E.2d at 1208; Donovan v. Scuderi, 51 Md. App. at 219, 443 A.2d at 123.
475. See supra notes 462-71 and accompanying text. The traditional assumptions about the na-
ture of the exchange are at once highlighted and challenged by this comment from the dissenting judge
in Rehak:
[W]here a man and woman have contracted with each other to cohabit together illegally, a
court will not require the woman to perform her promise nor will it require the man to pay
for her services. However, where a man hires a maid to clean house for him, his obligation to
pay wages is enforceable in court even though he seduces her.... I do not find evidence that
the female in this case agreed to make house payments in consideration of the male's promise
to seduce her or to cohabit with her illegally.
239 Ga. at 544, 238 S.E.2d at 83 (Hill, J., dissenting).
476. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 71 comment b; see also text accompanying
notes 309-314 (discussing Restatement's treatment of consideration).
477. See, e.g., Roznowski v. Bozyk, 73 Mich. App. 405, 408-09, 251 N.W.2d 606, 608 (1977) (in
"family relationship," absent "proof of the expectations of the parties, the presumption of gratuity
will overcome the usual contract implied by law to pay for what is accepted"); Cropsey v. Sweeney,
27 Barb. 310, 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 1858): "[Tlhese services were performed not as a servant, with a
view to pay, but from higher and holier motives .... "); Roberts v. Roberts, 64 Wyo. 433, 450, 196
P.2d 361, 367 (1948) ("'[T]he relationship as husband and wife negative[s] that of master and servant
.. "') (quoting Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 437, 49 P.2d 670, 681 (1935)).
478. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d. 660, 670 n.5, 557 P.2d 106, 113 n.5, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822
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homemaking services are considered lawful and adequate consideration for
a promise to pay wages, the entire domestic service industry will
founder.479 Just as plainly, such services can provide the consideration for
an agreement concerning property distribution.480 Tobriner thus appeals
to the substance of objective value: There is a market in which domestic
services receive a price; when intimates arrange that one will deliver those
same services to the other, that promise is therefore capable of supporting
a return promise.
Even as Tobriner uses ideas of objective value, however, his reasoning
reveals that the ultimate rationale for this aspect of consideration doctrine
depends upon arguments of subjective intent. Like the promise in the
Michigan case, 81 the services could constitute consideration if they were
offered with the intention of bargain or exchange. It is only the altruistic
context, revealing the beneficent intention, which invalidates them. 482
Thus, while one route of access into this issue threatens to expose the
public determination of what values the law will and will not recognize,
that route is apparently closed off by the reminder that it is private inten-
tion, not public power, that assigns value. But then the very public role
abjured in the context of objective value is played out instead through the
"finding" of intent according to criteria that are essentially and inevitably
public rather than private.
E. The Question of Power
Under duress and unconscionability doctrines, policing the "fair" ex-
change is tied irretrievably to asking whether each party entered into the
contract freely, whether each was able to bargain in equally unconstrained
ways, and whether the deal was a fair one.483 I suppose that any of us
n.5 (1976).
479. Id.
480. Id. at 679, 557 P.2d at 119, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 828 (citing Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d.
681, 686-87, 134 P.2d 761, 763-64 (1943) (Curtis, J., dissenting)).
481. Wisconsin & Mich. Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903). See discussion supra text
accompanying notes 287-297.
482. There is a subtheme in some of the cases, however, suggesting that in fact homemaking
services are of little objective value. In Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 596 (Wyo. 1981), where
the parties entered a settlement agreement based on the woman's provision of services in improving a
property and managing and maintaining a household, the court stated: "A contract made in settlement
of claims is valid even if the claims settled are of doubtful worth." (citations omitted).
Another suggestion, dependent on measures of objective value rather than subjective intent, is that
even if the woman's services are not disqualified from counting as consideration by the benificent
intention with which they are provided, they are "balanced out" by the companionship and services
provided by the man. This appears to be the reasoning of the trial court in the second Marvin deci-
sion, in determining that Lee Marvin was not unjustly enriched by his relationship with Michelle
Triola. Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 874, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557 (1981) (court of
appeals' statement of facts taken from findings of trial court).
483. In asking these questions, we examine the substance of the deal (according to inevitably
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would find these questions even harder to answer in the context of inti-
mate relationships than in other contexts-harder in that we would re-
quire a much more detailed account of the particulars before we could
hazard an opinion, and harder in that even this wealth of detail would be
likely to yield contradictory interpretations. Yet we acknowledge the im-
portance of these questions in the area of intimate relations; we do not
imagine either that most couples wind up with a fair exchange, or that
most couples have equal bargaining power vis-A-vis one another.484
The doctrinal treatment of cohabitation agreements, however, like the
treatment of contracts in general, usually pays little attention to questions
of power and fairness. Duress and unconscionability are the exceptions
that prove the rule. Those doctrines identify the only recognized deviations
from the supposedly standard case of equal contracting partners. Intimate
partners are conceived of as fitting the standard model. One consequence
of this conception is that courts can justify the failure to enforce cohabita-
tion arrangements as mere nonintervention, overlooking the fact that the
superior position in which nonaction tends to leave the male partner is at
least in part a product of the legal system.485 Another is that courts can
idealize the private world in which their "nonintervention" leaves the par-
ties, disregarding the ways in which that world is characterized by in-
equality and the exercise of private power. 486 Yet another is that courts
can talk blithely about the intentions of "the parties" in a fashion that
ignores the possibility that one party's intentions are being respected at
the expense of the other's.487
suspect measures of equivalence); the behavior of the parties (according to equally suspect standards of
good behavior); or the state of mind of the parties (asking questions that lead us back to other evidence
of those states of mind, like the outcome of the deal or the behavior of the parties).
484. Our talk about relationship in nonlegal contexts certainly deals at length and in depth with
these issues, as we ponder, for example, why relationships are formed and why they fall apart, or
what motivates particular decisions within intimate relationships.
485. See, e.g., Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law,
in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 11, at 117, & especially 118-24; cf. Hale, supra note 100, at
471-74 (legal system places one of contracting parties in superior position by imposing legal duty on
other party); see also supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
486. Taub & Schneider, supra note 485, at 122; cf Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 15 (1915)
(discussing employer-employee relationship); supra text accompanying notes 96-103 (discussing
Coppage).
487. For a thoughtful account that still posits a single contractual intention, shared by both par-
ties, see the California Supreme Court opinion in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 675 n.11, 557
P.2d 106, 117 n.11, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 826 n.11 (1976). Commenting on the second trial court's
award, on remand, of rehabilitative alimony, the second opinion of the appeals court challenges that
supposition: "[T]here is nothing in the trial court's findings to suggest that such an award is war-
ranted to protect the expectations of both parties." Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 876, 176
Cal. Rptr. 555, 558 (emphasis in original) (1981). See also Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 126 n.2, 577
P.2d 507, 512 n.2 (1978) (emphasis in original):
In fact, whatever else may be true of the intentions and expectations of unmarried couples (if
these are shared at all) the one thing that may often be inferred with some certainty is that
they have chosen not to be married and to place themselves within the legal consequences of
1107
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Not all of the cohabitation contract opinions ignore the issues of fair-
ness and power. They are more likely to receive explicit attention when a
judge frankly invokes "public policy" instead of relying exclusively on
contract doctrine. They appear, for example, when the Illinois appeals
court in Hewitt explains why enforcement of such agreements promotes
rather than undermines the institution of marriage.488 When a judge casts
his opinion in traditional doctrinal terms, using intention, for example, or
consideration, then any sensitivity he has to questions of power and fair-
ness must be translated-translated, for example, into a willingness to as-
sume that the parties did intend to enter a relationship of reciprocal obli-
gation or that the woman has provided services that require
compensation. 89 Frequently this involves construing the male partner's in-
tentions as if he were the concerned and equal partner the law assumes
him to be.4 90 Again, these devices parallel those used by courts across the
range of contract decisions. But only when judges move outside the frame-
work of traditional contract doctrine will they be in a position to grapple
with the full range of problems posed by these disputes.
There are several ways to begin a richer examination of the cohabita-
tion cases. First, we can learn from the truths underlying contract doctrine
while rejecting the idea that that doctrine alone can lead us to correct
answers. The dichotomies of public and private, manifestation and intent,
form and substance, do touch on troubling questions that are central to
our understanding of intimate relationships and the role of the state in
undermining or supporting them. The problem with doctrinal rhetoric is
twofold. First, it recasts our concerns in a way that distances us from our
that relationship.
488. The court stated:
The value of a stable marriage remains unchallenged and is not denigrated by this opinion.
It is not realistic to conclude that this determination will "discourage" marriage for the rule
for which defendant contends can only encourage a partner with obvious income-producing
ability to avoid marriage and to retain all earnings which he may acquire. One cannot ear-
nestly advocate such a policy.
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 62 Ill. App. 3d 861, 868-69, 380 N.E.2d 454, 460 (1978).
489. See, e.g., Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
490. Id. at 683, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830 (suggesting presumption "'that the parties
intended to deal fairly with each other"') (quoting Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 674, 371 P.2d
329, 339, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 603 (1962) (Peters, J., dissenting)). This is essentially the tactic chal-
lenged by the second opinion of the appeals court in Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 876-77, 176 Cal.
Rptr. at 559; see also Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 390-91, 403 A.2d 902, 909 (1979)
(Pashman, J., concurring) (supporting presumption of fair dealing); Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d
249, 255 (Minn. 1977):
The trial court found that the parties had lived together for over 21 years, had raised a son to
maturity, and had held themselves out to the public as husband and wife. The home and some
personal property were in joint tenancy. Thus, the trial court was justified in finding that on
all the facts of this particular case the parties intended that their modest accumulations were to
be divided on an equal basis . . ..
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lived experience of them. Second, the resolution of the cases that the ap-
plication of doctrine purports to secure offers us a false assurance that our
concerns can be met-that public can be reconciled with private, manifes-
tation with intent, form with substance.
Once we realize that doctrinal "resolutions" are achieved only by
sleight of hand, consideration of the identified dichotomies helps us to ex-
plore more fully the cohabitation agreement. What is the nature of this
relationship, or what range of cohabitation arrangements precludes us
from making general statements about the nature of the relationship? To
what extent do these relationships need protection from authority, and to
what extent do they require nurturing by authority? To what extent do
they reflect the shared expectations of their participants, and to what ex-
tent the imposition of terms by one party on another? How can we harbor
intimacy within institutions that offer the flexibility to accommodate indi-
vidual need, while at the same time providing a measure of predictability
and stability? What stake does the society have in limiting the forms of
association it will recognize? Given our dependence on our social and cul-
tural context, what freedom does any of us have to reimagine the terms of
human association?
Study of the play between public and private, objective and subjective,
shows us that these same dichotomies organize not only the strictly doctri-
nal territory of contract interpretation or consideration, but also the
broader "policy" issues that are folded into the cases. Questions of judicial
competence, for example, turn out to involve precisely the question of
whether a private sphere can be marked off from the public sphere.4 91
Similarly, whether enforcement of cohabitation agreements is a pro-
marriage or an anti-marriage position turns out to depend on questions of
intention and power.492 Even as this analysis illuminates the policy dimen-
sion of the cases, it refutes the claim that the addition of policy considera-
tions can cure doctrinal indeterminacy.
491. The Supreme Court of Illinois in the Hewitt case used the traditional argument that policy
in this area should be left to the legislature-that the judiciary should stay out of "public policy in the
domestic relations field." Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 61, 394 N.E.2d at 1209 (citations omitted). The appeals
court doubted the validity of the distinction between intervention and nonintervention, or "public"
enforcement of the agreement, and "private" nonenforcement:
[A]lthough the courts proclaim that they will have nothing to do with such matters, the procla-
mation in itself establishes, as to the parties involved, an effective and binding rule of law
which tends to operate purely by accident or perhaps by reason of the cunning, anticipatory
designs of just one of the parties.
Hewitt, 62 Il. App. 3d at 867, 380 N.E.2d at 459 (quoting West v. Knowles, 50 Wash. 2d 311, 316,
311 P.2d 689, 693 (1957)).
492. The appeals court in Hewitt thought that not enforcing agreements of this sort would en-
courage the income-producing party to avoid marriage, and favor the cunning. See supra notes 488,
491. The supreme court said: "We cannot confidently say that judicial recognition of property rights
between unmarried cohabitants will not make that alternative to marriage more attractive by allowing
the parties to engage in such relationships with greater security." Hewitt, 77 11. 2d at 61-62, 394
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If neither doctrine nor the addition of policy can determine how deci-
sionmakers choose outcomes in particular cases, the next question is
whether the opinions contain other material that illuminates the decision-
making process. The dimension of these cohabitation cases that cries out
for investigation is the images they contain of women, and of relationship.
And since images of women and of relationship are the central concern of
feminist theory, I have used that theory as the basis for my enquiry. This
does not, of course, foreclose the possibility that other enquiries, in this or
other settings, might prove equally possible and promising once doctrine is
opened up to make room for them.
I am not claiming that judges decide cohabitation cases on the basis of
deeply held notions about women and relationship in the sense that these
notions provide a determinate basis for decision. For this to be true, atti-
tudes toward women and relationship would have to be free from contra-
diction in a way that doctrine and policy are not. I believe instead that
these notions involve the same perceived divide between self and other that
characterizes doctrine, and are as internally contradictory as any doctrine
studied in this Article. My claim, therefore, is only that notions of women
and relationship are another source of influence, and are therefore as de-
serving of attention as any other dimension of the opinions. These notions
influence how judges frame rule-talk and policy-talk; in a world of inde-
terminacy they provide one more set of variables that may persuade a
judge to decide a case one way or another, albeit in ways we cannot pre-
dict with any certainty.
One introductory caveat is in order. To say that "the opinions" convey
images of woman and relationship is to miss the distinction between
images that appear to inhere in the doctrine as it has developed, and
images woven into the texture of opinions seemingly at the initiative of a
particular judge. I think this distinction is worth noting, even though in
practice it cannot always be made. It becomes clearest, perhaps, when a
judge struggles against images he sees embedded in the doctrine, and of-
fers new images that in turn provide him with new doctrinal choices."93
One powerful pair of contradictory images of woman paints the female
cohabitant as either an angel or a whore. As angel, she ministers to her
male partner out of noble emotions of love and self-sacrifice, with no
thought of personal gain.49 It would demean both her services and the
N.E.2d at 1209.
493. Justice Tobriner does this consistently in his opinion in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660,
557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
494. See, e.g., Cropsey v. Sweeney, 27 Barb. 310, 314-15 (N.Y. App. Div. 1858) ("[Hler long,
devoted, faithful love, and services, as a wife and mother, will not permit us to say that she is legally
entitled to receive pay for those services as a servant.") (emphasis in original); Roberts v. Roberts, 64
Wyo. 433, 450, 196 P.2d 361, 367 (1948) ("'[T]he relationship as husband and wife negatives[s] that
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spirit in which they were offered to imagine that she expected a return-it
would make her a servant.495 As whore, she lures the man into extrava-
gant promises with the bait of her sexuality-and is appropriately pun-
ished for her immorality when the court declines to hold her partner to
his agreement.496
Although the image of the whore is of a woman who at one level is
seeking to satiate her own lust, sex-in these cases--is traditionally
presented as something women give to men. This is consistent both with
the view of woman as angel, and with the different image of the whore as
someone who trades sex for money. In either event, woman is a provider,
not a partner in enjoyment.49" When a judge invokes this image, he sup-
ports the view that sex contaminates the entire agreement, and that the
desire for sex is the only reason for the male partner's promises of eco-
nomic support. If sex were viewed as a mutually satisfying element of the
arrangement, it could be readily separated out from the rest of the agree-
ment. In most cases, the woman's career sacrifices and childrearing and
homemaking responsibilities would then provide the consideration for the
economic support proffered by the man.
Marriage is often presented in the cases as the only way in which men
and women can express a continuing commitment to one another. 9" This
suggests that when men do not marry women, they intend to avoid all
of master and servant. . . . "') (citation to Stewart v. Waterman, 97 Vt. 408, 414, 123 A. 524, 526
(1924), in Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 437, 49 P.2d 670, 681 (1935)).
495. "The law would do injustice to the plaintiff herself, by implying a promise to pay for these
services; and respect for the plaintiff herself, as well as for the law, compels us to [deny her relief]."
Cropsey v. Sweeney, 27 Barb. at 315.
496. "From plaintiff's own lips and from her own petition, the court was informed that she and
the defendant lived together or cohabited together without the benefit of marriage and in this court's
judgment she 'committed iniquity' and the court concludes that her action 'arises out of an immoral
transaction."' Roach v. Buttons, 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2355 (Tenn. Oh. Ct. Feb. 29, 1980) (quot-
ing Q. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISDICTION §§ 397-404, at 737-61 (4th ed. 1918)).
That her partner has equally participated in immoral conduct but is rewarded by a decision not to
enforce the agreement is simply irrelevant. See, e.g., Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 596, 599
(Wyo. 1981) (Rooney, J., dissenting).
497. The point is not that courts ruminate openly about the nature of the sexual relationship
between the cohabitants whose agreements they oversee. As clarified in the following text, provision of
sex by the man to the woman is never suggested as the consideration for the provision of sex for the
woman to the man. The implication is, therefore, that women are not benefited by, or do not enjoy,
the sex-but provide it for ulterior motives such as economic support. For another example of judicial
reliance on traditional assumptions, see the dissenting opinion of Justice Hill in Rehak v. Mathis,
quoted supra note 475.
498. See, e.g., Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1948) (where woman
denied maintenance and share of property acquired in man's name during relationship, "[eiquitable
considerations arising from the reasonable expectation of the continuation of benefits attending the
status of marriage entered into in good faith are not present"); Roach v. Buttons, 6 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2355 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Feb. 29, 1980) ("[Mlarriage is a legal state or legal relationship between
two persons of the opposite sex and, as aforesaid, certain mutual benefits flow one to the other as a
result of the marriage contract .... If plaintiff had married defendant, these rights and benefits
would have been hers, but she entered into a relationship that is not sanctioned by Natural or Divine
Law.").
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responsibility for them.4 9 Women therefore bear the burden of protecting
themselves by declining the irregular relationship.500 At the same time, the
institution of marriage as an expression of caring is portrayed as so fragile
that only the most unwavering support by the state will guarantee its sur-
vival.50 1 This could mean that other expressions of caring would entirely
supplant marriage without vigilant enforcement of the socially endorsed
forms of relationship, although that would be inconsistent with the por-
trayal of marriage as the only expression of commitment. Alternatively, it
could mean that men and women would not choose to enter relationships
of caring without pressure from the state.
These nightmarish images have much in common with what other dis-
ciplines tell us men think about women and relationship. The conception
of women as either angels or whores is identified by Freud,50 2 and sup-
ported by feminist accounts.50 3 The evil power of female sexuality is a
recurrent subject of myth and history. 50 4 The contrast of men fearing rela-
tionship as entrapping, and women fearing isolation, is the subject of
Carol Gilligan's work in the psychology of moral development;5"5 others
499. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 222 Minn. 169, 171-72, 23 N.W.2d 582, 583-84 (1946) ("Where
the arrangement under which the parties lived together was a meretricious one, the court will grant
no relief, . . . [In such a situation, there is no implied obligation on the part of the man to compen-
sate the woman for household services rendered by her.") (citations omitted); see also supra note 487
(discussing judicial analysis of contractual intention in cohabitation arrangements).
500. This suggestion arises out of the notion that the relationship is one equally chosen and there-
fore equally avoidable. The Illinois Supreme Court in Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 58, 394 N.E.2d
at 1207, questions whether "legal rights closely resembling those arising from conventional marriages,
can be acquired by those who deliberately choose to enter into what have heretofore been commonly
referred to as illicit or meretricious relationships . . . ." See also Roach v. Buttons, 6 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) at 2355 ("[Slhe voluntarily and with her eyes open entered into an illicit relationship. .. .
Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 597 (Wyo. 1981) (Rooney, J., dissenting):
[Tihe plain fact exists that both parties have assumed a relationship that is recognizable in
law, morals and public policy only if the legal requirements for such relationship are met. For
either of them to ask the courts to disregard this fact but sanction an aspect flowing from such
relationship is impertinent.
501. For a court to enforce a cohabitation agreement would be "but another failure by the court
to maintain the standards and principles upon which our society and nation were founded and which
are essential to their successful continuance." Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d at 597 (Rooney, J.,
dissenting). Justice Underwood, for the Supreme Court of Illinois in Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 58, 394
N.E.2d at 1207-08, uses rhetorical questions to suggest a parade of horribles: "Will the fact [of
enforcement] . . . encourage formation of such relationships and weaken marriage as the foundation
of our family-based society? . . . And still more importantly: what of the children born of such rela-
tionships? . . . What of the sociological and psychological effects on them of that type of
environment?"
502. XI S. FREUD, A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men, in THE STANDARD EDI-
TION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 165 (J. Strachey trans. & ed.
1957); XI S. FREUD, On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love, in id. at 179.
503. See, e.g., A. DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING (1974).
504. Id., see especially 31-46, 118-50.
505. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 3, at 24-63 ("Images of Relationship").
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have explored the origins of that difference in the context of psychoana-
lytic theory. 506 Raising these images to the level of consciousness and in-
quiry therefore seems to me an important aspect of understanding this
particular set of cases. It is also a way of stepping beyond the confines of
current doctrine and beginning to think about other ways of handling the
reciprocal claims cohabitants may make of one another.50"
EPILOGUE
The stories told by contract doctrine are human stories of power and
knowledge. The telling of those stories-like the telling of any story-is,
in one sense, an impoverishing exercise: The infinitely rich potential that
we call reality is stripped of detail, of all but a few of its aspects. But it is
only through this restriction of content that any story has a meaning. In
uncovering the way doctrine orders, and thereby creates, represents, and
misrepresents reality, I have suggested and criticized the particular mean-
ing created by doctrinal stories, the particular limitations entailed in the
telling of those stories.
My critique is in turn a story, which itself creates order and meaning.
My story, too, is subject to the charge that it has reduced the richness of
contract law and the multiplicity of its concerns to *a few basic elements,
that it misrepresents as much as it reveals. And, in fact, I do not believe
that my story is the only one that can be told about contract doctrine. I
insist only that it is an important story to tell.
My story reveals the world of contract doctrine to be one in which a
comparatively few mediating devices are constantly deployed to displace
and defer the otherwise inevitable revelation that public cannot be sepa-
rated from private, or form from substance, or objective manifestation
from subjective intent. The pain of that revelation, and its value, lies in its
message that we can neither know nor control the boundary between self
and other. Thus, although my story has reduced contract law to these few
basic elements, they are elements that merit close scrutiny: They represent
our most fundamental concerns. And the type of analysis I suggest can
help us to understand and address those concerns.
By telling my story, I also hope to open the way for other stories-new
accounts of how the problems of power and knowledge concretely hamper
our ability to live with one another in society. My story both asks why
506. N. CHODOROW, supra note 22; D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22.
507. It may not be possible, ultimately, to "transcend" the kinds of categories our current ways of
thinking and imagining condemn us to use in order to make sense of our experience. But being self-
conscious about the particular set of categories inhering in particular doctrine may at least enable us
to expand our repertoire, and enlarge the number of concrete alternatives available to u§ in this
context, even while recognizing the limits of our culture.
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those problems are not currently addressed by doctrine and traditional
doctrinal analysis, and suggests how they might be. By presenting doctrine
as a human effort at world-making, my story focuses fresh attention on
those to whom we give the power to shape our world. My story requires
that we develop new understandings of our world-makers as we create
them, and are in turn created by them. This kind of inquiry, exemplified
for me by feminist theory, can help us see that the world portrayed by
traditional doctrinal analysis is already not the world we live in, and is
certainly not the only possible world for us to live in. And in coming to
that realization, we increase our chances of building our world anew.
1114
Vol. 94: 997, 1985

The Yale Law Journal
























































Business Manager: Pamela Standish Editorial Assistant: Rosemary B. Carey
Student Contributors to this Issue
Lynn A. Baker, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980
Pauline E. Calande, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response
to the Demise of Implied Federal Rights of Action
Stephen M. Cutler, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin
Claims Under Title VII
Rosemary Herbert, Women's Prisons: An Equal Protection Evaluation
Niki Kuckes, Reenacting the Equal Access to Justice Act: A Proposal
for Automatic Attorney's Fee Awards
Kathleen Leslie Roin, Due Process Limits on State Estate Taxation:
An Analogy to the State Corporate Income Tax
